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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
A comprehensive sets of bilateral sectoral agreements. Switzerland and 
the European Union concluded two sets of bilateral sectoral agreements 
between 1994 and 2004. The first set of agreements – known as Bilateral I – 
entered into force in June 2002. The second set of agreements – known as 
Bilateral II – was signed in 2004. As a result of these agreements, 
Switzerland is more closely integrated with the EU than any non-member 
state, with the exception of its EFTA partners Norway, Iceland and 
Liechtenstein. Previously limited mainly to economic affairs, EU-Swiss 
relations are increasingly moving into other areas such as the field of justice 
and home affairs.  
The bilateral agreements function well. The principal conclusion of 
this study is that overall, the bilateral sectoral agreements that entered into 
force in June 2002 – Bilateral I – function well. There have been no 
significant conflicts or disputes between the EU and Switzerland over the 
agreements and implementation has proceeded smoothly. This assessment 
was shared by virtually all of the officials interviewed as part of the study.  
Full implementation will occur only in the next decade. Most of the 
agreements of Bilaterals I and II include significant transition periods, and 
many agreements of Bilateral II have not yet entered into force. Full 
implementation of all 16 agreements in the two packages will only occur 
towards the middle of the next decade. It is therefore too early to fully 
assess the impact of Bilaterals I and II, and thus of the bilateral sectoral 
approach as a model of integration without membership. 
Minor problems encountered with Bilateral I. In spite of this, a 
number of (actual and potential) problems and deficiencies related to the 
functioning of the bilateral agreements have been identified. The most 
prominent general problems that have been encountered include 
disagreements on the precise delineation of the scope of specific 2 | VAHL & GROLIMUND 
 
agreements, the role of the European Court of Justice and ECJ case law, and 
the scope for Swiss derogations. None of these issues, however, has 
achieved sufficient prominence to trigger the formal dispute settlement 
mechanisms provided for by the bilateral agreements, with the exception of 
a case currently pending before the ECJ concerning the Zürich airport in 
connection with the air transport agreement.  
Divergent analyses of the main problems by Switzerland and the 
EU. EU and Swiss officials appear to have different interpretations of what 
constitute the most important challenges posed by the bilateral agreements. 
The principal Swiss concerns are related to a lack of transparency and 
information about the implementation of the agreements, and the limited 
access to ‘decision-shaping’ accorded by the agreements. On the EU side, 
the main concerns are the practical difficulties in managing the complex set 
of sectoral EU-Swiss agreements and scepticism towards Swiss attempts at 
‘cherry picking’ EU policies and norms.  
Swiss concerns less prominent in more comprehensive agreements. 
There are indications that some of the problems encountered in particular 
on the Swiss side are smaller in the more ambitious ‘partial integration’ 
agreements, such as air transport and Schengen, than in the more 
traditional cooperation agreements. If this turns out to be a trend, it would 
have interesting implications, as these partial integration agreements go 
further in terms of integration with the EU than most EU third-country 
agreements.  
Difference between the rhetoric and the reality of the Swiss-EU 
relationship. There seems to be a notable difference between the way the 
EU-Swiss relationship is portrayed in official Swiss statements and 
documents and the way the relationship functions in practice, according to 
Swiss and EU officials. In the former context, emphasis is placed on the 
‘static’ nature of many of the bilateral agreements, the autonomous 
implementation of the agreements in Switzerland and the fact that the 
agreements are based on the notion of ‘equivalence of laws’. But the reality 
faced by those in charge of managing the day-to-day relationship is that 
EU-Swiss relations follow the general pattern in the EU’s relations with 
small neighbouring countries: the EU is the policy-maker and the associate 
is the policy-taker. Access to the EU market and to EU programmes and 
agencies takes place on the EU’s terms.  
Differences and similarities between the Swiss model and the 
European Economic Area (EEA). While Switzerland has considerably INTEGRATION WITHOUT MEMBERSHIP | 3 
 
upgraded its relationship with the EU through Bilaterals I and II, it still falls 
far short of the relationship established between the EU and the EFTA 
states of the EEA. Switzerland’s access to the EU’s internal market is much 
more limited, perhaps most notably exemplified by the absence of an 
agreement on services. Although the EEA entails more extensive 
obligations towards the EU, the EEA states are also granted rights, for 
instance on ‘decision-shaping’, that are not accorded to Switzerland. In 
spite of the considerable conceptual and institutional differences between 
the EEA and the bilateral sectoral approach, the overall balance of rights 
and obligations appears quite similar. 
Not one, but several Swiss models. While it is possible to speak of 
the bilateral sectoral approach as the ‘Swiss model’, it is becoming less 
unique in the EU’s external relations, as other third countries, notably 
among the EU’s neighbours, are cooperating and integrating ever more 
closely with the EU, frequently through the conclusion of sectoral bilateral 
agreements. Furthermore, the EU-Swiss agreements differ considerably 
among themselves. Some agreements take the form of more traditional 
cooperation agreements, while others – such as the agreements on 
Schengen and air transport – allow for partial Swiss integration with the 
EU. The latter cases provide possible models for the EU’s fledgling 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), for instance by giving the 
European Court of Justice a greater role in the process of providing the 
ENP partners a ‘stake in the single market’ (the ‘Swiss air transport model’) 
or giving the neighbours a more inclusive role in the decision-shaping and -
making processes within the EU (the ‘Schengen association model’).  
A dynamic relationship. One of the supposed benefits of the bilateral 
sectoral approach was that it was a more ‘static’ model compared with the 
more ‘dynamic’ EEA, thus giving greater autonomy to Swiss authorities to 
determine the scope and depth of cooperation and integration. But this 
study shows that the relationship between Switzerland and the EU is 
highly dynamic. Indeed, no other country has seen such a significant 
upgrade in its relationship with the EU as has Switzerland. It seems clear 
that this dynamism will continue over the course of the next decade, as 
new agreements are concluded and existing agreements are adapted, 
updated and renewed.  
Impact of bilateral agreements and the unilateral Europeanisation 
of Switzerland. The bilateral sectoral agreements have had a considerable 
direct impact on Switzerland. Combined with the unilateral and pre-4 | VAHL & GROLIMUND 
 
emptive Europeanisation of Switzerland in response to the broader process 
of European integration and globalisation, these have led to important 
changes to the political and economic system in Switzerland. The main 
consequence has been to change the balance of power among the main 
actors in the complex Swiss political system. The power of the executive 
branch of the federal government has been strengthened. While the power 
of the Swiss people through direct democracy remains intact, the linkages 
(legal and political, explicit and implicit) between the agreements 
compound the consequences of each individual vote on a specific 
agreement being adopted or amended. Each vote thus becomes a 
referendum not just on a specific agreement, but on the bilateral sectoral 
approach and virtually the entire set of agreements between the EU and 
Switzerland.  
Broad satisfaction with the bilateral sectoral approach. In spite of 
these factors, there is broad support in Switzerland for the current state of 
the relationship following the conclusion of Bilaterals I and II. Neither the 
political elite, the major economic interest groups nor the general public are 
currently inclined to substitute the bilateral sectoral approach in favour of 
other theoretical alternatives, such as full EU membership or joining the 
European Economic Area. The EU is content with the overall state of the 
relationship and is unlikely to seek any fundamental changes to the 
bilateral sectoral approach with Switzerland. Officials on both sides agree 
that it is now time to focus on the implementation of the agreements in full 
and to allow them to function for some years before any debate on more 
fundamental alternatives can be considered anew.  
Potential stumbling blocks. The dynamism of EU-Swiss relations 
and the sectoral nature of the relationship combined with the peculiarities 
of the Swiss political system mean, however, that the long-term prospects 
of the bilateral sectoral approach between Switzerland and the EU are far 
from assured. There are likely to be numerous occasions in the coming 
years that could upset the smooth functioning of the bilateral agreements. 
Further referenda as well as additional negotiations of new agreements 
combined with the legal and political linkages between the various 
agreements create an element of uncertainty not just about the specific 
agreement in question, but about the continuation of the bilateral sectoral 
approach as such.  
 | 5 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
Switzerland appears as one of the great anomalies of European integration. 
Located at the heart of Western Europe and surrounded by European 
Union (EU) member states on all sides, it has chosen not to be a member of 
the EU. Fiercely proud of their sovereignty and independence, the Swiss 
people have on repeated occasions said ‘no’ to proposals for further 
integration. While a referendum on EU membership, the stated goal of the 
Swiss government since May 1992, has never taken place as such, the Swiss 
voters rejected participation in the European Economic Area (EEA) 
together with its partners in the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) 
in December 1992.  
But a closer look reveals that Switzerland is in fact closely integrated 
with the European Union. In economic terms, the EU is Switzerland’s 
number one trading partner, accounting for more than 60% of total Swiss 
exports and almost 80% of its imports. Switzerland is the third most 
important trading partner of the EU, with the volume of bilateral trade 
approaching €150 billion annually. There are similar patterns as concerns 
investments.1  
In fact, it can be claimed that few European countries have attained 
the level of integration with their EU neighbours as has Switzerland, even 
among the EU member states themselves. Some 20% of the residents of 
Switzerland are foreigners, the large majority of whom – more than 850,000 
people – are EU citizens, and hundreds of thousands people regularly 
commute across the Swiss-EU border. This is a higher share of non-EU 
citizens than found in any EU member state except Luxembourg. EU 
citizens are even more numerous in certain sectors of the economy, 
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constituting for instance more than a third of the teaching staff in Swiss 
universities.  
Furthermore, although Switzerland is not a member of the EU, it has 
an extensive set of bilateral agreements with the Union. Indeed, the EU has 
concluded more bilateral agreements with Switzerland than with any other 
third country. Following the ‘no’ vote to the EEA in late 1992, Switzerland 
has taken further steps to move closer to the EU. Between 1994 and 2004, 
the Swiss government negotiated two sets of bilateral sectoral agreements 
with the EU. The first set of seven such agreements – known as Bilateral I – 
were concluded in 1998 and entered into force in June 2002. A second set of 
nine agreements – known as Bilateral II – were signed in October 2004. 
Negotiations on further agreements are envisaged.  
Indeed, the acceleration of the European integration process from the 
mid-1980s, with the creation of the internal market, economic and 
monetary union, an ‘area of freedom, security and justice’, and common 
foreign, security and defence policies, has arguably had a greater impact on 
how Switzerland is governed than in many EU member states. These 
changes have taken place directly as a result of the bilateral agreements, as 
well as through changes to the Swiss political and constitutional system 
undertaken primarily to handle Switzerland’s relationship with the 
European Union.  
In spite of these developments, EU-Swiss relations have received 
relatively little attention in the field of European studies. A review of the 
major social science journals specialised in European integration and 
searches in research and internet databases reveal a limited number of 
studies on the subject. Part of the reason for this is perhaps linguistic. The 
lingua franca of European studies is English. Most of the research 
conducted on EU-Swiss relations is undertaken by Swiss scholars writing 
mainly in German or French.  
The lack of attention to EU-Swiss relations in the academic literature 
has a parallel in the European policy debate. There has been a growing 
interest in EU policy towards its neighbours in recent years. This is a 
reflection of the considerable developments in the EU’s relations with non-
members in the wider European area, notably with the creation of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) from 2002 onwards. Whereas this 
has been accompanied by a considerable interest in the EU’s relations with 
Switzerland’s partners in EFTA and the European Economic Area as 
possible models for EU neighbourhood policy, there has so far not been a INTEGRATION WITHOUT MEMBERSHIP | 7 
 
corresponding interest in EU-Swiss relations. More than a decade in 
gestation, Bilaterals I and II are now being implemented in the midst of a 
serious crisis in the EU, in part due to ‘enlargement fatigue’. Whether or 
not the ‘Swiss model’ can be made to function can provide important 
lessons for the EU and the search for a viable model of ‘integration without 
membership’. 
This study aims to analyse the functioning of the bilateral agreements 
between Switzerland and the EU, focusing on the agreements that entered 
into force in 2002 (Bilateral I). Particular attention is paid to the institutional 
arrangements and their ability to adapt the agreements to new legal and 
political developments in the EU, the impact of the agreements on the 
functioning of Swiss democracy and how the Swiss political system affects 
the implementation of the bilateral sectoral agreements. In the process of 
carrying out this study, the authors conducted more than 20 personal 
interviews with EU and Swiss officials and experts between July and 
October 2005. 
The study starts with a brief historical overview of EU-Swiss relations 
and the Swiss political system. Understanding the Swiss political system is 
essential to any analysis of relations between the EU and Switzerland. The 
second chapter therefore set out the constitutional framework of 
Switzerland. This is followed by an overview of the bilateral agreements 
concluded between Switzerland and the EU. The fourth chapter analyses 
the functioning of the bilateral sectoral agreements, focusing in particular 
on the implementation of Bilateral I. The fifth chapter compares EU-Swiss 
relations with the experiences of the EEA, the only arrangement for 
integration without membership that is more extensive than the Swiss 
model. The sixth and final chapter looks at the future of EU-Swiss relations, 
assesses possible measures to improve the functioning of the bilateral 
approach and, in light of the continuous development of the EU, suggests 
potential alternatives to the bilateral sectoral approach that currently 
characterises the relationship between Switzerland and the EU. 8 | 
 
 
2.  EU-Swiss relations and the Swiss 
political system 
2.1  The development of EU-Swiss relations 
The preservation of neutrality was the principal goal of Swiss foreign 
policy when the process of European integration was launched after World 
War II. Swiss policy towards European integration predates the 
establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in the 
early 1950s, which was the precursor of today’s EU. The official position of 
Switzerland can be traced back to 1947, when the Federal Council set out 
the principles for Swiss accession to the Organisation for European 
Economic Cooperation (OEEC, later the OECD).2 The OEEC, created in 
1948 to develop a joint European recovery programme and supervise the 
distribution of aid, emerged from the Marshall Plan, with Switzerland 
among its founding members.  
A corollary of this goal was a fundamental rejection of surrendering 
any sovereignty that could damage the credibility of the policy of 
neutrality. This position remained basically unchanged until the end of the 
Cold War. The comprehensive 1988 report by the Federal Council on Swiss 
relations with the European Community (EC) emphasised the role of 
neutrality as an obstacle to Swiss membership in the EC. A further 
corollary was that Swiss foreign policy would be aimed towards the 
preservation of autonomy in economic and trade policy. A distinction was 
made between technical or economic organisations, in which Switzerland 
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could participate, and political and military organisations, which were 
regarded as incompatible with the principle of neutrality.  
In line with these principles, the Swiss greeted the creation of the 
ECSC with a mixture of suspicion and support that has since guided the 
Swiss ‘pragmatic middle-of-the-road’ approach to European integration. 
Switzerland was deeply sceptical of positive political integration aimed at 
harmonisation and the development of common policies. It can be argued 
that as far as the European Economic Community (EEC) was concerned, 
the problem was thus initially not the substance of cooperation, but the 
ultimate political goals of European integration captured by the concept of 
an ‘ever closer union’. Thus, the government ruled out participation in the 
ECSC, and later the EEC, primarily because of the stated goal of setting up 
a political European entity, which was seen as incompatible with the 
independence of the Swiss people.  
On the other hand, the attempts to create a European free trade zone 
met with considerable interest and support in Switzerland, which was 
among the founding members of the European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA) in 1960. In accordance with the policy of favouring technical 
agreements and pragmatic solutions, a dialogue was soon established 
between Switzerland and the ECSC, leading to a first agreement in 1956 on 
transit of coal and steel through Switzerland and a consultation agreement 
between Switzerland and the ESCS High Authority (the precursor of the 
European Commission). Over the course of the next decades, these initial 
arrangements were followed by many bilateral sector-specific and mainly 
‘technical’ agreements (see Chapter 3). Among these, the agreement of 
1972, which mainly focused on trade in industrial goods, was until recently 
by far the most important agreement between Switzerland and the EU. 
Strongly supported by the Swiss peopl e  ( 7 2 . 5 %  v o t e d  i n  f a v o u r  i n  a  
referendum), the 1972 agreement represented a compromise between entry 
together with its EFTA partners Britain and Denmark and standing on the 
sidelines of the integration process underway in Europe. Virtually identical 
agreements between other EFTA members and the EEC were negotiated in 
parallel, the main purpose of which was to reverse trade diversions caused 
by the creation of the Common Market. However, in spite of the accession 
of two EFTA partners in 1973, the possibility of accession was not seriously 
contemplated in Switzerland. 
In 1984, the EC and EFTA launched the so-called ‘Luxembourg 
process’ aimed at deepening and broadening the 1972 agreements to also 10 | VAHL & GROLIMUND 
 
include services and non-tariff barriers, which were introduced into 
international trade agreements by the GATT Tokyo Round in the late 1970s. 
The launch of the plans for a Single European Market in 1985 added 
urgency to this process, as did the growing problems of the Swiss economy 
from the end of the 1980s. The process leading up to the European 
Economic Area (EEA) of today was initiated following the speech of then 
Commission President Jacques Delors to the European Parliament in 
January 1989, in which he called for the creation of a ‘common European 
economic space’ between the EC and EFTA, partly for the benefit of an 
expanded single market, but perhaps more importantly to avoid 
membership applications from the EFTA states.  
Although Switzerland favoured bilateral as opposed to multilateral 
cooperation with the EC and was initially lukewarm towards the EC-EFTA 
economic space, it participated in the EEA negotiations from the beginning. 
Indeed, taking Swiss peculiarities into account was an important element in 
the EEA negotiations.3 The Federal Council made clear that the successful 
conclusion of EEA negotiations depended upon Switzerland being 
guaranteed the continuation of direct democracy and federalism in 
Switzerland. The prospect of EEA participation required a considerable 
effort to adapt Swiss laws and regulations to those of the EU. This was 
undertaken under the law introduced in 1992 known as ‘Eurolex’, which 
requires all new Swiss legislation to be compatible with EC legislation.  
But as the EEA negotiations proceeded, the EEA was increasingly 
regarded as a stepping-stone towards full EC accession. Between 1989 and 
1992, five of the six EFTA states applied for full membership. Switzerland 
applied for EC membership on 20 May 1992, just a few weeks after the 
signing of the EEA agreement. It has been argued that dissatisfaction with 
the lack of an equal share in decision-making in the EEA led to the Swiss 
membership application, although broader geopolitical developments 
certainly played a role. The preservation of neutrality had been the 
principal argument against Swiss membership since the very beginning of 
European integration. The end of the Cold War and the subsequent 
accession of three neutral states to the EU in 1995 reduced this argument to 
the point of irrelevance. The 1999 Integration Report of the Swiss 
government concluded that “there is no doubt that EU membership is 
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legally compatible with the status of permanent neutrality”. It further 
argued that if the EU were to agree on a common defence and a new 
security structure, neutrality “might become meaningless”. 
In accordance with the Swiss Constitution, the EEA Treaty was 
submitted to a referendum on 6 December 1992. The EEA was rejected by 
the Swiss people in a close vote, with 49.7% voting in favour of the EEA 
and with a majority of the cantons voting against. It has been argued that 
this vote should be interpreted as a vote against full membership rather 
than the EEA as such, coming as it did only five months after the Swiss 
application for membership.4 The membership application was suspended 
indefinitely following the EEA referendum. Several popular initiatives to 
re-launch negotiations on membership were made in the years following 
the ‘no’ vote on the EEA, but all where eventually rejected or abandoned. 
The Council of States – the second chamber of the Swiss parliament – 
rejected one such initiative in June 1996, while a similar proposal was 
rejected by almost 74% of the voters in a referendum in June 1997. 
Opposition was even higher to the most recent popular initiative to ‘de-
freeze’ the Swiss membership application and resume accession 
negotiations, when 77% voted against the ‘Yes to Europe’ initiative on 4 
March 2001. All cantons voted against resuming membership negotiations 
in both referenda.  
Following the Swiss ‘no’ to the EEA, the Swiss government launched 
an economic revitalisation programme and in early February 1993 
presented its proposals for negotiations of bilateral sectoral agreements in 
15 areas.5 The Swiss government decided that sector-by-sector agreements, 
the approach previously pursued in EC-Swiss relations, was the best way 
forward in the short-term, while keeping the option open of full 
membership in the longer-term. The EU agreed internally on its counter-
proposals in November 1993 which called for negotiations to commence in 
                                                      
4 Church (2000, p. 12). 
5 Namely, 1) Technical barriers to trade; 2) Public procurement; 3) Research; 4) 
Road transport; 5) Animal and plant protection legislation; 6) Air traffic; 7) 
Intellectual property, including labels of origins and geographic designations; 8) 
Processed agricultural goods; 9) Statistics; 10) Audio-visual sector; 11) Education, 
training and youth; 12) Outward processing of textiles; 14) Country of origin; and 
15) Product liability. 12 | VAHL & GROLIMUND 
 
four areas – road transport, research, market access for agricultural 
products and the free movement of persons – only the first two of which 
were on the Swiss list. The EU Council also called for talks on agreements 
on technical barriers to trade and public procurement. The EU Council 
further insisted on ‘appropriate parallelism’ as guiding criteria for the 
conclusion of the set of agreements. All of the agreements were seen as part 
of one package by the EU, and as a consequence, it insisted that all 
agreements must be adopted, enter into force and eventually expire 
simultaneously. But according to the Swiss Integration Bureau, the EU was 
unwilling to agree to a Swiss proposal of creating legal ties between the 
Bilateral I agreements and previous EU-Swiss agreements such as the 1972 
agreement and the 1985 research agreement.  
Negotiations on Bilateral I were launched in December 1994. The 
package included seven proposed agreements: the six suggested by the EU 
Council in November 1993 as well as an agreement on air transport. The 
agreements on free movement of persons and land transport were the most 
difficult areas in the negotiations. In the latter case this concerned in 
particular transit through the Swiss Alps, which was complicated by the 
Swiss Alps initiative supported in a referendum in 1994, which held up 
negotiations on Bilateral I for a period. The negotiations on Bilateral I were 
concluded at the political level in December 1998 following four years of 
negotiations, and the agreements were subsequently signed in 
Luxembourg on 21 June 1999. Switzerland formally ratified the seven 
agreements in October 2000, following the 67.2 % vote (and a majority in all 
cantons except two) in favour in a referendum held on 21 May and the 
almost unanimous support from the two houses of parliament (183 for and 
11 against in the Federal Assembly and unanimous support in the Council 
of States). The EU ratification process was finalised in early 2002, allowing 
the seven agreements of Bilateral I to enter into force on 1 June 2002, nine 
and a half years after the Swiss people rejected the EEA agreement.  
The EU and Switzerland had launched negotiations on a set of new 
sectoral bilateral agreements, known as Bilateral II, even before the entry 
into force of Bilateral I. The EU was initially reluctant to enter into another 
round of negotiations before Bilateral I was concluded. But concerns about 
possible Swiss violations of EU customs rules related to the smuggling of 
cigarettes and the development of an EU savings tax directive, for which 
some member states demanded bilateral agreements with Switzerland and 
other countries with favourable savings tax regimes, changed the EU’s INTEGRATION WITHOUT MEMBERSHIP | 13 
 
willingness to consider a new round of negotiations. Negotiations were 
launched in four areas – customs fraud, processed agricultural products, 
environment and statistics – in June 2001, followed by the start of 
negotiations in an additional seven areas – savings tax, Schengen, Dublin, 
services, media, pensions, and education, training and youth – in 2002.  
The Bilateral II package thus consisted initially of 11 dossiers, seven 
of which were the so-called ‘leftovers’, areas in which Switzerland 
originally sought an agreement but which the EU did not agree to include 
in Bilateral I. In addition, Switzerland also sought an agreement on 
Schengen and Dublin, while the EU sought agreements in two areas – the 
fight against fraud and taxation of savings – not included in the original 
Swiss list. Switzerland further agreed in autumn 2003 to make a financial 
contribution to social and economic cohesion in the enlarged EU, modelled 
on the significantly increased contribution agreed between the EU and the 
other EFTA states. This contribution was according to some EU officials 
regarded as a necessary quid pro quo for Swiss association with the 
Schengen and Dublin agreements. Due to limited progress in the 
negotiations on the agreement on services, with a large number of 
outstanding issues, it was agreed in March 2003 to suspend negotiations, 
and that such an agreement would be completed at a later stage. 
The (by then) ten agreements of Bilateral II were initialled at the first-
ever EU-Swiss summit in May 2004, and were subsequently signed in 
October 2004. Most of the agreements in this package are as of early 2006 in 
the process of ratification. Three agreements – the agreement on processed 
agricultural products, the savings tax agreement and the agreement on 
pensions – have already entered into force. While none of the agreements 
of Bilateral II met the requirement for a compulsory referendum in 
Switzerland (see Chapter 2), seven of the eight agreements were submitted 
to an optional referendum in accordance with Art. 141 of the Swiss 
Constitution.6 However, the only successful request for an optional 
referendum concerned the Schengen and Dublin agreements, which were 
subsequently approved by the Swiss people in a referendum on 5 June 
2005, with 54.6% voting in favour. 
                                                      
6 The agreement on processed agricultural goods was the only agreement that did 
not meet the constitutional requirement for an optional referendum, as it is only an 
adaptation of a protocol of the 1972 free trade agreement (see Chapter 3).  14 | VAHL & GROLIMUND 
 
The EU enlargement in May 2004 had a direct impact on the EU-
Swiss bilateral agreements. On 6 May 2004, the Commission formally 
requested an extension of Bilateral I to the new EU members. Six of the 
seven agreements were automatically extended. On the seventh – the 
agreement on the free movement of persons – a separate protocol 
extending the agreement to the new member states was negotiated from 
July 2003. The resulting protocol was approved in an optional referendum 
on 25 September 2005, with the extension of the agreement on free 
movement of persons approved by 56% of the voters.  
After the referendum, the key issues in the Swiss European debate 
are concerned with the entry into force and subsequent full implementation 
of Bilaterals I and II, the possibility of concluding an overarching 
association agreement as well as further bilateral sectoral agreements, and 
finally the question whether the frozen application should be formally 
withdrawn, although no activation is expected during the current national 
parliamentary period (2003-07).  
2.2  The Swiss constitutional framework 
The bilateral sectoral approach and the implementation of the recently 
concluded agreements between Switzerland and the EU is highly 
influenced by Swiss structures of direct democracy, the principles of 
federalism and decentralisation as well as by Swiss administrative 
procedures. In order to understand national decision and legislation 
processes of relevance to the EU-Swiss bilateral agreements, this section 
highlights the main constitutional principles of the Swiss Confederation 
and the procedure for the conclusion of treaties.  
2.2.1  The democratic principle 
Switzerland is one of the oldest democracies in the world. Having been 
surrounded by monarchies and non-democratic entities for centuries, the 
democratic principle has become a factor of identification for the Swiss 
citizen and a constitutive element of the Swiss ‘idea’ and the Swiss 
Confederation. The identification factor has even been amplified in recent 
years in the debate on European integration and the possibility of Swiss 
accession to the European Union.  
The most unique feature of Swiss democracy is that the people not 
only elect their representatives in parliament, but also decide on INTEGRATION WITHOUT MEMBERSHIP | 15 
 
substantive matters through direct democracy. Although the democratic 
principle is of the utmost importance to the governance of Switzerland, it is 
not explicitly mentioned in the Swiss Constitution. It is, however, indirectly 
embodied in diverse provisions of the Constitution. 
Art. 148 (1) of the Swiss Constitution emphasises that, subject to the 
rights of the people and the cantons, the federal assembly is the highest 
authority of the confederation. The election of the representatives in the 
two chambers of the parliament reflects the representative democracy as it 
exists in many different democratic nations.  
The importance of the democratic principle is also shown by 
minimum requirements for the democratic organisation of the cantons. 
According to Art. 51 (1) of the Constitution, each canton has to adopt a 
democratic constitution on its own, which shall be approved by the 
confederation to assure its conformity with federal law (Art. 51 (2)). The 
Swiss Constitution on the other hand has to be approved by the people and 
can be revised by popular initiative.  
Another significant outflow of the strongly highlighted principle of 
democracy is provided in Art. 190 of the Constitution: The federal court is 
not competent to declare on the compatibility of federal statutes and the 
Constitution, because the people’s democratic legitimacy is considered 
higher than the court’s legitimacy. 
The Swiss Constitution provides for two mechanisms of direct 
democracy at the federal level: the Popular Initiative (Art. 138) and the 
Referendum (Arts 140 and 141). The Popular Initiative entails the right of 
citizens to propose a total or partial revision of the Swiss Constitution. The 
Referendum on the other hand entitles the people to vote on parliamentary 
decisions after the event. The referendum is similar to a veto of the people 
and is therefore both a safeguard and a delaying element in the political 
processes in Switzerland.  
The Swiss democratic structures have been frequently discussed 
within the country in recent years, in particular whether the instruments of 
direct democracy allow Switzerland to be governed effectively and adapt to 
the fast-moving processes of European integration and globalisation.  
2.2.2  The federal principle 
Switzerland is a federal state. The cantons and their citizens constitute the 
fundamental elements of the Swiss Confederation. According to Art. 1 of 16 | VAHL & GROLIMUND 
 
the Constitution, “The Swiss people and the Cantons of Zürich, Berne, 
Lucerne, […] form the Swiss Confederation”.7 But Swiss federalism differs 
from other federations. Unlike the federalism of the United States, Swiss 
federalism is not just an instrument to ensure the separation of powers, but 
is based on a constitutionally guaranteed balance between shared rule and 
self-rule: the powers are split up between the entities and the confederation 
(self-rule) and at the same time, the entities participate in the decision-
making of the confederation (shared-rule). The speciality of Swiss 
federalism is that the federal level can only act in the area of expressly 
enumerated powers. The Constitution therefore transfers certain powers to 
the federal level while residuary powers lie with the cantons.8 
Just like the democratic principle, the federal principle as such is not 
explicitly mentioned in the Swiss Constitution. There are however a 
number of constitutional provisions embodying the federal principle, 
including provisions on the division of powers between the cantons and 
the federal state, the participation of the cantons in constitutional revisions 
and the bicameral system of the federal parliament. 
The Swiss Confederation is organised in three different governmental 
levels: the federal, the cantonal and the municipal. The subordinate entities, 
both the cantonal and the municipal, are autonomous in certain areas. As 
far as is possible, these entities are in the position to make their own 
decisions, taking into account their regional or local specificities.  
The Constitution assigns most powers to the federal level and is, 
unlike the cantonal power, the highest authority of the three entities.9 The 
autonomy of the cantons is therefore limited in the sense that they on the 
one hand have their own territory and citizen just like the classic ‘state’, but 
that their powers on the other hand are limited by the Swiss Constitution. 
According to Art. 3 of the Constitution they are “[…] sovereign insofar as 
their sovereignty is not limited by the Federal Constitution, they shall 
exercise all rights not transferred to the Confederation”. Each canton has its 
                                                      
7 While the ‘Confederation’ (der Bundesstaat) is the term for the Swiss federal state, 
the term ‘federal’ is used for the highest of the three governmental levels or entities 
(der Bund).  
8 Arts 3 and 42 of the Constitution. 
9 Also called the ‘sovereignty’ of the federation. INTEGRATION WITHOUT MEMBERSHIP | 17 
 
own institutions as well as cantonal authorities, organised freely within the 
framework of competences. The cantons of Switzerland are entitled to 
conclude treaties among themselves in the domains where they have 
remained sovereign, as long as such treaties do not harm the interests of the 
federation or other cantons (Art. 48). They are – again within the scope of 
their powers – even entitled to conclude treaties with foreign states (Art. 
56).  
The Swiss political system does not have an institutionalised 
representation of the cantons. The 46 members10 of the Council of States 
(Ständerat) constitute the second chamber of the Swiss Parliament and 
politically represent the interests of the cantons of Switzerland in the 
Parliament. On the other hand, the governments of the cantons, involved in 
the different implementation aspects of treaties, are not represented in the 
Council of States.  
The autonomy of the third entity – the municipalities – is guaranteed 
within the limits fixed by cantonal law (Art. 50). By virtue of cantonal law 
the municipalities are corporate bodies of public law entitled to fulfil local 
public tasks with significant autonomy. 
In light of the deepening of EU-Swiss relations with Bilaterals I and II 
and the broader process of globalisation, the self-rule and the shared-rule 
of the cantons have become a topic of political debate in Switzerland. 
Although the principle itself has never been questioned as such, federalism 
is one of the discussed topics in the confederation. Previous versions of the 
Swiss Constitution provided a more extensive autonomy to the cantons. 
The self-rule principle of the cantons was curtailed as a result of 
internationalisation and the increasing extension of federal powers and the 
connected changes in legislative procedures. Due to the political 
interdependence of the confederation and the cantons, there has hardly 
remained one item where the cantons are fully autonomous. In many 
policy fields today, there is a rather complex meshing of cantonal and 
federal law.  
                                                      
10 The cantons of Obwalden and Nidwalden, Basel-City and Basel-Country, 
Appenzell outer Rhodes and Appenzell Inner Rhodes select one representative 
each, while the other cantons (ranging in size from Zürich with over 1 million 
inhabitants to Uri with roughly 36,000 inhabitants) select two senators.  18 | VAHL & GROLIMUND 
 
The implications for the cantons of the bilateral agreements with the 
EU are not limited to the specific policy dossiers in which they have 
extensive powers that are covered in the agreements. One of the main tasks 
of the cantons is the implementation of federal legislation and objectives 
(Art. 46), and many, if not most, of the sectors of the bilateral agreements 
have an impact on these implementation tasks of the cantons. This cantonal 
challenge reveals and clarifies their interest in timely and extensive 
consultations with the federal government. In the course of negotiating and 
implementing the bilateral agreements, it was therefore very important to 
establish a formal procedure to accommodate the interests of the cantons. 
Those consultation rights of the cantons in legislation procedures have now 
been improved and introduced in the revised Constitution of 1999 (see 
Chapter 4.2.4.).  
2.2.3  The neutrality principle 
Switzerland had an old tradition of conducting warfare and providing 
mercenary services on behalf of other countries. But when the Thirty Year’s 
War (1618-1648) threatened the political unity of Catholic and Protestant 
cantons, a policy of neutrality was adopted for the first time. Following the 
Napoleonic Wars, the neutrality of Switzerland was recognised in the 
Treaty of Paris of 1815, and has been reaffirmed several times since then.  
The implications of Swiss neutrality in operational policy terms have 
been adjusted regularly over the course of time. Switzerland abides by a 
concept of active neutrality through which perpetual, armed neutrality 
shall be preserved. Switzerland will not initiate a war or take part in any 
military aggression. Furthermore, Switzerland remains neutral in all wars, 
independent of the parties involved and does not support any of the parties 
in the conflict. At the same time, Switzerland’s active foreign policy is 
based on solidarity and participation. The goals of this concept are 
enumerated in the Constitution: according to Art. 54 (3) the “Confederation 
shall contribute to […] promote respect for human rights, democracy, the 
peaceful coexistence of nations […]”.  
Whereas Switzerland was a founding member of the League of 
Nations after World War 1, Switzerland did not become a member of the 
United Nations until 18 July 2002, even though the UN has numerous 
agencies located in Geneva, and despite the fact that neutrality was not an 
obstacle for UN membership of other neutral states such as Austria, 
Sweden, Finland and Ireland a long time ago. The accession of Switzerland INTEGRATION WITHOUT MEMBERSHIP | 19 
 
to the United Nations (UN) and the debate that followed the accession 
procedure have shown that Swiss neutrality is not affected by its accession 
to the UN. This was also declared by the Federal Council in 2000, requiring 
that the Federal Council’s application for accession should point out the 
neutrality of Switzerland and that this should be repeated on the occasion 
of the first General Assembly of the UN.11 With its accession to the UN, 
Switzerland entered an organisation of collective security under conditions 
that do not compromise its neutrality policy. Switzerland will for example 
contribute financially to peacekeeping operations by the UN, but it is not 
obliged to commit troops for this purpose.  
Nevertheless, Switzerland’s long tradition of self-rule, autonomy and 
independence in foreign policy has a psychological impact on the general 
attitude of the population towards European integration processes.  
2.3  The conclusion of international treaties 
2.3.1  Constitutional basis 
According to Art. 54 of the Swiss Constitution, the conclusion of treaties is 
principally a federal matter, even if the subject matter falls within the scope 
of cantonal powers (such as police or education).12 The cantons participate 
in the preparation of foreign policy decisions which concern their powers 
or their essential interests (Art. 55 (1)). Although foreign relations are a 
federal matter, the cantons have an additional competence for the 
conclusion of treaties with foreign countries, but only within the scope of 
their powers. Those cantonal treaties may of course not be contrary to the 
law or to the interests of the federation (Art. 56). The federal assembly does 
not participate in the negotiation of international agreements, but must 
according to Art. 166 (1) be consulted.  
2.3.2  Procedures for the conclusion of international treaties 
According to the Constitution, the Federal Council conducts foreign 
relations, including the negotiation of international agreements. It 
                                                      
11 “Botschaft” of the Federal Council on the popular initiative on the accession of 
Switzerland to the United Nations, 4 December 2000, p. 1212 ff. 
12 Müller (2001).  20 | VAHL & GROLIMUND 
 
nominates and instructs the Swiss delegation and grants authorisation to 
the members of the delegation to sign the negotiated treaty.13 
An international agreement negotiated by the executive needs the 
approval of the Federal Assembly. The assembly is only in a position to 
accept or to reject the treaty, and cannot submit any modification proposals 
(Arts 166 (2) and 184 (2)). Although the approval of the Parliament is the 
general rule, the Constitution provides some significant exceptions based 
on statute or international law, empowering the Federal Council to 
conclude treaties independently (Art. 166 (2)).14 Those exceptions were 
introduced in the Federal Statute on the Organisation of the Government 
and Administration (RVOG).15 According to its Art. 7, the Federal Council 
is empowered to conclude treaties without the approval of the assembly if:  
•  the treaty does not impose new duties on Switzerland or does not 
entail the waiving of such duties (Art. 7, a RVOG);  
•  the agreement is only of an executive nature (treaty on the execution 
of an existing agreement) (Art. 7, b RVOG);  
•  the subject of the treaty is in the exclusive power of the Federal 
Council (Art. 7, c RVOG); and 
•  the treaty regulates administrative and technical matters of limited 
importance (so-called ‘bagatelle treaties’). These kinds of treaties 
primarily affect the public administration, do not require any statute 
law adaptations, do not affect the interest of the individual and do 
not generate significant expenses. Furthermore the treaty shall be 
susceptible to termination on short notice16 (Art. 7, d RVOG).  
The democratic rights of the Mandatory Treaty Referendum (Art. 140 (2) 
b) and the Optional Treaty Referendum (Art. 141 (1) d) have a direct bearing 
on the procedure for the conclusion of international treaties. Such treaties 
are subject to a Mandatory Treaty Referendum if they entail entry into 1) 
                                                      
13 Häfelin & Haller (2001). The Federal Council represents Switzerland abroad with 
respect to the participatory rights of the Federal Parliament (Art. 184 of the 
Constitution). 
14 Müller (2001, §70, N 38). See also Chapter 2.6 of the present work.  
15 Regierungs- und Verwaltungsorganisationsgesetz vom 21. März 1997, RVOG, SR 
172.010.  
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organisations for collective security, such as the Swiss accession to the UN 
in 2002, or 2) supranational communities such as the EU. In either of these 
two circumstances, the accession treaty shall be submitted to the vote of the 
people  and the cantons.17 In other words, the entry into such 
organisations/supranational communities needs two separate majorities; 
the majority of the people and the majority of the cantons.18There have been 
many examples in the history of Switzerland where the majority of the 
cantons seemed to be the problematic and final factor for a vote.  
International treaties are subject to Optional Treaty Referenda if they 
are 1) of unlimited duration and may not be terminated, 2) provide for the 
entry into an international organisation and 3) involve a multilateral 
unification of law, such as the bilateral agreements between the Swiss 
Confederation and the European Union or the European Convention on 
Human Rights. These referenda are ‘optional’ in the sense that 50,000 Swiss 
citizens or eight cantons are entitled to request a referendum in order to 
submit a treaty of this category to the vote of the people.19 The vote on an 
Optional Treaty Referendum does not need the majority of the cantons, 
unlike the Mandatory Treaty Referendum. 
After the approval by the Federal Assembly and a possible positive 
referendum, ratification falls within the power of the Federal Council (Art. 
184 (2)). Unlike other states such as the UK or the Nordic countries, which 
have adopted a so-called ‘dualistic system’, Switzerland has adopted the 
monistic system in connection with treaties: Further transformation into 
national law is therefore not required. An international treaty concluded by 
Switzerland does not gain binding force for individuals until its publication 
in the Official Register of Federal Law (Amtliche Sammlung des 
Bundesrechts-AS).20 
 
                                                      
17 Although the EEA entails supranational elements but does not provide any 
‘supranational community’ in terms of Art. 140 (2) b of the Constitution, the decree 
on the EEA of 9 October 1992, was treated like a constitutional revision and was 
therefore submitted to the vote of the people and the cantons; See BBl 1992 IV 538.  
18 As it has to be a majority, the positive vote needs the majority of 12 cantons. 
According to Art. 142 (4) of the constitution the ‘half-cantons’ are counted half.  
19 Müller (2001, N 44 ff). 
20 Arts 2 and 10 of the Federal Publication Act, SR 170.512; see also Häfelin & 
Haller (2001, N 1914 ff). 22 | 
 
 
3.  The bilateral agreements between 
the EU and Switzerland 
No other third country has entered into as many agreements with the EU as 
has Switzerland. Indeed, it is difficult to determine the precise number of 
bilateral agreements, as they vary according to the sources and their 
definition of what should be understood as an ‘agreement’. Some experts 
claim that more than 100 agreements have been concluded over the last 30 
years.21 This very high number is achieved by counting the numerous 
amendments and updates to the various agreements as separate 
agreements, and the actual number of agreements is substantially lower. 
This chapter sets out the scope of the agreements concluded between 
Switzerland and the EU since the creation of the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC), the precursor to the EU some fifty years ago, focusing 
on Bilaterals I and II.  
3.1  Earlier agreements 
Contractual relations between Switzerland and the European Communities 
were first established in the late 1950s, with a consultation agreement 
between the Swiss federal government and the High Authority of the 
ECSC, and an agreement on transit of coal and steel by railway through 
Switzerland. In the subsequent four decades, a series of (mainly limited 
and sectoral) agreements were concluded between the two sides. The 25 
agreements reached between the EU and Switzerland since the creation of 
the ECSC and that are not part of Bilaterals I and II are listed in Box 1. 
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Box 1. Agreements between Switzerland and the EU, 1956-2004 
Trade and industry agreements 
1967  Tariffs on certain cheeses 
1972  Agreement between the EC and Switzerland (the ‘free trade agreement’)* 
1974  Clock and watch industry 
1985  Trade in soups, sauces and condiments 
1986  Trade in non-agricultural and processed agricultural goods 
1989  Trade in electronic data interchange systems 
1990  Simplification of inspections and formalities in respect to the carriage of 
goods 
1995  Trade in certain agricultural and fishery products 
2001  Tariff preferences under the General System of Preferences (GSP) 
Transport agreements  
1956  Railway tariffs for the carriage of coal and steel through Swiss territory 
1992  Carriage of goods by road and rail 
Research agreements 
1978  Thermonuclear fusion and plasma physics 
1985  Scientific and technical cooperation 
1988  R&D in the field of wood, including cork, as a renewable raw material  
1988  R&D in the field of advanced materials (Euram) 
1991  European Stimulation Plan for the Economic Sciences (SPES) 
1991  EEC R&D programme in the field of applied metrology and chemical analysis 
Other bilateral agreements 
1957  Consultation agreement between Switzerland and the ECSC High Authority 
1984  Prevention of fraud 
1988 Terminology   
1991  Direct insurance other than life insurance 
2004 Europol 
Multilateral agreements: EEC/EFTA conventions 
1987  On the simplification of formalities on trade in goods 
1987  On a common transit procedure 
1990  Procedure for the exchange of information in the field of technical regulations 
_______________________ 
* The 1972 agreement (formally consisting of two agreements, one with the European 
Community and one with the ECSC) is frequently referred to as the ‘free trade 
agreement’, despite the fact that there is no reference to free trade in the title. Hereafter, it 
is referred to as the 1972 agreement. 
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Most of these are bilateral agreements between Switzerland and the 
EU, but the list also includes multilateral agreements of particular 
relevance to EU-Swiss relations concluded between the EEC and its 
member states on the one hand, and the EFTA member states on the other. 
Most of these are traditional international cooperation agreements in 
areas such as trade and research, and the scope of each agreement is 
limited, with agreements on single products and narrowly defined sectors, 
for instance the agreements on trade in cheese, the clock and watch 
industry, cooperation on fusion research and fraud. Several of these 
agreements have been changed since then. The 1972 agreement has for 
instance been amended more than a dozen times since it was first 
concluded, in certain cases through the adoption of additional protocols 
that arguably had greater implications for the bilateral relationship than 
many of the other, more limited agreements. Some of these agreements 
were superseded by Bilaterals I and II, for instance agreements in the fields 
of research, transport and trade.  
Until the conclusion of Bilateral I, the 1972 agreement was the 
principal bilateral agreement between Switzerland and the European 
Community. Negotiated in parallel with similar agreements between the 
EC the other EFTA states, the 1972 agreement provides for free trade in 
industrial products. The EU and Switzerland have also negotiated other 
agreements in parallel with the bilateral packages, most notably the 
cooperation agreement with the European Police Office (Europol) signed in 
September 2004.  
3.2   Bilateral I 
The first set of bilateral agreements negotiated between 1994 and 1998 
consists of seven agreements.  
Box 2. Bilateral I sectoral agreements 
1.  Research  
2.  Technical barriers to trade 
3.  Free movement of persons  
4.  Air transport  
5.  Land transport  
6.  Agriculture  
7.  Public procurement INTEGRATION WITHOUT MEMBERSHIP | 25 
 
3.2.1  Research  
Cooperation on research between Switzerland and the EC/EU has a long 
history. A number of agreements were concluded from the 1970s onwards, 
in specific areas (for instance wood as a renewable material, thermonuclear 
physics, metrology), as well as a broader agreement on scientific 
cooperation in 1985-86, which allowed for limited Swiss participation in 
certain EC research programmes on a project-by-project basis, fully and 
directly financed by the Swiss government. The funds allocated to this were 
steadily increased, from 11 million Swiss francs (CHF) in 1992 to 120 
million CHF (approximately €80 million) in 2002, funding Swiss 
participation in more than 1,400 projects. 
The research agreement concluded as part of the Bilateral I package 
represents a considerable upgrade of the 1985 agreement, making 
Switzerland one of five ‘associated states’ (the others are the other EFTA 
member states and Israel) of the EU’s 5th Framework Programmes on 
Research. This status grants Swiss research establishments equal rights in 
all programmes and activities of the on-going framework programme. 
More specifically, researchers in associate states have the same rights and 
obligations as researchers from EU member states, including the right to 
assume the role of project coordinator, and receive their funding from the 
Commission in accordance with EU rules. For example, in shared-cost 
projects, Swiss institutions need find only one partner from a member state 
to form a consortium. Previous restrictions, such as on Marie Curie actions 
or CRAFT projects, do not apply. Switzerland’s participation in future EU 
framework programmes on research requires negotiations on renewal of 
the research agreement.  
3.2.2  Technical barriers to trade 
This agreement provides for mutual recognition of conformity assessments 
of standards (certificates, tests, product authorisations, etc.) across a wide 
range of industrial products.22 The agreement recognises the equivalence of 
                                                      
22 More than a dozen product groups are listed: Machines; medical products; 
manufacturing checks for pharmaceuticals (although authorisation for the sale of 
medicine is not covered); testing for the registration of chemical substances; toys; 
construction machines; motor vehicles, tractors; telecommunications installations; 
measurement instruments; gas heating boilers and appliances; electrical and 
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Swiss legislation with that of the EU, which simplifies procedures and 
reduces costs for producers in both markets. Only one single test of 
conformity will henceforth be required for a product covered by this 
agreement to be acceptable in both Swiss and EU markets.  
However, merchandise from third countries may not be certified in 
accordance with standards by Swiss bodies for the purpose of 
commercialisation in the EU. In areas not covered by the agreements and 
where Swiss and EU requirements differ, for instance, certain chemical 
substances, phytosanitary products, biocides and construction products, 
two conformity tests will still be required, although it is now possible for 
both tests to be undertaken by Swiss authorities.  
3.2.3  Free movement of persons 
This is widely seen as the most important agreement in the Bilateral I 
package. The agreement sets out a progressive opening of the labour 
market leading eventually to the free movement of persons between 
Switzerland and the EU. Swiss and EU nationals will be entitled to the 
same working and living conditions in Switzerland and the EU.  
The agreement covers workers of all kinds, including the self-
employed and the unemployed given that they have sufficient financial 
means of their own. The agreement also includes the mutual recognition of 
professional diplomas and coordination of social insurance. Switzerland is 
incorporated into the multilateral EU social security totalisation agreement, 
which covers pensions, health care, family allowances and other social 
security benefits. Employers remain covered for pensions by their home 
country, whereas health care, sickness, workers’ compensation, etc. are 
covered by the host country. The agreement also covers cross-border 
provisions of services for shorter periods. 
3.2.4  Air transport 
This agreement provides for Switzerland to be included in the EU’s civil 
aviation market. The acquis communautaire in this field is extended to 
                                                                                                                                       
electromagnetic compatibility appliances; equipment used in environments where 
there is a high risk of explosion; equipment for the protection of individuals; and 
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Switzerland, and Swiss airlines are given equal access to the EU’s 
deregulated market on a reciprocal basis. Swiss companies are granted 
commercial flying rights, are included in a ban on discrimination on the 
basis of nationality and are extended the right to acquire a majority stake in 
EU airlines. Restrictions on supply and sales are removed, and Swiss 
airlines can serve any destination, with planes of any capacity.  
The agreement opens up the possibility of levying fees on noise and 
other environmentally related issues, including restrictions on landing 
rights, if it is done in a non-discriminatory fashion. The air transport 
agreement replaces more than a dozen less extensive bilateral agreements 
with EU member states on civil aviation.  
3.2.5  Land transport 
The agreement calls for the coordination of transport policy, and sets out a 
gradual reciprocal opening of markets for the transport of goods and 
people by road and rail between Switzerland and the EU. The agreement 
allows for ‘grand cabotage’ (transport between two EU member states), 
subject to certain temporary restrictions, while regular cabotage (transport 
within a member state) is excluded from the agreement.  
The agreement increases the maximum weight of heavy goods 
vehicles (HGVs) allowed to transit Switzerland from 28 tonnes before the 
agreement was negotiated to 40 tonnes in 2005. To compensate and 
encourage a shift in traffic from road to rail, the agreement envisages a 
significant increase in the HGV tax for transit through Switzerland. Other 
restrictions, such as the ban of HGV travel on Sundays and at night, will 
remain.  
Both sides also commit themselves to improve the railway 
infrastructure. Switzerland undertakes to build the tunnels planned under 
the New Transalpine Railways (NEAT) at a cost of more than €10 billion, 
while the EU is committed to improve access both to the north and south of 
NEAT. The land transport agreement replaces previous transport 
agreements between Switzerland and the EU, as well as bilateral 
agreements with most member states. Some of the latter include barriers to 
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3.2.6  Agriculture 
This agreement liberalises trade in certain categories of agricultural 
products by lowering tariffs and reducing or eliminating a number of non-
tariff barriers. 
The agreement grants better access to the other’s markets, in 
particular on products of special interest to one or the other party. A 
number of reciprocal concessions were made over fruit and vegetables, 
horticultural products and to a lesser extent, dried meats and wine 
specialties. Tariffs will be reduced on products like cheese, fruit and 
vegetables where Switzerland is competitive. Switzerland on the other side 
has made financial concessions on fruits and vegetables in the winter 
season, and for products not grown in Switzerland. A number of important 
agricultural products such as meat, wheat and milk are not subject to tariff 
reductions under this agreement.  
Mutual recognition of technical specifications is extended to 
pesticides, animal feeds, seeds, biological agriculture, rules for the sale of 
wine and, to some extent, veterinary medicine, and quality standards for 
fruit and vegetables. Switzerland has been granted the responsibility by the 
EU of certification on Swiss territory, on the basis of EU rules, of fruit and 
vegetables for export. Added to the agreement was a joint statement that 
mutual protection of labels guaranteeing the origins of products and so-
called ‘protected geographical indications’ such as champagne and feta 
cheese – one of the 15 items on the Swiss ‘wish-list’ of February 1993 – 
would be incorporated in the agreement in the future.  
3.2.7  Public procurement  
The EU-Swiss agreement on public procurement builds on the WTO 
agreement on public procurement markets (APM). This multilateral 
agreement introduced rules on tenders issued by national and regional 
authorities in the areas of water, public transport, energy and construction 
(with certain limits) based on the principals of equal treatment (non-
discrimination), transparent procedures, and the right of legal appeal on 
tenders and contracts (of a certain size). 
The bilateral agreement on public procurement extends beyond the 
scope of the APM into the fields of telecommunications and rail transport, 
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addition to electricity) and also includes procurement by local governments 
and private companies.  
3.3  Bilateral II 
The second set of bilateral sectoral agreements negotiated between 2001 
and 2004 consists of nine agreements and one declaration of intent. 
Box 3. Bilateral II sectoral agreement 
1.  Processed agricultural goods 
2.  Statistics 
3.  Media 
4.  Environment  
5.  Pensions 
6.  Education, occupational training, youth (declaration of intent)  
7.  Taxation of savings 
8.  Schengen 
9.  Dublin  
10.  Fight against fraud  
3.3.1  Processed agricultural products 
This agreement further liberalises trade in processed agricultural goods, 
which were only partially included in the 1972 agreement. Protocol 2 of the 
1972 agreement, which was adopted in 1977, removed duties on the 
industrial component of such goods, with a price compensation mechanism 
of duties and export subsidies introduced for the raw material aspects of 
the products, to take account of the disadvantage of high price differences 
on certain basic agricultural goods. 
The agreement on processed agricultural products amends and 
improves Protocol 2 of the 1972 agreement, by simplifying the price 
compensation scheme and by extending the scope of application of the 
agreement. The principle of net price compensation is introduced to 
simplify procedures. In accordance with Protocol 2 of the 1972 agreement, 
world prices were used as the starting point to calculate the price 
compensation. With the agreement on processed agricultural products, the 
much smaller differences between Swiss and EU prices will be used as the 
reference.  
As prices are higher in Switzerland, the consequence of the net price 
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agricultural goods covered by the agreement are completely abolished on 
the EU side. In some areas Switzerland will also completely abolish duties 
and export contributions, affecting products such as coffee, cocoa, jams, 
mineral water, soft drinks, beer and spirits. In other areas, Switzerland will 
make a corresponding reduction in duties and reduce its export subsidies. 
This applies to products such as flour, dried milk, butter and vegetable fat, 
and has consequences across a wide range of products such as chocolate, 
pasta, biscuits, bread, pastries, ice cream and other processed foods.  
Furthermore, the scope of application of the agreement has been 
widened to include additional products, notably those brought about as a 
result of technological advances made in the food industry since the 1970s, 
e.g. food supplements and phyto-pharmaceuticals.  
3.3.2  Statistics 
This agreement enables Switzerland to access pan-European data and 
guarantees the compatibility of data, as statistical data collection in 
Switzerland is brought in line with Eurostat (Statistical Office of the EC) 
standards. A joint annual programme for Switzerland and the EC is being 
developed within the framework of the EU’s multi-year statistics 
programme.  
3.3.3  Media 
The MEDIA programme was established in 1991, to promote the creation 
and distribution of film productions in Europe and to establish a training 
programme for EU film industry professionals. Switzerland joined the 
MEDIA programme upon its creation in 1991, as the first non-EU member 
state. This participation was ended by the EU following the Swiss rejection 
of the EEA in December 1992.  
The current (third generation) MEDIA programmes consist of two 
parts: Media Plus, which promotes creation and distribution of European 
films, and MEDIA Training Programmes. With the media agreement, the 
EU now funds Swiss-EU member state co-productions through Media Plus, 
and Swiss film makers qualify for the MEDIA Training Programmes. 
3.3.4  Environment  
This agreement allows Switzerland to join the European Environmental 
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information on the state of the environment, provide advice to the EU on 
environmental policy and disseminate information to the public. An 
environmental information and observation network (EIONET) plays a key 
role in the work of the European Environmental Agency. While it was 
established as an EC agency, the European Environmental Agency also 
includes as members the candidate countries and the other EFTA member 
states. Switzerland currently cooperates with the European Environmental 
Agency on an informal basis, through selective participation in technical 
and scientific projects.  
The agreement will allow Swiss institutions to participate in 
European Environmental Agency programmes and respond to invitations 
to tender from the European Environmental Agency. Switzerland will get 
full access to EIONET, to which it will contribute comparable 
environmental data, thus enabling Switzerland to be included in European-
wide studies.  
3.3.5  Pensions 
The agreement on pensions was concluded to avoid double taxation of the 
pensions of former EU officials residing in Switzerland. As Bilateral I was 
concluded in 1999, it was agreed, at the behest of the EU, to include this 
issue in the Bilateral II negotiations. The agreement reached entails that 
Switzerland grants an income-tax exemption on income from pensions of 
retired EU officials living in Switzerland, provided that the income is taxed 
at source (i.e. in the EU). In contrast to the other agreements of Bilateral II, 
this is an agreement between the European Commission and the Swiss 
Federal Council and affects approximately 50 residents of Switzerland.  
3.3.6  Education, occupational training, and youth 
The Swiss rejection of membership in the European Economic Area made it 
impossible for the country to participate in EU programmes on education, 
such as SOCRATES II (general school and university education, including 
ERASMUS exchange programmes), LEONARDO DA VINCI II 
(professional training) and YOUTH (extra-curricular youth activities). From 
1994 onwards, Switzerland adopted certain transitional financial measures 
that enabled it to participate as a ‘tacit partner’, including for instance in 
the ERASMUS programme. This participation was based on the goodwill of 
the EU, and not a contractual agreement between Switzerland and the EU, 32 | VAHL & GROLIMUND 
 
so Switzerland has sought an agreement with the EU. During the 
negotiations of Bilateral II, the two parties agreed on annual high-level 
meetings to strengthen the current cooperation in this area and to prepare 
talks on Swiss participation in the future.  
3.3.7  Taxation of savings 
This agreement came about as a result of the EU directive on savings tax, 
and was arguably the most politically sensitive agreement in the 
negotiations of Bilateral II. Three EU member states – Austria, Belgium and 
Luxembourg – were unwilling to accept the provisions on exchange of 
information, and introduced a withholding tax on savings instead. They 
further insisted that they would only agree to this if agreements on taxation 
of savings were concluded between the EU and Switzerland and other low-
tax countries such as Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco and San Marino. 
The core of the agreement is the obligation of Switzerland to 
introduce a retention tax on income from savings to natural persons 
domiciled for taxation purposes in the EU. Two-thirds of the income from 
the tax, set eventually at 35%, will be paid back to the EU member state. 
The agreement does not include legal persons, i.e. companies, and does not 
apply to interest payments on debtors residing in Switzerland. According 
to some EU officials, the latter provision ensures that the scope of 
application of the savings tax agreement will be very limited. 
3.3.8  Schengen 
The Schengen association agreement will lead to the eventual abolition of 
controls of persons on the border between the EU and Switzerland. 
Systematic random controls of persons at the frontier will be replaced by 
mobile controls within the country. The agreement allows for border 
controls to be re-introduced on special occasions in situations of 
particularly high risk (for instance high-level political meetings and sports 
events). As Switzerland is not part of the EU’s customs union, control of 
goods at the EU-Swiss border will continue. 
The Schengen association agreement includes a number of common 
measures to control the common external border, including a common visa 
policy for shorter stays, cross-border police cooperation and judicial 
cooperation in the area of criminal justice. The agreement gives Swiss 
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network, which provides information of wanted or undesirable persons 
and is regarded as an important tool in the fight against cross-border crime, 
such as smuggling, trafficking, etc. The agreement further improves and 
facilitates mutual legal assistance in criminal matters, including on tax 
offences. The latter issue was one of the last to be resolved in the Bilateral II 
negotiations.  
3.3.9  Dublin 
The Dublin association agreement allows Switzerland to participate in EU 
asylum cooperation. The Dublin Convention sets out common rules for the 
proceedings of asylum seekers and gives access to the fingerprint-database 
Eurodac, which was established in January 2003. This allows double or 
multiple asylum applications to be identified in an easier and more 
transparent way. As the database is continuously expanded, the ability of 
the Swiss authorities to prevent so-called ‘asylum shopping’ is improved.  
3.3.10  Fight against fraud 
This agreement represents an upgrade of a protocol on cooperation against 
fraud to the 1972 free trade agreement between the EU and Switzerland. 
While this protocol had strengthened EU-Swiss cooperation against fraud, 
certain issues such as time-consuming legal processes and the absence of an 
agreement on extradition, were unresolved.  
The agreement introduces a commitment to provide administrative 
and legal assistance on indirect taxes (customs duties, VAT, specific excise 
duties, etc.), subsidies and public procurement, and speeds up cooperation 
between customs, tax and judicial authorities. The scope of legal assistance 
is extended from tax fraud to tax offences relating to indirect taxes in the 
EU, although direct taxes are not covered by the agreement. Coercive 
measures are possible above certain limits. This was one of the last dossiers 
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3.4  Institutional framework of the bilateral agreements 
3.4.1  Bilateral committees 
As a general rule, each bilateral sectoral agreement between the EU and 
Switzerland is managed by a Joint or Mixed Committee.23 These bodies are 
composed of representatives from the EU and Switzerland and make 
decisions by consensus.  
There are some exceptions to this rule. First, such committees were 
only established to manage some of the older agreements, such as the 1972 
agreement and the clock and watch agreement. In addition to the seven 
committees set up to manage Bilateral I, there are currently ten committees 
managing the pre-Bilateral I agreements. Bilateral committees will be 
established for all of the agreements of Bilateral II, with the exception of the 
pensions and savings tax agreements, for which there will be no 
committees as the agreements are ‘static’, and will in the latter case remain 
unchanged until a possible revision of the agreement will be discussed in 
2013. The agreement on processed agricultural goods will be managed 
under the joint committee established for the management of the 1972 
agreement. The agreements on agriculture are furthermore managed both 
by a Veterinary Committee and an Agriculture Committee. In some of 
these agreements, the joint committee is assisted by sub-committees of 
experts and lower level officials. There are for instance ten such sub-
committees working on the agriculture agreement of Bilateral I. In total, 13 
new joint committees will be established as a result of Bilaterals I and II.  
The bilateral committees typically meet once per year, which is often 
the minimum required by the agreements. In other cases, for example in 
the agreement on environment, the Joint Committee will only meet upon 
the request of either of the parties (Art. 16 (1)), while in other agreements, 
the parties meet more often than once per year. Although each committee 
sets its own rules of procedure, the chairmanship of the committee, which 
includes the formal responsibility to set the agenda, typically rotates 
between the EU and the Swiss side. In practice, the agenda circulates back 
and forth between the two parties and is agreed beforehand, so that there 
                                                      
23 Hereafter referred to as joint committees unless a specific committee with 
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are few surprises in the statements and opinions expressed in the actual 
meetings of the various joint committees. 
3.4.2  Composition of the bilateral committees 
The joint committees are as a rule bilateral, with meetings between officials 
from the Swiss central administration and the European Commission. The 
members of the Swiss delegation are elected by the Federal Council. The 
standing members of the delegation consist of officials of the Federal 
Offices involved.24 The cantons have a representative in the five committees 
governing agreements in which cantonal policy competences are relevant.25 
The Swiss delegation to the bilateral committees also includes a 
representative of the Swiss Integration Bureau and the Mission to the EU in 
Brussels. In most delegations there is also a representative of the 
Directorate of International Law of the Foreign Affairs Office. 
Most EU agreements with third countries are managed by the 
Directorate General (DG) for External Relations of the European 
Commission. On the EU-Swiss agreements, the management of the joint 
committees is divided among the relevant sectoral DGs.26 EU-Swiss 
relations here differ from most other EU relationships with third countries, 
in which DG External Relations plays the lead role on the EU side. In the 
Swiss case, DG External Relations is only responsible for the 1972 
agreement and the agreement on free movement of persons, and could 
possibly be given responsibility also for the management of the Schengen 
and Dublin association agreements. 
                                                      
24 For example in the joint committee for the agreement on the free movement of 
persons: Federal Migration Office, Federal Office for Education and Technology, 
Federal Office for Social Security and Federal Secretariat of Economy (Seco).  
25 These are the agreements on public procurement, air transport, overland 
transport and the free movement of persons in Bilateral I. In Bilateral II, the KdK is 
working on ensuring the canton’s representation in the Schengen Mixed 
Committeee. 
26 For example DG Transport and Energy on the air and overland transport 
agreements, DG Health and Consumer Protection and DG Agriculture on the 
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3.4.3  Other committees 
Several of the agreements entail Swiss participation in EU and EC 
programmes and agencies, and include provisions on the participation of 
Swiss representatives in the bodies of these programmes and agencies. As a 
result of the agreement on environment, for example, Swiss representatives 
will participate on the board of the European Environmental Agency to 
discuss environmental research projects without any formal voting powers. 
A unilateral declaration by the EU governs Swiss participation, without 
voting rights, in the panels that support the Commission in developing the 
statistics programme. On research, Switzerland has observer status in the 
overall FP6 programme committee and the programme committees for the 
thematic sub-headings of the programme in which Switzerland participates 
financially, where work programmes and tenders are discussed. 
3.4.4  A special case: The Schengen Mixed Committee 
The Mixed Committee of the Schengen association agreement differs from 
the typical joint committees in two ways. First, although there are formally 
two such Mixed Committees with associated states, one with Switzerland 
and the other with Iceland and Norway, the meetings are held together. It 
thus functions as a multilateral agreement, one of the very few such 
agreements between the EU and third countries. Secondly, the EU is 
represented in most international agreements by the so-called ‘Troika’, 
which is led by the EU presidency and assisted by the incoming chair of the 
EU Council, the secretariat of the Council and the European Commission, 
or, as in the case of the other EU-Swiss agreements, by the European 
Commission alone. By contrast, all member states participate in the 
Schengen Mixed Committee. In practice, this arrangement entails 
participation by non-member states in the EU’s Council of Ministers and its 
important sub-groups, the COREPER and the working groups, as well as in 
the Commission’s working groups responsible for the preparation and 
implementation of legislation alongside the member states. The associates 
participate in the discussions on an equal basis with the EU member states, 
but do not have a vote. The fact that decisions are usually made by 
consensus reduces the significance of the absence of a formal vote, even 
though the search for consensus does not have to extend to the associated 
partners.  INTEGRATION WITHOUT MEMBERSHIP | 37 
 
3.4.5  Tasks of the bilateral committees 
The main function of the bilateral committees is to ensure the proper 
implementation of the agreements, providing a forum for dialogue aimed 
at resolving misunderstandings and differences in interpretation of the 
provisions of the agreement. This includes the important task of integrating 
new legal provisions by adapting the agreements, as well as being the 
arena for the settlement of disputes between the two sides (see sections 3.5 
and 3.6 below). Although the specific provisions of the tasks differ from 
one agreement to another, they are in practice quite similar. 
The bilateral committees serve as the principal forum for the 
exchange of information concerning the development of the agreements. 
These discussions can cover the day-to-day implementation of the 
agreements, legislative developments in Switzerland and the EU, the effects 
of legal changes to the agreements and the effects of a new jurisdiction to 
the agreements.  
3.5  Adapting the agreements to new legislation 
Whether or not, or the extent to which, the bilateral sectoral agreements 
entail a commitment by Switzerland to adopt EU rules and standards, the 
(in)famous  acquis communautaire, is arguably the most fundamental, 
controversial and complex question arising from Bilaterals I and II. The 
extent to which the various agreements should be based on the acquis was a 
recurring issue of disagreements between Swiss and EU officials in the 
negotiations of Bilaterals I and II, and was the main reason why the talks on 
an agreement on services was abandoned in 2003.  
Swiss authorities go to great lengths to underline that most of the 
agreements in Bilaterals I and II take the form of ‘traditional’ agreements of 
international cooperation.27 In many respects, this is correct. First, decisions 
on any changes to any of the agreements are made by consensus between 
the EU and Switzerland. Secondly, any dispute between the EU and 
Switzerland on any agreement, with one notable exception discussed 
below, will be settled bilaterally in the joint committees. Thirdly, each of 
the two parties is responsible for the proper implementation of the 
                                                      
27 See for instance the explanatory documents for Bilaterals I and II on the 
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agreements on its own territory, again however with some notable 
exceptions that are discussed below.  
The Swiss Integration Bureau distinguishes between three types of 
agreements in its analysis of Bilateral I: five deregulation agreements, one 
cooperation agreement and one ‘partial integration’ agreement, namely the 
agreement on air transport. Most of the agreements of Bilateral II are 
cooperation agreements. Several of these are essentially ‘static’ agreements, 
such as the agreement on the fight against fraud and on savings tax, in the 
sense that no changes to the provisions of the agreement are envisaged. On 
the other hand, most of the agreements of Bilaterals I and II are based on 
the notion of equivalence of laws between the two parties, and 
implementation and application of the agreements are based on mutual 
recognition of the relevant legislation. These agreements include 
consultation procedures in the event of changes to laws or regulations on 
either side, and explicitly set out how to adapt the agreements to legislative 
or regulatory changes if that is required. Typically the joint committee is 
authorised to make ‘technical’ changes to specified annexes and protocols 
of the agreements, but not to change the main provisions of any of the 
agreements as such. 
Thus, the relevant joint committees can make changes to the annex of 
the air transport agreement, to eight of the ten annexes of the land transport 
agreement, to all of the annexes of the public procurement agreement, to both 
of the annexes of the agreement on technical barriers to trade, to annexes 1 
and 2, as well as to the appendices of the other 9 annexes of the agriculture 
agreement, to annexes II and III (but not annex I) of the agreement on free 
movement of persons, to the two annexes of the statistics agreement, to the 
annexes of the environment agreement and to the annex of the agreement 
on Swiss participation in the MEDIA programme.  
The Switzerland/Communities Research Committee and the joint 
committee in the agreement on the fight against fraud are on the other hand 
not authorised to make any changes to the respective agreements and their 
annexes. Likewise, the Schengen and Dublin Mixed Committees are not 
authorised to make any decisions concerning new legislation, as the 
adoption of new Schengen acquis is reserved to the EU institutions.  
According to the Swiss Federal government, none of the agreements 
fulfilled the criteria for a compulsory referendum, which would have been 
necessary in case any of the agreements entailed the inclusion in a 
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agreements are based on the equivalence of law, the entire Bilateral I was 
submitted to optional referenda. As noted in Chapter 2, the Swiss federal 
government and Parliament agreed that all nine contractual agreements of 
Bilateral II, except the agreement on processed agricultural products, 
would be submitted to an optional referendum. In the end, however, only 
the Schengen and Dublin association agreements received enough 
signatures for such a referendum to take place in June 2005. 
In some agreements, Switzerland is explicitly committed to adopt the 
acquis in delineated areas and sectors. In the Dublin agreement, Switzerland 
commits itself to adopt the Dublin and Eurodac regulations governing 
asylum cooperation in the EU (Art. 1). If Switzerland is unable to except 
these changes, the agreement is suspended (Art. 4). On air transport, 
Switzerland has agreed to accept the acquis in the civil aviation sector (and 
that application and interpretation of the acquis is under the control of the 
EU institutions in specified areas). On the free movement of persons, the 
parties agreed to adopt measures enabling them to implement rights and 
obligations between them equivalent to those contained in the parts of the 
acquis to which the agreement refers. According to the land transport 
agreement, Switzerland agrees to apply regulations that are equivalent to 
those in the EU concerning access to the professions, social welfare, 
technical standards and weight limits. The statistics agreement envisages 
that EU acts of law on statistics become compulsory for Switzerland. 
Participation in the MEDIA programme is conditional on having legislation 
in the audio-visual sector that is EU-compatible, including the directive on 
Television without Frontiers. As Switzerland is already part of the Council 
of Europe’s Convention on Transfrontier Television, there were few 
differences in this field, although Switzerland had to adapt its position on 
the film industry in the WTO to enable participation in MEDIA. The Joint 
Committee managing the environment agreement has the authority to 
make decisions with respect to accepting new EU law into the agreement 
related to the activities of the European Environmental Agency. 
Switzerland also had to adapt is laws concerning the buying and owning of 
firearms, on which the Schengen agreement sets minimum requirements. 
However, Swiss law already conformed largely to EU directives, and only 
minor changes to Swiss legislation are required. In the agreement on 
technical barriers to trade, the parties can agree to let already harmonised 
legislation be covered by the agreement. 40 | VAHL & GROLIMUND 
 
Only one of the agreements of Bilateral II, the Schengen association 
agreement, could be regarded as a partial integration agreement, although 
this could be disputed depending on the choice of definition of the concept 
of ‘partial integration’. Formally, the incorporation of new Schengen acquis 
into the EU-Swiss Schengen association agreement requires approval from 
the Swiss legislature every time. However, if Switzerland is unable to adopt 
new Schengen acquis, the agreement could eventually, in accordance with 
the procedures set out in Art. 7 of the Schengen association agreement, be 
terminated. This of course dramatically raises the cost of rejecting 
individual pieces of new Schengen acquis by Switzerland to the point of 
making it highly unlikely that Switzerland will exercise this right. In 
practice, therefore, the Schengen association agreement implies a general 
commitment by Switzerland to adopt EU rules and regulations in this 
policy area.  
It should also be mentioned in this context that some of the 
agreements also allow for safeguard measures to be introduced under 
specific conditions. For instance, the agreement on the free movement of 
people will allow for the unilateral reintroduction of quotas in the case of a 
large influx of EU workers – defined as more than 10% of the average of the 
three preceding years – for two years during June 2007- June 2014 period. 
The land transport agreement contains a ‘consensus-based’ safeguard 
clause in case of serious disturbances to the flow of traffic.  
3.6  The settlement of disputes 
In all but one of the agreements of Bilaterals I and II, any conflicts between 
the parties are to be settled by the bilateral committees, in accordance with 
the mechanisms and procedures of international law. Disputes between the 
contractual parties can neither be submitted to the European Court of 
Justice nor to the Swiss courts. The absence of any legal remedies against 
decisions of the bilateral committees and the fact that there is no 
surveillance authority to monitor compliance, combined with the dynamic 
development of (some of) the bilateral agreements, raise some important 
questions concerning the settlement of any disputes between the parties in 
the bilateral sectoral agreements. 
The exception to the general rule of dispute settlement between the 
EU and Switzerland is the air transport agreement, where the EU 
institutions – the European Commission and the European Court of Justice 
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and dispute settlement (Arts 17-20). The usual dispute settlement 
procedure of the joint committees is inapplicable here, although all other 
matters covered by the air transport agreement are to be settled by the Joint 
Committee (Art. 29).  42 | 
 
 
4.  The bilateral sectoral approach in 
practice 
4.1  The implementation of the bilateral agreements 
4.1.1  From entry into force to full implementation  
Before embarking on an assessment of the bilateral sectoral agreement, it 
should be noted that although Bilateral I entered into force in June 2002 
(and three of the agreements of Bilateral II – the agreements on processed 
agricultural products, taxation of savings and pensions – entered into force 
in 2005), few of the agreements of Bilateral I were fully implemented on 1 
June 2002. Indeed, it will take almost another decade before all seven 
agreements in Bilateral I and all nine agreements of Bilateral II are fully 
implemented. 
4.1.1.1. Postponed implementation. The somewhat later than 
expected end of negotiations and entry into force of Bilateral I had 
consequences for several of the agreements, in particular those envisaging 
the participation of Switzerland in the EU’s multi-year programmes. When 
the research agreement was negotiated, the aim was for Switzerland to 
participate in the 5th Framework Programme (1998-2002), which expired at 
the end of 2002. According to the agreement, the financial provisions 
would take effect on 1 January the year after entry into force. Since Bilateral 
I did not enter into force until 1 June 2002, the agreement did not take full 
effect. However, another provision provided for the possibility of renewal 
to allow full Swiss participation in the 2002-06 6th Framework Programme 
(FP6). The research agreement allowing for Swiss participation in the FP6 
was renewed by the Commission in January 2003 and initialled by the two 
parties in September 2003. It was agreed to apply the agreement on a 
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its previous participation on a project-by-project basis for more than a year 
and a half after the entry into force of the research agreement.  
A similar development is occurring concerning Swiss participation in 
EU programmes envisaged in agreements in Bilateral II. For legal reasons, 
it was not possible for Switzerland to participate in current EU 
programmes on education, training and youth as envisaged in the 
agreement. The European Commission made a unilateral declaration in 
June 2002, stating that it would propose the possibility of Swiss 
participation in the next generation of programmes from 2007 onwards to 
the Council and the European Parliament. 
4.1.1.2. Transition periods. A second and more significant reason why 
the entry into force did not entail full implementation of Bilateral I in June 
2002 is that most of the bilateral agreements allow for significant transition 
periods for certain provisions. As a consequence, it will not be possible to 
assess the full impact of the agreements for several years to come. 
The most significant example of transition periods are in the 
agreement on the free movement of persons. The rights and obligations 
under the free movement agreement are phased in through several stages. 
In the first stage, which lasted for two years after entry into force, i.e. until 
June 2004, the two parties were allowed to continue to give priority to own 
nationals in employment, and the country’s own laws on employment 
terms and conditions continued to be applied. This did not, however, apply 
to EU nationals already living and working in Switzerland and Swiss 
nationals already living and working in the EU, and priority for nationals 
in favour of these people was not allowed. During the first five years, i.e. 
until June 2007, Switzerland is able to limit the number of short-term work 
permits to no less than 115,000 and long-term permits to no less than 
15,000. On social security, vested benefits cannot be received in cash after a 
five-year period following entry into force, unless the person leaving 
Switzerland does not join a similar scheme in the EU. Full freedom of 
movement between the EU and Switzerland will only be introduced in June 
2014, 12 years after the entry into force of the agreement. The protocol 
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enlargement sets out the specific quotas, as well as longer transition 
periods for the new members.28 
The commercial flying rights granted to Swiss airlines in the EU 
under the air transport agreement are phased in gradually. Most of the so-
called ‘eight freedoms of civil aviation’ were granted at the date of entry 
into force of the agreement in June 2002, such as overfly rights and the right 
to non-commercial stopovers, as well as access to the important route 
between Zürich and Paris. Grand cabotage was allowed by the agreement 
from June 2004 (Art. 15 (1)), two years after its entry into force, while 
negotiations on the eighth freedom, cabotage, are to commence in 2007, five 
years after the entry into force of the agreement (Art. 15 (3)).  
In the agreement on land transport, the prices charged by 
Switzerland for traffic through Switzerland by heavy goods vehicles, the 
so-called HGV tax, as well as the weight limits for such trucks, will be 
phased in gradually. The weight limit remained at 28 tonnes until 2001, 
was then increased to 34 tonnes until 2005, when the 40 tonne limit 
envisaged in the agreement was introduced. During the transition period 
until 2005, the EU received annual quotas for vehicles above the size limit. 
The HGV tax will increase drastically, from 40 CHF (approximately €25) 
until 2001 to 172 CHF in the 2001-05 period, to 293 CHF between 2005 and 
2008, and 325 CHF (approximately €210) thereafter. Grand cabotage limits 
are removed in 2005.  
Further, the withholding tax introduced in Switzerland as a result of 
the agreement on taxation of savings will be phased until 2011. The tax rate, 
currently set at 15%, will rise to 20% between July 2008 and July 2011, and 
finally to 35% from July 2011. The removal of tariffs on cheese, considered 
by the Swiss Integration Bureau to be the ‘cornerstone’ of the agriculture 
agreement, will apply from June 2007, five years after the entry into force of 
the agreement. 
Switzerland negotiated two special provisions in the Schengen 
association agreement related to the matter of transition periods. The 
adoption of new acquis is not automatic under the Schengen association 
agreement, but must be approved each time by the Swiss legislature. In 
light of the relatively lengthy Swiss legislative process, the agreement 
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grants a two-year period for new Schengen acquis to pass through the Swiss 
legislative process. Secondly, Switzerland obtained what the Swiss 
Integration Bureau describes as a ‘perpetual exception’ in the event that 
Schengen cooperation develops to give rise to an obligation for legal 
assistance with regard to evasion of direct taxation. This was done in order 
to protect Swiss banking secrecy. Switzerland has further been guaranteed 
the ‘principle of speciality’ which ensures that the exchange of information 
on judicial assistance is not used in cases relating to direct taxation.  
4.1.1.3. Validity of agreements. Most of the bilateral agreements 
between the EU and Switzerland are concluded for a definite period. 
Typically they will be automatically extended indefinitely unless one of the 
parties chooses to withdraw from the agreement, although there are 
different possibilities and mechanisms for extension and/ or revision 
and/or renewal in each of the agreements. The agreement on the free 
movement of persons is initially valid for a seven-year period, i.e. until 1 
June 2009, and is automatically renewed for an indefinite period unless 
either party notifies a decision to the contrary before the expiry of the 
agreement. The continuation of the agreement is to be confirmed by a 
referendum in Switzerland. A possible revision of the savings tax 
agreement will be jointly undertaken in 2013. In other cases, the duration of 
the agreement depends on the duration of various EU multi-annual 
programmes, for instance on research and in the audio-visual sector. The 
participation of Switzerland in FP6 and MEDIA is terminated when these 
programmes end their life-cycles in 2006. Swiss participation in the 
respective successor programmes will then be the subject of new 
negotiations. 
4.1.2  Incorporation of new acquis 
4.1.2.1. The development of new acquis. The EU has launched a number of 
broader policy initiatives in many of the areas covered by Bilateral I since 
the agreements were signed in 1999. Most of these initiatives envisage 
legislative measures, some of which have already been introduced.  
There have for instance been considerable changes in the field of air 
transport. In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the 
US, the EU has adopted a raft of legislation on air safety and security. 
Secondly, the ‘Single European Sky’ initiative launched in 1999 was 
adopted in 2004, consisting of four new regulations. In the area of overland 
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railway sector in Europe. The directives of the first package entered into 
force in 2003, while the measures of the second package are currently being 
discussed in the EU institutions. The Commission unveiled its proposals 
for the third package in 2004. The idea of creating a ‘European Research 
Area’ was launched at the March 2000 European Council as part of the so-
called ‘Lisbon agenda’ to make the EU the most competitive economy in 
the world by 2010.  
Beyond these broader new initiatives, the EU continues to adopt and 
update existing acquis. On the free movement of people, EU legislation was 
consolidated in 2004. Two regulations and nine directives were repealed 
and replaced with a new directive. Public procurement legislation, 
previously contained in four directives, was similarly updated and 
consolidated in two directives adopted in 2004. 
One of the principal tasks of the Swiss Mission to the EU in Brussels 
is to gather information on legislative developments in the EU. The Federal 
Offices with their experts and task groups then examines the compatibility 
of new legislation with the agreements. Their conclusions are either that the 
new piece of legislation does not have any effect on the specific agreement, 
that it affects the agreement but that existing legislation is compatible with 
the legislative change, or that the new legislation requires adaptation of the 
specific agreement in question. Usually these entail minor technical 
changes to the annexes of the agreements. In several of the agreements, the 
joint committee has the competence to make such adaptations of the 
agreements.  
Since, in theory, Switzerland is not bound by rulings of the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) taken after the date of 21 June 2001, Switzerland shall 
be informed if the ECJ changes its practice in a case touching the area of a 
specific agreement. The relevant joint committee will then discuss the 
effects of the new practice and can make a decision on the analogue 
application of the new ruling. 
4.1.2.2. Decision-shaping. Switzerland plays a negligible role in the 
development of the acquis. The bilateral agreements allow for a limited 
participation by Swiss experts in the committees preparing legislation for 
the Commission. The Commission is committed to consult with Swiss 
experts on an equal basis with experts from EU member states in fields 
where Swiss legislation is recognised as equivalent to the acquis. In 
connection with the conclusion of the Bilateral I package, the EU Council of 
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participate as ‘active observers’, with a right to speak, but not to vote, in 
committee meetings in the areas of research, air transport, social security 
and recognition of diplomas. Although decision-shaping is not meant to be 
a function of the bilateral committees, very often the Swiss representatives 
in the committees are also sent to participate on behalf of Switzerland in the 
European Commission committees preparing legislation where 
Switzerland is granted access.  
Beyond the ‘pre-pipeline’ stage of legislative preparation, Swiss 
representatives are not present. Not surprisingly in this context, the 
provision of adequate and timely information emerged as another 
important issue in the interviews. On the matter of transparency, there 
were notable differences among the European and Swiss officials 
interviewed for this study. Among the Swiss interlocutors, a minority was 
quite satisfied, characterising the information flow as easy and informal (by 
e-mail or telephone) throughout the whole year. A majority, however, 
thought that Switzerland is disadvantaged because of its position as a non-
member country. According to this group, first of all, Switzerland is 
dependent on good sources in the EU to get the information needed 
concerning actions in the EU. The flow of information is judged to be 
inadequate because Switzerland very often has to get the information itself 
(especially in cases when the Swiss EU Mission in Brussels is not deeply 
involved). In the same context, it was often mentioned that the information 
flow is even deficient within Switzerland itself and needs to be improved. 
The information deficit seems less of a problem in the more dynamic 
agreements, which provide, perhaps not surprisingly, for the most 
extensive cooperation and participation in EU structures. However, in the 
case of the Schengen agreement, this does not include the crucial first step 
of consultations when it is decided whether a new JHA measure is 
‘Schengen-relevant’ and should therefore be incorporated into the 
Schengen association agreements, or whether it falls outside the scope of 
the Schengen agreement. In the latter case, the participation of non-EU 
member states requires a separate agreement.  
Lack of information was not considered a problem on the EU side, 
and the topic was not raised in most of the interviews. When it did come 
up, EU officials expressed the view that Switzerland managed quite well to 
keep itself informed about EU developments in general and about relevant 
new EU laws in particular. This was to a large extent due to the drawn-out 
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familiarise itself with new EU laws and regulations, but also a result of 
consultations through the joint committee system. 
4.1.2.3. Decision-making in the bilateral committees. The bilateral 
committees are typically authorised to make ‘technical’ changes, i.e. 
adaptations to (some of) the annexes of the agreements, which mainly 
consist of lists of references to the acquis. Although the rules of procedure of 
each agreement typically stipulate that the chair of the joint committees 
rotates between the EU and Switzerland, and that it is the responsibility of 
the chair to set the agenda, according to EU officials it is in practice the EU 
that takes the initiative to have new acquis  incorporated into the 
agreements. 
On the Swiss side, decisions falling within the competence of the joint 
committee only require the approval of the Federal Council. In case the 
decision would need an adaptation of Swiss statute law, the joint 
committee can only make its final decision if the statute law adaptation is 
first approved by the Federal Assembly and, in case a referendum is also 
required in Switzerland, by the people.  
The decision-making process. Once it is concluded that an agreement 
needs to be amended to take legislative changes in the EU into account, the 
parties have to examine whether and in what form the new legislation shall 
be integrated into the agreements. This process can be quite fast, if the new 
regulation simply replaces an outdated regulation in the annex. In other 
cases, however, the process is more complicated.  
When Switzerland does not wish to integrate a new piece of 
legislation into the agreement, the EU has to decide whether it agrees with 
the proposed Swiss derogations or not. The proposition will circulate 
between the parties as long as they don’t fully agree. These procedures 
slow down the already complicated decision process further, as the Federal 
Offices and the European Commission require the approval by their 
respective governments.  
Following a decision to incorporate new legislation into any of the 
agreements, the Federal Justice Office and the Directorate for International 
Law of the Foreign Affairs Office examines whether the Federal Assembly 
needs to be consulted. Eventually the cantons will have to be consulted 
and/or the Federal Assembly (Presidents of the Chambers, Foreign Policy 
Commission). The Swiss Integration Bureau and the head of the Swiss 
delegation to the relevant bilateral committee are in charge of coordinating 
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The decision is prepared by the rotating chair of the joint committee. 
When Switzerland holds the chair, the draft text is prepared by experts in 
the relevant Federal Office in collaboration with the Swiss EU Mission in 
Brussels and the Integration Bureau, often in consultations with various 
interest groups. The draft is then legally examined by the Federal Office of 
Justice and/or the Directorate of International Law in the Foreign Affairs 
Office, before the Federal Council decides on the adoption of the proposal 
and commissions the negotiation mandate. The delegations in the joint 
committee will hereafter inform each other and negotiate and compare the 
proposal for adoption. If the joint committee does not agree, the proposal 
will again be revised following the consultation procedures described 
above.  
Once agreement on a text is reached in the bilateral committee, it is 
submitted to the respective authorities of each party, on the Swiss side by 
the Federal Office in charge of the dossier to the Federal Council, for formal 
approval. The leaders of the delegations to the joint committee can then 
sign the document. In case there is no request for an optional referendum 
and the approval of the Federal Assembly is not needed, the adaptation 
decision of the joint committee enters into force upon publication in the 
Bundesblatt (BBl.) and usually, in the form of notification, in the Amtliche 
Sammlung des Bundesrechts (AS).  
Many of the officials interviewed complained that the decision-
making process in the bilateral committees was a very slow and unwieldy 
process, due in part to the elaborate examination of legislative 
compatibility undertaken by Switzerland as well as the consultation 
mechanisms, where speedy agreement is hindered by the relatively 
infrequent meetings of the bilateral committees. The process of 
transposition of new EU acquis in the ‘dynamic’ agreements such as the air 
and overland transport agreements is judged to be particularly slow and 
unwieldy by Swiss officials involved. Once a decision on implementation 
has been made, the speed of procedure depends on one hand on the 
complicated legislation procedure in Switzerland, but also on the 
complicated mechanisms in the EU. The whole procedure can take up to 1 – 
1½ years until the new EU acquis can enter into force in Switzerland. This 
has however created only a few minor problems that were either ignored or 
resolved at a lower level and have so far not led to any political disputes 
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could be more likely to result in difficulties once all of the agreements are 
fully implemented.  
Experiences on incorporation of new acquis. A law commonly known as 
Eurolex, drawn up before the EEA referendum in December 1992, 
introduced the requirement that all new Swiss legislation should be 
compatible with EU legislation. In spite of the ‘no’ vote on the EEA, this 
law has continued to be applied, and it was estimated that as much as 85% 
of new Swiss legislation was EU-compatible by the late 1990s.29 The fact 
that all new Swiss legislation had been made compatible with that of the 
EU for almost a decade when Bilateral I entered into force in 2002 lessened 
its direct and immediate impact and reduced the need for legislative 
changes in Switzerland in order to implement Bilaterals I and II. The 
agreement on technical barriers to trade is one example, which had a 
limited impact on Swiss regulations and standards as such, as Swiss 
standards to a large extent already conformed to EU standards, in 
compliance with the Swiss law on technical barriers to trade adopted in 
October 1995. On Schengen, Switzerland has already switched towards a 
greater use of mobile controls, with only sporadic controls at the border. 
Swiss participation in major international organisations and treaties, such 
as the UN, the Council of Europe and the WTO, entails a significant 
amount of alignment and harmonisation of national policies and laws of 
participating states, and has further facilitated the implementation of the 
bilateral agreements with the EU. 
Up until today there has not been the need for substantial changes to 
Swiss statute law.30 Art. 7a RVOG31 entails that the Federal Council (and 
the delegated mandate to the joint committee) would not be competent to 
adopt the treaty alone, but needed the approval by the Swiss parliament. 
The EU-Swiss joint committee would have to wait for the assent of the 
Federal Assembly before making the decision on adaptation of the 
                                                      
29 Sverdrup & Kux (1997, pp. 10-11).  
30 The introduction of the European Air Safety Agency (EASA) into the agreement 
on air transport provoked an adaptation of Art. 3 of the Swiss Statute of Air 
Transport (LFG), to which the Federal Assembly had to agree, in addition to the 
approval of the introduction of the EASA regulation. This single adaptation cannot 
be considered to be substantial.  
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agreement. The presumption concerning substantial developments in EU 
law affecting Switzerland is that Switzerland has in the end no choice but 
to adopt the new acquis, if only for economic reasons. A possible rejection 
by the Federal Parliament of a change of Swiss statute law to adapt to new 
acquis would broaden the gap between EU law and ‘Swiss acquis’ and could 
endanger the existence of the bilateral agreements as such.  
Among the agreements of Bilateral I, the air transport agreement goes 
furthest in terms of integration between the EU and Switzerland. In 
addition to the new civil aviation legislation on air safety and security and 
on the ‘single European sky’, the joint committee also had to contend with a 
backlog of legislation adopted in the EU between the signing of Bilateral I 
and its entry into force two-and-a-half years later. The Joint Committee has 
met four times since the entry into force of the agreement in June 2002. In 
addition, the two parties meet at expert level once or twice per year to 
prepare the meetings of the Joint Committee. The Joint Committee made 
three decisions on amending the annexes of the agreement in 2004 and one 
in 2005, with at least three expected for 2006, including one on Swiss 
participation in the European Air Safety Agency (EASA).  
The dynamic development in EU civil aviation policy has created 
some amount of friction in EU-Swiss relations, Switzerland was for 
instance initially reluctant to accept the inclusion of references to new (or 
revised) legislation on ground-handling and night-boarding into the annex 
of the air transport agreement, arguing that these were not necessary for 
the good functioning of the agreement. Due to these disagreements, 
implementation of the night-boarding directive in Switzerland did not take 
place as originally envisaged in 2004. A long list of directives and 
regulations has recently been agreed upon, and will be incorporated into 
the agreement in early 2006, including the directive on night-boarding. 
In spite of these minor problems, i t  i s  a l s o  n o t e w o r t h y  t h a t  t h e  
negotiations on security-related legislation on air transport were brief and 
did not trigger any demands for any derogations beyond minor technical 
adaptations. It should further be noted that the two parties agreed not to 
use the air transport Joint Committee as the venue for the dispute over the 
Zürich airport (see below).  
A few problems have also emerged concerning the overland 
transport agreement, mainly related to implementation issues. Switzerland 
here typically chooses to wait on EU member states with similar 
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Netherlands). There have also been some minor issues raised in the 
agreement on technical barriers to trade concerning chemicals, while the 
proposed reduction of EU sugar subsidies could cause some problems for 
the agreement of processed agricultural products. There have also been 
certain problems concerning earlier agreements, for instance concerning the 
radioactivity warning systems, an area in which the EU is currently 
revising its legislation.  
Another problem encountered in several cases concerns the 
difficulties and differences in defining the precise boundaries of the various 
agreements. One aspect of this is the role and relevance of EU case law and 
specific rulings of the European Court of Justice. There have been a number 
of such cases in the bilateral agreements, for example concerning air 
transport and the free movement of persons. The consolidation of the acquis 
on free movement of persons was accompanied by changes in the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice, which the Joint Committee 
has agreed to take into account. Questions have also been raised concerning 
the reach of the provision on services in this agreement. A specific case 
related to the principle of equal treatment in the agreement on free 
movement of persons was raised by Switzerland, which argued that 
differentiated entrance fees between EU and Swiss citizens at certain 
museums and historical sites in Italy and Spain were against the 
agreement, basing its argument on specific ECJ rulings. According to the 
Commission, this ECJ case law was not relevant to the agreement, as it was 
adopted after the signing of Bilateral I. The Commission further replied 
that such an interpretation of the agreement would also extend to cover 
differentiated pricing of ski-passes in certain Swiss resorts. No decision on 
this issue has been made by the Joint Committee.  
A second related issue has emerged where the sectoral agreements do 
not cover the entire area of cooperation in the EU in that policy domain, 
such as the Schengen agreement and EU cooperation in the field of justice 
and home affairs. The determination as to whether new justice and home 
affairs  acquis is ‘Schengen-relevant’ becomes a key question. The 
applicability of ECJ rulings has emerged as an issue of contention also in 
the case of the Zürich airport and the air transport agreement (see below).  
All of these are examples of relatively few and quite minor issues of 
contention, and as a rule, the two sides find agreement on adjusting the 
bilateral agreements to the development of new acquis. There have been a 
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key Swiss national interest and where Switzerland has some political 
leverage, for instance on overland transport and in banking, these efforts 
have according to Swiss officials not been successful. Such an attempt to 
depart from EU legislation in the field of air transport was indeed met by a 
series of démarches from the EU to Switzerland, criticising the latter for their 
interpretation of the agreement and warning against attempts at ‘cherry-
picking’ the acquis.  
Taking into account that Bilateral I has been in force for less than 
three years, a pattern seems to emerge concerning the discussions between 
the EU and Switzerland on the incorporation of new acquis into the bilateral 
agreement. While the latter attempts a more restricted line, arguing that 
new EU legislation is not directly relevant to a specific bilateral agreement, 
the EU argues for a broader interpretation. Many Swiss officials noted that 
Switzerland usually is in the weaker position relative to the EU in case it 
expresses reservations concerning a regulation to be implemented. The EU 
normally takes notice of a Swiss reservation, but often takes no action, and 
the ensuing situation of non-compatible legislation is allowed to persist. 
Ultimately, however, Switzerland typically feels compelled by its interest in 
market access and the benefits of equivalence of law to implement the EU 
regulation. Indeed, all EU officials, as well as most Swiss officials, agree 
that even in areas where Switzerland is not formally bound to implement 
the acquis, such as in the so-called ‘static agreements’, the economic benefits 
of compatible legislation is such that Switzerland does so in the end.  
There are several reasons why this pattern has emerged. The first, 
and most obvious, explanation is that it simply reflects the balance of 
power and interests between the EU and Switzerland. Access to EU 
markets or participation and association with EU policies, programmes and 
agencies are far more important to Switzerland than access to Swiss 
markets and Swiss participation in EU activities are to the EU.  
Secondly, the EU has recently changed its policy on temporary 
exceptions and permanent derogations in relations with third countries. 
While permanent exemptions were not unheard of before then, the EU now 
has a policy of not accepting such derogations. This change in policy was a 
direct result of the 2004 enlargement process. The EU received a very large 
number of detailed requests for permanent derogations from the candidate 
states in the early 2000s, and decided in 2002 on a more restrictive line in 
relations with third countries on the issue of exemptions, in general not 
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heterogeneous Union, which makes it more difficult for the EU to be 
flexible and accept special derogations vis-à-vis non-member states. 
This shift in general EU policy is compounded by the perception 
among EU officials that the relationship with Switzerland is unnecessarily 
complicated. The management of the numerous bilateral sectoral 
agreements requires considerable time and resources on the EU side, which 
many EU officials find unwarranted in light of the overall significance of 
Switzerland to the Union. EU officials noted that senior officials and 
political leaders in the EU often found it difficult to find common ground 
with their Swiss counterparts, as the latter seemed to give far greater 
attention to the details and specificities of the various agreements, rather 
than taking a more ‘political’ view of the relationship.  
This seems related to the general perception among EU officials that 
Switzerland was the demandeur for the current (complex) state of the 
relationship, and thus ultimately responsible for its functioning. While the 
relationship is considered to be good and the bilateral agreements 
functioning well, EU officials seemed in agreement that it would be up to 
Switzerland to find workable solutions to any possible problems that may 
arise. Swiss officials, on the other hand, emphasised that a number of the 
bilateral sectoral agreements, for instance on savings tax and a possible 
agreement on energy transit, had been formally requested by the EU side. It 
was also noted that the bilateral approach with Switzerland causes 
difficulties in relations with other third countries, notably with and among 
other EFTA countries, and that from a management perspective, it would 
be much easier for the EU if Switzerland was part of the EEA.  
Finally, Swiss agreement on the EU’s interpretation is also a result of 
the ‘appropriate parallelism’ which the EU insisted upon in the 
negotiations of Bilateral I. There are political and legal linkages between the 
agreements that reduce the de facto autonomy of Switzerland. First there is 
the so-called ‘guillotine clause’ in Bilateral I. While there is no such general 
linkage in Bilateral II, there is a ‘mini-guillotine’ linking Schengen and 
Dublin and the agreements with the other associates in this area (Norway 
and Iceland). There are also other linkages between the agreements that are 
not legal and thus contested, notably the link between Schengen and the 
agreement of free movement of persons. All EU officials interviewed 
concurred with the opinion expressed by Commissioner Benita Ferrero-
Waldner that it is not possible to have a Schengen association without an 
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requirement is here related to the opt-outs of certain member states from 
Schengen cooperation. These linkages raise the potential cost of rejecting 
individual pieces of legislation. 
4.1.3  Dispute settlement in practice 
There have been no significant disputes between the EU and Switzerland 
concerning any of the agreements of Bilateral I since they entered into force 
three and a half years ago. The Swiss approach to the question of dispute 
settlement could be described as pragmatic. According to the Swiss 
interlocutors, it has so far not been necessary to resort to the formal 
arbitration process in the joint committees as set out in the bilateral 
agreements. If the parties did not agree on a specific question, this was 
discussed in a friendly manner. If a solution was not found, the matter 
would be postponed to a further meeting and it was declared that the 
parties promise to examine the question under dispute. 
However, although most of the officials interviewed were rather 
relaxed concerning the use of dispute settlement in the joint committees, 
some of the interlocutors voiced a general concern about the design of the 
formal dispute settlement mechanism. This essentially entails that a dispute 
should be settled in the joint committees among the same individuals that 
were unable to reach agreement in the first place.  
The case of the Zürich airport (see Box 4) currently pending before 
the European Court of Justice provides another example of disagreement 
related to the Court and the relevance of its rulings on the bilateral 
agreements. The case is indeed unique in the history of the EU, as it is the 
first time a non-member state has brought the European Commission 
before the Court. Even though this is not explicitly provided for in the 
agreement, the case was accepted and was referred to the Court of First 
Instances in accordance with normal internal EU procedures. An eventual 
ECJ decision in favour of the position of Germany and the Commission 
could lead to a considerable reduction in traffic at Zürich airport, which 
again could have implications for Zürich as an international commercial 
and financial centre.  
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Box 4. The Zürich airport case (Case C-70/04) 
On 16 February 2004, the Swiss Confederation brought an action against the 
European Commission to the European Court of Justice to annul a decision 
relating to the use of German airspace by aircraft approaching and departing 
from the Zürich airport.  
This use of German airspace was governed by a bilateral agreement 
between Switzerland and Germany until the latter terminated the agreement 
with effect from 31 May 2001. A new agreement was negotiated and 
subsequently signed, but it has not been ratified by either party.  
Germany published a new regulation (No. 213) for the implementation of 
German air traffic regulations in January 2003, which was subsequently 
amended in April 2003. Regulation 213 sets a number of limitations for the 
approach to Zürich airport, including minimum waiting levels, specific sets of 
landing procedures, and imposing the use of five routes for planes taking off 
from Zürich airport.  
In June 2003, the Swiss government requested that the Commission make 
a decision to the effect that Germany could not continue to apply regulation 213. 
This was followed by an interim agreement between Switzerland and Germany 
whereby the latter agreed to suspend application of the regulation for a few 
months. However, Switzerland persisted in its complaint vis-à-vis the 
Commission.  
Having received comments and further information from the two parties, 
the European Commission decided in Germany’s favour on 5 December 2005. 
This was based in part on ECJ judgements (Malpensa and Karlstad) that the Swiss 
arguments fall outside the scope of the air transport agreement.  
A ruling on the Zürich airport case is currently pending before the Court 
of First Instances of the European Communities.  
Sources: Commission Decision of 5 December 2003, Official Journal L4/13, (2004/12/EC) 
8.1.2004. Order of the Court (Second Chamber) of 14 July 2005, Official Journal C 
296/8, (2005/ c295/15), 26.11.2005. 
 
The question of dispute settlement did not arise in the interviews 
with EU officials, with the exception of the Zürich airport case. This was 
mainly because there have not been any d i s p u t e s  s o  f a r  t h a t  r e q u i r e d  
settlement, but also the perception shared by all EU officials interviewed 
that the solution would in any case, in the end, always be in accordance 
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has been very important so far, were discussed amicably in the bilateral 
committees.  
The absence of disputes has several potential explanations. One 
would be to regard this as evidence that a functioning system has been 
established. Emerging issues and potential issues of disputes are often 
handled and resolved by desk officers in the Commission and the Swiss 
administration even before they reach the senior officials in the joint 
committees.  
Another interpretation is that it is simply too early to tell. The 
agreements have as of early 2006 only been in force for about three and a 
half years, and have not so far required any change to Swiss statute law. 
Many of the key provisions in some of the more important agreements 
have not yet been implemented as they are subject to considerable 
transition periods, for instance on the introduction of free movement of 
people, which will only occur towards the middle of the next decade. 
Another potential explanation for the absence of disputes is that there 
is a considerable commonality of interest between the EU and Switzerland, 
and that the bilateral agreements are in a fundamental sense ‘win-win’ 
situations. Finally, it could be claimed that one should in fact expect few 
disputes, as one of the basic ‘rules’ of EU association and cooperation 
agreements – that harmonisation is based on the acquis – is applicable also 
to EU-Swiss relations. While the agreements are not always presented in 
this manner to the Swiss public, its officials all seem to accept what the 
‘equivalence of law’ entails in practice:  
When the EU concludes an agreement with any third country, it does 
not accept the establishment of harmonised regulations that might 
differ in any way from the acquis communautaire.32 
4.1.4  Transparency  
The issue of transparency was raised by most interlocutors. The complexity 
of the system in practice makes it difficult, even for officials directly 
involved in the process, to have a correct overview of the structure of the 
entire system (such as the number of agreements and bilateral committees) 
                                                      
32 Fact sheet on Bilateral I of the Swiss Integration Bureau (downloaded from 
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and the current state of play of the relationship. A number of specific 
problems relating to this theme were raised by the officials interviewed, in 
particular on the Swiss side.  
4.1.4.1 Different aspects of transparency. Problems related to 
transparency emerged in discussions about many of the bilateral sectoral 
agreements. The agreements entail provisions for the joint committees to 
decide on their own rules of procedure. Those rules of procedure and the 
minutes of the meetings are usually not accessible to the public, as the joint 
committees are institutions of international law, which creates an obvious 
problem concerning the transparency of the bilateral agreements. Another 
aspect relates to the fact that the bilateral committees are managed by 
different administrative departments.33 The decentralised nature of this 
system allows the various joint committees to ‘live their own lives’ to a 
greater extent than is typically the case in EU external relations. This was 
seen by some interlocutors as a growing problem. One issue raised by EU 
officials was that the various joint committees adopted different basic 
positions on the scope and relevance of EU legislation in the different 
bilateral agreements.  
Another aspect of the transparency issue related to the 
implementation in Switzerland of already-adopted EU regulations and 
directives. The courts, attorneys-at-law and, of course, also officials in the 
federal or cantonal administration positions are confronted with a number 
of issues in different areas of law governed or linked to one of the bilateral 
agreements. It appears to be hard to know where to get the information 
needed and to search for the applicable provisions of law. Even Swiss 
officials found it difficult to obtain information about EU regulations 
adopted by Switzerland, especially in the dynamic (parts of) the 
agreements on issues such as social security or diplomas. 
Yet another aspect of transparency raised in connection with the 
bilateral agreements concerns the openness of the Swiss government and 
administration towards the public. This issue was mainly voiced by Swiss 
interlocutors, and was not raised as a problem by the EU side. Some 
officials and experts interviewed claimed that the transparency of the ‘true 
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and technical effects’ upon Switzerland and its legislation is restrained in 
the sense that the public is provided with only politically correct 
information. The development in Switzerland in recent years, however, 
shows that the need for more transparency has been acted upon. 
4.1.4.2. Institutions and legal basis of transparency. In order to 
understand the importance attached to the topic of transparency in 
connection with the bilateral agreements between the EU and Switzerland 
and the acquis in Switzerland, it is useful to know which institutions are 
entrusted with the publication of laws and their communication to the 
public. 
There are three different levels of institutions entrusted with the 
publication and communication with the general public in connection with 
treaties such as the bilateral agreements. At the highest political level, this 
is the responsibility of the Federal Chancellery. The Integration Bureau, as 
the leading agency on European affairs, plays the principal role in 
disseminating information to the public at the level of the federal 
administration. Thirdly, each federal office and department have 
responsibilities for communication and transparency in specific 
agreements, for instance the Federal Traffic Office in connection with the 
overland transport agreement, the Federal Migration Office in connection 
with the agreement on free movement of persons, etc. 
The Federal Chancellery has a pivotal function between the 
government, the administration, the Federal Assembly and the public.34 
The Chancellery is responsible for the publication of the corpus juris of 
Switzerland: the Official Register of Federal Law (Amtliche Sammlung (AS)) 
and the Systematic Register of Federal Law (Systematische Sammlung (SR)). 
The legal basis for this – the Publication Statute and the connected 
Publication Ordinance – has recently undergone significant revision.35 For 
the publication of international law texts, the statute now reduces the scope 
of compulsory publication, as treaties with limited importance do not 
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das Bundesblatt, Publikationsgesetz, SR 170.512; AS 2004 4929; and Verordnung 
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require publication in the AS.36 In addition, decisions of international law 
that do not entail new legal binding provisions, such as most of the 
decisions of the joint committees, will only be announced in the form of a 
notification within the AS instead of being made public as the usual 
enacted legal provisions.37  
Beyond the legal basis of publication, there is a significant trend 
towards a more open communication by Swiss authorities. The 
administration’s actions have until today been explicitly governed by the 
principle of secrecy in Switzerland. The creation of a new statute for 
improved transparency of the administration was proposed in 2000, and a 
draft statute explicitly embracing the general principle of publicity, was 
endorsed by the Federal Assembly on 17 December 2004. A separate 
section on law enacted in connection with the bilateral agreements with the 
EU has furthermore been established on the homepage of the Swiss 
Confederation, and all of the texts of the agreements of Bilaterals I and II 
can be freely downloaded from the website of the Integration Bureau. The 
latter also includes a section on the decisions of the joint committees in each 
agreement, where the decisions on adaptation of the annexes are made 
public.38 
4.1.4.3 Specific problems of transparency. The joint committees are 
accorded the power to adopt their own rules of procedure in the bilateral 
agreements, meaning that there are and will be as many sets of rules of 
procedure as there are joint committees. A few of these rules of procedure 
have been made public and are available on the Swiss government website. 
The rules of procedure of the Air Transport Joint Committee have for 
instance been made public, and those of the Schengen agreement – of 
which only a draft document has until now been available – is planned to 
be made public.  
Since the joint committees are institutions of international law, the 
minutes of their meetings are as a general rule not made public. The 
meetings are usually followed by a press conference and a brief 
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communiqué, however, which provides information on the main topics of 
the meeting.39 While the communiqué lists the new acquis envisaged to be 
incorporated in the annexes of the agreements, it does not give any clues as 
to the positions of the two sides.40 The Integration Bureau publishes a short 
note on meetings of the joint committees on its website after it has been 
debriefed on the meetings by the federal office or department in charge of 
the particular dossier in question. As soon as the minutes of the meetings 
have been approved by the EU and Swiss government, the decisions on the 
adaptation of the agreements are published on the homepage of the Swiss 
government and as a notification in the official journal (AS). According to 
officials interviewed, this last step of publication can take from a month up 
to one year.  
The officials were asked for the reason of the policy of limited 
transparency. Most respondents answered that some of the issues and 
actions of the joint committees could appear politically sensitive and be 
misunderstood by the public. The reason for the limited transparency of the 
actions of the bilateral committees is of course their legal nature, being 
institutions of international law.  
While improvements have been made, a lack of transparency vis-à-
vis the Swiss public has further implications that should be taken into 
consideration. The question arises whether Switzerland is aware of the 
exact scope of the acquis and the consequent obligations which have been 
incorporated in Swiss legislation. And as a result of the reluctant and 
cautious communication policy of the Swiss government and 
administration both before and after the entry into force of the bilateral 
agreements, the Swiss public is left with the impression that the bilateral 
agreements are static, underestimating both the dynamic nature of (many 
of) the bilateral agreements, the continued evolution of EU rules and 
policies and their impact on how Switzerland is governed in practice.  
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4.2  The Europeanisation of Switzerland 
4.2.1  Impact of the bilateral agreements on Switzerland 
The bilateral sectoral agreements have required and resulted in significant 
changes to Switzerland in the last decade. Specific measures have been 
undertaken unilaterally in Switzerland to accommodate and facilitate the 
implementation of the bilateral agreements with the EU.  
The most extensive such package has been the set of changes made to 
Swiss wage and labour policy to adapt to the agreement on the free 
movement of people, including significant changes in Swiss social welfare 
provisions.41 The so-called ‘accompanying measures’ to the agreement on 
free movement of persons consisted of three main elements: a new law 
laying down minimum wages and working conditions for seconded 
employees working temporarily in Switzerland; ways of making it easier to 
declare collective labour agreements as binding; and standard employment 
contracts with minimum wages in areas without collective labour 
agreements. Tripartite commissions consisting of representatives of the 
authorities, the employers and the trade unions have been established at 
both federal and cantonal level to monitor the labour market and, if 
needed, to propose sanctions.  
Although the agreement on free movement of persons entered into 
force in June 2002, the accompanying measures were only introduced in 
June 2004. The first experiences with the measures seem, however, to have 
been positive, and controls carried out in the second half of 2004 showed 
that the measures and the general wage and working conditions in 
Switzerland are adhered to. The Swiss experience with the agreement on 
free movement of persons has overall been positive. Total immigration to 
Switzerland has been slightly reduced since 2002 and the composition of 
immigrants have changed, with a growing share (and in absolute terms) of 
EU citizens residing in Switzerland. There has also been a slight increase in 
cross-border commuting since the agreement entered into force, largely 
offset by a decrease in the number of short-term residence permit holders. 
The accompanying measures were strengthened in connection with 
the extension of the agreement of free movement of people to the new EU 
member states in Central and Eastern Europe. The measures included more 
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stringent sanctions in case of non-compliance with the law on secondment, 
a requirement that employers must notify the authorities in writing of its 
seconded workers in Switzerland, the appointment of labour market 
inspectors, measures to make it easier to declare collective labour 
agreements as binding, various measures against fictitious self-
employment and better protection for temporary workers. An 
Accompanying Measures Task Force of federal and cantonal 
representatives and representatives of the social partners was established in 
2004 to improve the implementation of the measures.  
Numerous studies were commissioned by the Swiss government to 
assess the costs and benefits of the bilateral agreements, including specified 
costs and savings on the federal budget, as well as broader analyses of the 
impact the agreements would have on the Swiss economy and society. 
Studies commissioned in 1999 found that the Bilateral I package could 
increase the size of the Swiss economy by up to 2% in the long-term, or by 
approximately €5 billion. It has been estimated that the additional controls 
that are removed through the technical barriers to trade agreement 
represented approximately 0.5-1% of the total value of the products, in 
addition to delays caused by double-testing.  On Bilateral II, it has been 
calculated that the extended scope of the agreement on processed 
agricultural goods would increase the volume of trade by one-third, worth 
almost €1 billion annually. The Dublin association agreement relieves some 
of the pressure on the Swiss asylum system. It has been estimated that 20% 
of all asylum applications in Switzerland are second applications. As an 
increasing number of European states are part of the Dublin Convention, 
Swiss non-participation could have increased the number of asylum 
applications in Switzerland.  
Then there are the more diffuse benefits that are even more difficult 
to quantify. It is argued that having EU compatible statistics increases the 
attractiveness of Switzerland as a location for industry and also strengthens 
Switzerland in international negotiations. Further, access to EU film 
distribution structures draws more attention to Swiss films and brings a 
greater variety of European films to Switzerland. It is expected that the 
Swiss costs for its MEDIA participation will be more than compensated for 
by the benefits, including financial reimbursements, improved distribution 
and better marketing opportunities for Swiss films. 64 | VAHL & GROLIMUND 
 
4.2.2  The bilateral agreements and the Swiss federal budget  
The bilateral agreements have implications for the budget of the Swiss 
Federation. These include costs connected to participation in EU 
programmes as well as other contributions from Switzerland as a result of 
the bilateral agreements. Several of the agreements also have an impact on 
the expenditure and/or revenues of the Swiss federal government.  
The Swiss government funds Swiss participation in the programmes 
on the basis of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), as do the EU member states. 
The total cost of this following the conclusion of Bilateral II will be 
approximately €100 million annually. The bulk of this contribution will be 
allocated to Swiss participation in the research framework programmes, 
much of which returns to Switzerland in the form of participation in 
projects by Swiss researchers. In the first calls for proposals under FP6, 
projects with Swiss participation had a higher success rate than the EU15 
average.  
In spring 2004, Switzerland agreed that it would make a financial 
contribution to the new EU member states of one billion Swiss francs 
(approximately €650 million) over the five-year period 2005-09.42 The EU 
had requested such a contribution in 2003 following successful negotiations 
with the EFTA states in the EEA on raising the EEA financial contribution, 
which was increased five-fold, as well as a similarly-sized additional 
Norwegian contribution earmarked for the new member states. The 
rationale behind the EU’s request was that the bilateral agreements 
provided Switzerland extensive access to the EU’s internal market and that 
Switzerland should contribute to the costs of this single market, 
operationalised in the form of the EU’s cohesion funds. The amount 
requested of Switzerland was based on the agreement on a financial 
contribution with the EFTA states negotiated in 2003. It was deemed 
reasonable that Switzerland would contribute one-third less than that 
provided by the other EFTA states, as the former did not have access to the 
single market in services due to the lack of an agreement on services. As of 
early 2006, negotiations on a Memorandum of Understanding on the Swiss 
financial contribution were almost concluded. The main outstanding issue 
was whether parts of the Swiss contribution should be allocated to ‘old’ EU 
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member states such as Greece and Spain, or whether the entire sum should 
go to the new member states in Central and Eastern Europe.  
The additional costs to the Swiss federal budget of the Bilateral I was 
estimated at about €400 million, while the impact of Bilateral II on the 
budget was much smaller. One-off costs related to the implementation of 
Bilateral I entail that current costs are slightly higher at around €500 million 
annually. The agreements with the most extensive additional costs in 
Bilateral I were the research agreement, overland transport (shifting traffic 
from road to rail), the agreement on free movement of persons (reduced 
sickness insurance premiums) and agriculture (loss of customs revenues). 
This includes the costs of participation in EU research programmes 
(approximately €70 million annually) and the co-financing of projects on 
overland transport. In some cases, these additional costs are not directly a 
result of the agreements. In the overland transport agreement, the principal 
additional costs are related to the shift of traffic from road to rail, a general 
goal of Swiss environmental policy.  
Bilateral II also entails additional costs for the Swiss federal budget. 
Among the main items is a loss of approximately €50-60 million in loss of 
customs revenues as a result of the agreement on processed agricultural 
goods, and costs related to participation in the MEDIA programme, 
statistics, education, training and youth and the European Environmental 
Agency (in total approximately €25 million annually). Implementation of 
Dublin and Schengen also entails extra expenditure from the federal 
budget. 
Some of the bilateral agreements also have positive effects on the 
Swiss federal budget. Based on the studies commissioned by the Swiss 
government on Bilateral I, it has been estimated that the tax revenues of the 
federal government could increase by as much as €700 million annually, 
and an even higher amount for the cantons, whose combined budgets are 
larger than that of the federal government, as a result of the expected 2% 
increase in GDP. 
It has been estimated that the HGV tax introduced as part of the 
overland transport negotiations could bring in as much as €1 billion in 
revenues by 2007, a third of which comes from companies outside 
Switzerland. The two agricultural agreements will allow a reduction of 
subsides in Switzerland of almost €150 million per year. It has been 
estimated that Swiss participation in Dublin will reduce asylum costs by 
approximately €50 million per year. Switzerland will retain 25% of the 66 | VAHL & GROLIMUND 
 
revenues from the withholding tax introduced as a result of the agreement 
on taxation of savings, although it is difficult to estimate the revenue from 
this.  
Overall then, and if these very approximate and uncertain estimates 
are broadly correct and a final agreement on the financial contribution is 
reached, the impact of the bilateral agreements will be roughly neutral as 
far as the Swiss federal budget is concerned. The cantons stand to gain 
considerably, mainly due to the higher tax revenues expected to emerge as 
a result of higher economic growth following the implementation of 
Bilaterals I and II, which is also a major contributing factor to the expected 
impact of the bilateral agreements on the Swiss federal budget. This does 
not, however, take account of the additional costs associated with the 
implementation of the bilateral agreements, which to a considerable extent 
falls on the cantons.  
4.2.3  EU-Swiss relations and economic reforms in Switzerland 
But the direct changes made in response to the bilateral agreements do not 
capture fully the impact of deepening European integration since the 
second half of the 1980s on Switzerland.43 The prospect of Swiss 
participation in the EEA led directly to a number of significant changes to 
the Swiss political system in the early 1990s. Indeed, the expected 
participation in the EEA and its subsequent rejection by the Swiss people 
has probably had a greater impact on the Swiss political and constitutional 
system than changes introduced as a direct response to the bilateral 
agreements. Furthermore, these changes have arguably been more 
profound in the case of Switzerland than in many EU member states. 
After the rejection of the EEA, the Swiss government launched an 
economic revitalisation programme in 1993 to improve the country’s 
competitiveness.44 This led to important reforms on competition policy and 
various sectoral reforms in such areas as telecommunications, agriculture, 
energy and transport. For instance, the Cartel Law was first reformed in 
1995, the telecommunications sector in 1991 and 1997, and Swiss public 
procurement policies in 1994 and 1995, although the latter was primarily 
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due to the WTO agreement on public procurement markets as agreed 
under the Uruguay Round.45 
The Domestic Market Act was adopted in 1998 to create a real single 
market in Switzerland in areas such as public procurement and 
professional services. Further changes to competition policy through a 
strengthening of anti-cartel legislation have recently been introduced 
through a new Cartel Law. Agricultural reforms introduced in the 1990s 
followed the policy shift within the EU, in which subsidies were directed 
away from price support towards direct support in order to minimise price 
distortion while maintaining income levels among Swiss farmers. One of 
the goals of agricultural reform was to reduce the price differences with the 
EU to half of the gap in 1998, but this has not been attained. Price support 
will be reduced further as a result of the Agriculture Policy 2007 initiative. 
Reform of the electricity markets, broadly following the EU’s liberalisation 
approach, was undertaken in 2000, with an opening of the sector to 
competition phased in over a six-year period. In 2004, structural reforms 
were given a further boost through 17 policy measures to be introduced in 
the current legislative period (2003-07), including a revision of the 
Domestic Market Act, as well as further reforms to public procurement 
policies and the energy and transport sectors. 
In many cases, the bilateral agreements are themselves an important 
part of the reform package in a given sector. The overland transport 
agreement was thus a key component of the railway reforms launched in 
1999, as well as the ‘Alps initiative’ in the early 1990s. The introduction of 
VAT (replacing a turnover tax) in Switzerland was approved in a 
referendum in November 1993. In 2001, Switzerland introduced a HGV 
(Heavy Goods Vehicle) tax supported by 57% of the voters in a referendum 
in September 1998, to a large extent due to the agreement on overland 
transport with the EU.  
4.2.4  European integration and the Swiss political system 
4.2.4.1 The development of the Swiss Constitution. Switzerland became a 
federal state with the adoption of the Swiss Constitution by the people and 
the Cantons in 1848. As the Constitution provides the popular right to 
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demand a partial revision of the Constitution, many single provisions were 
incorporated into the framework over the years. A total revision of the 
Constitution was debated from the mid-1960s, but it only became a reality 
in 1999 with the adoption of a new Constitution.  
The new Swiss Constitution is basically a comprehensive updating of 
the original Constitution. After the many partial revisions, the new 
Constitution has been improved in clarity, structure and language. 
Unwritten constitutional law, such as case law of the Federal Court in the 
field of human rights, was introduced and dispensable provisions were 
removed. Moreover, there have been changes in the content that are 
connected to the relationship between the federation and the cantons and 
to the parliamentary rights.46 In addition to comprehensively updating the 
Constitution, the 1999 revision was motivated by the recognition that 
Switzerland needed to respond to European integration in particular and to 
internationalisation more generally. 
Change of paradigm and the effect on the shift within the national powers. 
The provisions of the new Swiss Constitution concerning foreign policy 
reflect a fundamental change of paradigm from the introverted Swiss 
Confederation in the 19th century to a modern and open constitutional state. 
Adapting the Swiss political system to the accelerating processes of 
international integration and globalisation was another driving motivation 
behind the constitutional revision process.  
One aspect of the processes of globalisation and internationalisation 
is the growing prominence of legislation in the negotiation and conclusion 
of international treaties. This includes both agreements based on the 
principle of mutual recognition of law, and the creation of harmonised and 
common legal bases.47 As a consequence, national legislative procedures 
are moved to an international level of contract formation and to the 
connected diplomatic and political procedures, causing a shift within the 
national powers from the legislative to the executive branch.  
Relations between government and administration. Coordination between 
the government and the administration on a negotiation mandate has 
become unwieldy and difficult as a result of the growing complexity of 
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international treaties. As a result of the growth and complexity of the 
bilateral contractual relationship with the EU, in addition to the broader 
impact of European integration, the Union plays an increasingly prominent 
role in the work of the federal administration. Traditionally one federal 
department assumes the leading role in the negotiation of a specific treaty, 
and is also responsible for consultations with the other interested  and 
involved departments and private interest groups. Since the 1960s, 
relations with the EU and its precursors have been led by the Integration 
Bureau and the two departments of economics and foreign affairs that it 
serves, rather than units within each ministry. With the bilateral 
agreements, other ministries in Switzerland are increasingly engaged in the 
development of Swiss relations with the EU. This is part of a broader trend 
whereby international agreements increasingly affect several policy fields 
and thus many governmental departments, the internal processes have 
become cumbersome. The structures and remedies in Swiss administrative 
law for improving and facilitating the process of foreign policy-making 
seem to be missing.48 
Relationship between government and parliament.  There is a certain 
tension between the constitutional principle of approval of treaties by the 
parliament and the extended power of the Federal Council to conclude 
treaties autonomously (see Chapter 2.3.2). With the prospect of Swiss 
participation in the EEA followed by accession to the EU, the participatory 
rights of the Federal Assembly were revised and introduced in the Federal 
Parliament Act in 1992.49 This called for systematic consultations by the 
Federal Council with the Foreign Affairs Committee before adopting the 
Swiss position in the EU Council of Ministers on decisions that would be 
directly applicable to Swiss law (regulations) or entail amendment of 
existing Swiss legislation (directives).50 In spite of these changes, the 
parliament nevertheless still plays a subordinate role in foreign relations.51  
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The Federal Assembly has also sought to utilise its possibilities for a 
‘pre-emptive’ influence on foreign policy and the conclusion of treaties 
through the use of parliamentary resolutions formulating objectives for the 
design of treaties.52 These resolutions are binding in the sense that the 
government is obliged to justify all deviance from the formulated 
objectives. In the course of the ‘Yes to Europe’ initiative, the Federal 
Council even submitted a counterproposal and explained its intention of 
not wanting to steer Switzerland towards EU membership independently 
but would make the steering dependent on a decision of the parliament.53  
Unlike in the EU member states, the Swiss Federal Assembly is a so-
called ‘militia type’ of parliament consisting of non-professional members 
that have other occupations on the side. According to Art. 170 of the 
Constitution, the Assembly is entitled to evaluate the efficiency of measures 
taken by the federal authorities. In 1991, the Federal Assembly decided 
with broad support to establish a procedure for parliamentary control of 
the administration (PCA). The expressed reason for this decision was 
explicitly that the Swiss parliament does not have the resources or the time 
to properly undertake this task. Although the Federal Assembly today 
takes a reinforced position in foreign affairs and is consulted on a regular 
basis, the question arises whether a parliament consisting of part-time 
politicians without any support staff is able to meet the challenges of 
globalisation and European integration.  
The Confederation and the Cantons. The old Swiss Constitutions of 1848 
and 1874 provided extensive powers and autonomy to the cantons. These 
powers have slowly shifted to the federal level, as a process of 
centralisation gradually diminished cantonal autonomy. One of the aims of 
the 1999 revision of the Swiss Constitution was to compensate for these 
long-term developments, placing more emphasis on the principle of 
cooperation than on the principle of self-rule as expressed by the autonomy 
of the cantons.54  
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In foreign affairs, the Confederation has to take into consideration the 
powers of the cantons as well as the protection of their interests (Art. 54). 
The consultation of the cantons in foreign policy affairs is now provided in 
Art. 55 of the Constitution. While Art. 55 applies generally to international 
treaties, it is generally acknowledged that it is mainly relevant to European 
affairs (although it may also have some relevance to the proposed Swiss-US 
free trade agreement). The detailed provisions on information and 
consultation mechanisms have additionally been incorporated in the new 
Federal Participation Act of 1 July 2000.55 The cantons participate in the 
preparation of decisions of foreign policy that concern their powers or their 
essential interests. The Confederation must therefore inform the cantons in 
a timely and full fashion, and consult with them. The position of the canton 
has particular weight when the treaty concerns their competences. The 
cantons are also entitled to participate in international negotiations 
whenever appropriate.  
Inadequate information flows between the cantons and the federal 
government during the EEA negotiations provided impetus for the creation 
of the Conference of the Cantonal Governments (KdK56) in 1993. All 26 
cantons have become members of the KdK.57 The aim of the Conference is 
the coordination of decision-making procedures among the cantons in 
order to exercise their collective influence on the federal level.58 The 
cantons have concluded a framework agreement on cooperation with the 
Confederation. According to the agreement, the information and 
consultation shall principally be conducted by the KdK. The vote of 18 
cantons is sufficient to make a decision. The cantonal statements shall be 
given by the KdK in the name of all cantons.  
The cantons in Switzerland are involved at the federal level by a 
cantonal representative in each joint committee, elected by KdK. A 
representative of the cantons has now been elected to the Federal 
Department of Justice, and the KdK is also present at the Swiss EU Mission 
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to the EU in Brussels. In spite of these developments, the cantons 
themselves depend very much on information from the departments and 
the government, especially if they are responsible for implementation in the 
relevant policy area.  
4.2.4.1  Direct democracy and bilateralism 
The popular right to request optional referenda for treaties involving 
multilateral harmonisation of law, such as many of the EU-Swiss bilateral 
agreements, can potentially have an impact on the future stability of 
contractual relations between the EU and Switzerland. Two optional 
referenda relating to the bilateral agreements with the EU took place in 
2005: in June to approve the agreements on Schengen and Dublin and in 
September to support the extension of the agreement on the freedom of 
movement to the new EU member states in Central and Eastern Europe. 
While the Swiss people voted in favour on both occasions, the referenda 
highlighted the tensions between Swiss direct democracy and the bilateral 
sectoral agreements with the EU.  
The agreement on the free movement of persons was concluded as a 
so-called ‘mixed agreement’, i.e. the contracting parties of Switzerland are 
both the European Community as such and the member states of the EU. 
This is also the reason why the agreement on the free movement of persons 
could not directly be applicable to the new European member states. The 
extension of the EU needed a separate contractual basis. The extension 
protocol – which constitutes this legal basis – is an integral part of the 
agreement on the free movement of persons.59 
All agreements in Bilateral I are legally linked to one another by the 
so-called ‘guillotine clause’, which calls for all agreements to enter into 
force simultaneously and the automatic termination of all other agreements 
in the event that one of the agreements is terminated.60 According to the 
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(identical) final provisions of the agreements of Bilateral I, if any, one party 
terminates a single agreement of Bilateral I, all seven cease to apply six 
months after receipt of notification of non-renewal. In case Switzerland had 
voted against the extension protocol, the EU would have considered 
terminating the agreement on grounds that it was unacceptable to treat the 
citizens of the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ member states in a different manner. 
As the interviews took place before the vote in September 2005, the 
respondents were asked the question of what effect a rejection of the 
extension protocol would have on the bilateral agreements with the EU. On 
the one hand, most officials interviewed assumed that the EU would not 
have reacted so radically as to terminate the agreements, but would have 
required Switzerland to establish a procedure ensuring the equal treatment 
of citizens of the new European member states. In the absence of such 
Swiss remedies, however, it seemed clear on both sides that the EU would 
not have any major inhibitions about invoking the ‘guillotine clause’. 
4.2.4.2  Federalism and the bilateral approach 
The consultation mechanisms for the cantons in foreign relations have been 
improved both on a constitutional and technical level. The cantons are 
represented in the joint committees of the agreements affecting the cantons’ 
interests and implementation tasks directly, such as the agreements on free 
movement of persons, overland transport, air transport and public 
procurement. Inter-cantonal task groups have been established in the areas 
of social security, recognition of diplomas, public procurement, air 
transport and overland transport to support the representatives of the 
cantons in the preparative work for the meetings of the joint committees. 
After the meetings of the joint committees, the representative of the cantons 
will inform the head of foreign policy affairs in the KdK secretariat and the 
latter will give the information to the task groups or cantonal governments.  
With cantonal representatives in the joint committees and a 
permanent representative of the KdK in Brussels, most officials interviewed 
conceded that the consultation procedures of the cantons can hardly be 
improved at the international level. Domestically, however, the bilateral 
agreements have made the handling of the system of federalism more 
difficult.  
The situation of the cantons in foreign policy affairs is special insofar 
as they are directly affected by EU integration processes. They are 
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therefore very important for the cantons to be fully informed of the 
legislation and judicial procedures in the EU of relevance to the bilateral 
agreements. The interviews revealed that there was a problem in the very 
early phases of new negotiations. Often the cantons were faced with a fait 
accompli, as exploratory talks between the Swiss government and the EU on 
cooperation in a new area, in which the cantons were not involved, is often 
transformed into de facto negotiations of a draft agreement. It was also 
mentioned that the Confederation occasionally had decided on its own 
without consulting the cantons or consulting them too late. The new 
consultation provisions in the Constitution and the following Consultation 
Act seem to be lacking in clarity at the procedural level. It was repeatedly 
expressed that there was a need for a revision of the cantonal consultation 
procedures on a statutory or regulation level. 
Furthermore, the lack of clarity in delineating cantonal and federal 
powers in foreign policy mentioned above has an influence on the 
implementation of the bilateral agreements. Some of the agreements fall 
under the cantonal competences, in areas such as education, health, culture, 
infrastructure, public procurement and police and justice. The 
implementation of the Schengen agreement raises a number of practical 
questions relating to the role of the cantons in this process, for instance how 
the federal government can ensure that the provisions of Schengen are 
respected all over the country given that police powers, and thus 
responsibility for the implementation of much of the Schengen agreement, 
fall within the competence of the cantons. | 75 
 
 
5.  The bilateral sectoral approach and 
the European Economic Area 
5.1  Introduction 
As a result of Bilaterals I and II, Switzerland is becoming more closely 
integrated with the European Union than any other non-EU member state 
except its three EFTA partners in the European Economic Area (EEA). 
Indeed, Bilaterals I and II were an explicit alternative to the EEA, following 
the rejection of the latter by the Swiss people, which itself was generally 
regarded as a stepping-stone towards full membership. This chapter 
compares the Swiss-EU bilateral relationship with those of the EFTA states 
in the EEA.61  
Through the EEA agreement, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway are 
essentially part of the EU’s Single Market, with the exception of the 
common policies on trade, agriculture and fisheries. The EEA also provides 
the framework for the participation of the EFTA states in dozens of EU 
programmes and the growing number of EU agencies. In addition, Iceland 
and in particular Norway are closely associated with the EU on foreign, 
security and defence policy, and in justice and home affairs through the 
Schengen and Dublin association agreements on border and asylum policy, 
respectively.62 Indeed, the latter provided the model for Switzerland’s 
Schengen and Dublin association agreements.  
One unique feature of the EEA agreement is that it is multilateral, 
whereas the EU-Swiss agreements are bilateral, as are almost all other EU 
                                                      
61 Vahl (2004). 
62 Emerson et al. (2002). 76 | VAHL & GROLIMUND 
 
association agreements. However, the three EFTA states are required to 
speak with one voice, and from the EU’s point of view, these agreements 
thus consist of two parties, similar to other association agreements. The 
difference from the associates’ perspective is, however, profound, as it 
makes agreement on any issue dependent on acceptance by the other two 
EFTA states.  
The EEA relationship differs considerably from the Swiss-EU bilateral 
sectoral approach also in its institutional set-up and in how the agreement 
is implemented. The 1999 Integration Report of the Swiss government 
raised a number of arguments for and against the bilateral approach as 
compared with the EEA. First, the latter was criticised for its institutional 
weakness, and the absence of the full right of co-decision. Secondly, the 
EEA was criticised for its content, as there is no customs union and the 
common agricultural and fisheries policies are not included, and nor are 
other important policy areas such as monetary policy, asylum, internal 
security, external policy. Third, the multilateral nature of the EEA and the 
concomitant obligation to speak with one voice was criticised.  
The Integration Report identifies three main advantages of the 
sectoral approach based on the experiences in the negotiations of Bilateral I. 
First, it allows Switzerland an equal say with the EU in determining the 
subjects of negotiation. Secondly, the implementation takes place 
autonomously in Switzerland, and thirdly, the direct costs are low. One 
disadvantage of the sectoral approach highlighted in the report is a general 
reluctance on the part of the EU to engage in negotiations on new 
agreements, due to the diverse interests of the member states, which 
further ensures that negotiations, once launched, are lengthy. Successive 
EU enlargements have created a more complex Union with less flexibility 
in negotiating agreements with third countries. These difficulties are 
compounded by the systemic absence of Switzerland from meetings, which 
makes it difficult to clear up misunderstandings in a reasonable amount of 
time. 
Opportunities for further rapprochement have been exhausted in the 
sectoral approach, according to the 1999 Integration Report. This would 
require the transfer of sovereign rights to the EU and acknowledging the 
supreme judicial authority of the European Court of Justice. Such steps 
might entail the elimination of the customs union frontier for trade in 
goods, equal and comprehensive cooperation on justice and home affairs, 
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participation in economic agreements between the EU and other third 
countries. The sectoral approach also makes adjustments of the agreements 
to changing circumstances, e.g. technological improvements, cumbersome. 
This is particularly notable in the so-called ‘mixed agreements’ which 
require parliamentary approval in the EU member states.  
5.2  Scope of the EEA 
5.2.1  The core of the EEA 
The provisions on the participation of the three EFTA states in the EU’s 
internal market constitute the core of the EEA agreement. The scope of the 
EEA is determined by the existing EU acquis when the agreement was 
signed in 1992 plus the measures that have subsequently been adopted by 
the EU and to a very large extent also adopted by the EEA states. In total, 
more than 5,000 legal acts (Directives, Regulations and Decisions) have 
been incorporated into the EEA agreement since it entered into force 12 
years ago.  
Many of the agreements in Bilaterals I and II, as well as older 
agreements such as the 1972 free trade agreement, provide for Swiss access 
to the EU’s internal market based on the principle of equivalent rules and 
standards. As seen above, regardless of whether or not the agreements 
make explicit reference to the acquis, EU-Swiss legal harmonisation in 
practice entails Swiss adoption of EU laws and regulations. The EEA 
currently consists of more than 1,500 directives, or approximately 95% of all 
EU internal market directives. How does this compare with the coverage of 
the EU-Swiss bilateral agreements?  
It is beyond the scope of this study to find a precise answer to this 
question, which is also difficult to answer due to methodological challenges 
and the conceptual difference between the EEA and the bilateral sectoral 
approach. As far as methodology is concerned, clearly the importance of 
these directives and other instruments varies. Some are largely technical 
modifications to existing pieces of legislation, while others have a 
considerable political, economic and social impact on the countries 
concerned. Certain sectors and areas are covered by a large number of EU 
directives and regulations. For instance, approximately one-third of the 
EU’s internal market directives are aimed at eliminating technical barriers 
to trade, which does not reflect their relative importance. It is difficult to 
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evaluate these different legislative acts to develop a precise ‘measure’ of the 
partial integration of non-EU member states with the EU.  
Furthermore, the EEA and the bilateral sectoral agreements represent 
two conceptually different approaches towards the goal of ensuring access 
to the EU market for a third-country’s companies and their products across 
a wide range of sectors, i.e. their partial inclusion in the Single Market. The 
EEA agreement is based on a comprehensive approach. It starts from the 
principle of the four freedoms enshrined in the Single Market, with detailed 
provisions for excluded sectors. The Swiss agreements are, by contrast, 
sector-specific agreements covering cooperation in specified areas, without 
reference to overarching principles like the four freedoms, and without 
including ‘horizontal’ and ‘flanking’ policies, such as EU competition and 
state aid policy, except in areas and sectors explicitly defined in the 
bilateral agreements. 
In spite of these inherent difficulties, a number of observations can be 
made to give an indication of the overall scope of the EU-Swiss agreements 
compared with that of the EEA. Following the adoption of Bilateral II, 
Switzerland now has agreements covering a majority of the more than 30 
chapters of the acquis used in accession negotiations. Many of the 
agreements include provisions related to several chapters of the acquis, 
notably the more comprehensive agreements such the one governing the 
free movement of persons.  
The arguments supporting the EU’s proposals for a financial 
contribution from Switzerland provide another indication of the scope of 
the EU-Swiss agreements compared with that of the EEA. According to the 
European Commission, the absence of an agreement on services entailed 
that the EU-Swiss bilateral agreements overall gave Switzerland access to 
roughly two-thirds of the internal market. The Commission therefore 
requested Switzerland to contribute two-thirds in per capita terms of the 
contribution of its EFTA partners in the EEA.  
However, since the EEA agreement was negotiated, the acquis  has 
developed significantly in areas beyond the internal market, notably 
through the ambitious integration underway in the field of justice and 
home affairs. This reduces the EEA’s share of the acquis, which in the case 
of Norway and Iceland has been compensated for by the conclusion of 
agreements also in these areas, for instance Schengen/Dublin and Europol 
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following the conclusion of Schengen, Dublin and Europol agreements in 
the field of justice and home affairs. 
5.2.2  Horizontal issues and cooperation beyond the four freedoms 
The EEA agreement also provides for cooperation beyond the internal 
market and the four freedoms. The EFTA states and their citizens 
participate in EU programmes, including in the areas where Swiss 
participation is ensured through a bilateral agreement (or declaration of 
intent), such as research, the audio-visual sector, education and statistics, 
and are associated with a number of EU agencies through the EEA 
agreement, most recently the European Air Safety Agency (EASA). As in 
the case of Switzerland, the costs of participation of the EEA states in these 
programmes are covered by all participating states on the basis of their 
respective GDP/capita. Many of the agreements between the EU and 
Switzerland are concerned with participation in EU programmes and 
agencies. Swiss participation is however much less extensive than that of 
the EFTA states in the EEA. Switzerland currently participates only in a 
handful of EU programmes and agencies, while the EEA states participate 
in several dozens of EU programmes and are associated with almost half of 
the 18 EU agencies currently in operation. 
Although the EU’s common trade, agricultural and fisheries policies 
are excluded from the EEA agreement, there are important provisions 
covering these areas in the agreement, making it difficult to locate these 
sectors as being unambiguously either inside or outside the scope of the 
EEA agreement. Many of the greatest controversies surrounding the EEA 
agreement have been related to issues within these areas.  
The EEA agreement does not cover the EU’s Common Fisheries 
Policy. The agreement does however cover trade in certain fishery products 
divided by species and by degree of processing.63 For a number of 
unprocessed fishery products, the EEA gives the EFTA states free access to 
the EU market, while it stipulates higher tariffs for processed products. 
This situation stimulates the export of raw materials to be processed in the 
EU. For so-called ‘sensitive products’, the EU has kept high tariffs, 
including, among others, on salmon, which constitutes almost half of 
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Norway’s fish exports to the EU. This has become the main source of 
friction between the EU and Norway in the fisheries sector. Norway has 
frequently been forced to introduce voluntary export constraints following 
demands by EU fish farmers, stalling the growth in Norwegian exports and 
reducing Norway’s market share in the fast-growing EU market.  
Although the EEA agreement does not include the Common 
Agricultural Policy, and agricultural products are explicitly excluded from 
the general provision on the free movement of goods within the EEA, it 
does contain important provisions of relevance to the agricultural sector in 
the EFTA countries. The key provisions are found in Annex I, which brings 
the EU acquis on veterinary standards into the EEA agreement, Protocol 3 
on trade in processed agricultural products and Art. 19, which stipulates 
the progressive liberalisation of trade in agricultural goods and which is to 
be reviewed every other year.64 Some of the most controversial issues 
relating to the EEA agreement at the moment relate to veterinary 
standards, in particular, EU rules and standards concerning additives in 
food and on genetically modified organisms. For different reasons, 
however, most of these provisions have not yet, or only quite recently, 
entered into force, so that the full impact of the EEA agreement on 
Norway’s agricultural sector has not yet been felt. Trade in processed 
agricultural products was the main unresolved issue when the EEA 
agreement was signed in the spring of 1992, and the relevant protocol 
(Protocol 3) has only been in force since January 2002. Only one review of 
trade liberalisation, as stipulated by Art. 19 of the EEA agreement, took 
place in the first eight years after entry into force, partially because such a 
review was linked by the Norwegian side to agreement on Protocol 3. 
The EEA is not a customs union and there is no formal linkages 
concerning trade policy with third parties. The EFTA states are therefore 
theoretically free to determine their own external trade policy. In practice, 
however, the scope for divergence from the EU policies is fairly limited. 
This is seen in regional or bilateral trade relations, where EFTA followed a 
policy of ‘shadowing’ the EU in concluding agreements with third 
countries. The first agreements were initiated in the 1990s with the Central 
and East European economies, aimed at preventing or limiting any trade 
diversion or discrimination resulting from the Europe agreements between 
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the EU and these countries. EFTA has concluded more than a dozen such 
agreements, including with countries in the Western Balkans, the 
Mediterranean, and selected countries in America and Asia, in some cases 
concluding agreements ahead of the EU. The scope of the EFTA free trade 
agreements is more or less the same as the coverage of the EU bilaterals 
with the countries concerned. Differences occur mainly in those sectors that 
are not fully covered, such as agriculture where there are bilateral protocols 
between each EFTA state and the free trade partner of EFTA. Most of these 
are with relative insignificant trading partners of the EFTA countries, 
comprising in total approximately 4% of the total trade of the EFTA 
members. However, the EFTA states have recently become more proactive 
in this trade diplomacy, concluding free trade agreements before the EU 
concludes similar agreements, most recently seen with the EFTA agreement 
with South Korea. This is also taking place bilaterally, the most prominent 
example being the bilateral exploratory talks between Switzerland and the 
US begun in mid-2005 on a possible US-Swiss free trade agreement.  
5.3  Institutional framework 
5.3.1  The institutions of the EEA 
The institutional framework established to manage the EEA agreement 
differs considerably from that of the bilateral agreements between 
Switzerland and the EU. In some respects, for instance its institutional 
structure, it is more typical of EU agreements with other third countries 
than the agreements between the EU and Switzerland. The institutions of 
the EEA include a high-level political body, the EEA Council, a committee of 
senior officials, the EEA Joint Committee, an advisory parliamentary 
committee, the EEA Joint Parliamentary Committee, and a consultative body 
for the social partners, the EEA Consultative Committee. Most EU third-
country agreements have a similar structure of a high-level political 
council, a committee of senior officials and a parliamentary committee.  
The EEA Council is the main political body of the EEA. It consists of 
“members of the Council of the European Communities and members of 
the European Commission, and of one member of the Government of each 
of the EFTA States” (Art. 90), and meets twice per year. It provides political 
impetus to the agreement and guidelines for the Joint Committee, evaluates 
the functioning of the EEA agreement, as well as being a forum for general 
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the absence of a counterpart to this political forum is one of the main 
differences between the EEA and the EU-Swiss bilateral agreements. 
The  EEA Joint Committee is responsible for the day-to-day 
management of the EEA agreement, and is thus the equivalent to the 
bilateral EU-Swiss joint committees. It consists of the EU ambassadors of 
the EFTA states and representatives of the European Commission and takes 
decisions by consensus on incorporation of EU legislation into the 
agreement. It is assisted by five subcommittees: i) free movement of goods, 
ii) free movement of capital, iii) free movement of persons, iv) horizontal 
and flanking policies and v) legal and institutional matters, as well as ad 
hoc expert and working groups.  
The EEA Joint Committee meets every month, which is far more 
frequent than any other senior officials committee of EU and third-country 
officials. Annual meetings, such as in the EU-Swiss joint committees, is the 
norm in EU external relations. But with the entry into force of Bilateral II, 
there will be more than 20 joint committees and an even greater number of 
subcommittees between the EU and Switzerland. The institutional 
framework of the EU-Swiss agreements thus provides for more formal 
meetings between EU and Swiss senior officials than the EEA agreement.  
The Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC) consists of 66 members, half 
from the European Parliament and half from the national parliaments of 
the EEA countries, and meets twice per year. The JPC plays a modest role 
in the EEA. Its contribution comes through ‘dialogue and debate’ and 
through reports and resolutions adopted by the JPC. It examines the annual 
report of the EEA Joint Committee, and has the right to call the President of 
the EEA Council to appear before them and be heard by the JPC. The 
annual ‘bilateral’ meetings between representatives of the European 
Parliament and national parliaments of the EFTA countries of the EEA 
initiated in the 1980s have continued in parallel with the JPC.  
Delegates from the Swiss Federal Parliament and the European 
Parliament have also held annual meetings since the early 1980s. However, 
the Swiss federal parliament plays no formal role in the bilateral EU-Swiss 
agreements of the kind their EFTA counterparts in the EEA do through the 
JPC, although Swiss parliamentarians benefit from their participation as 
observers in the EEA Joint Parliamentary Committee.  
The  EEA Consultative Committee is composed of representatives of 
social partners/economic and social interest groups, and comprises an 
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Economic and Social Committee of the EU (ECOSOC). It works to 
strengthen contacts between the social partners and provides input to the 
work of the EEA in the form of reports and resolutions. 
In addition to the regular institutions of EU third-country 
agreements, specific institutions with competencies limited to the EFTA 
(i.e. non-EU) members of the EEA agreement were also established, 
creating a ‘two-pillar’ institutional structure that is unique among EU third-
country agreements. This was necessary in order to reconcile the central 
aim of maintaining a homogenous legal area with the constitutional and 
political requirements of the EEA states, which prevented them from 
accepting direct decisions by the European Commission or the European 
Court of Justice, as well as safeguarding the autonomy of EU decision-
making.  
The EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA) was established to ensure that 
the EEA states fulfil their obligations under the EEA agreement, i.e. that the 
provisions of the agreement are properly implemented in the national legal 
orders of the EEA member states and correctly applied by the authorities. It 
thus performs a similar role as does the European Commission vis-à-vis the 
EU member states. Cases are either initiated by the ESA itself or on the 
basis of complaints from individual legal persons or the Commission. The 
ESA has wider powers in the fields of public procurement, competition and 
state aid.65 The Brussels-based ESA is led by a college with one member 
from each of the three EEA members and has a staff of almost 50 officials, 
approximately two-thirds of whom are from the EEA countries. 
The EFTA Court in Luxembourg exercises similar competencies with 
respect to the EEA states as the European Court of Justice does vis-à-vis the 
EU member states. It deals with infringement cases brought by the ESA 
against an EEA state with regard to EEA implementation, the settlement of 
disputes between EEA states, appeals concerning decisions taken by the 
ESA, and gives advisory opinions to national courts on the interpretation of 
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EEA rules. The Court, consisting of three judges appointed for six years, 
one from each of the EEA countries, only sits in plenary session and its 
decisions are taken by majority vote. The Court has a staff of 12, in addition 
to the three judges.  
In order to prepare and coordinate their positions in the joint EEA 
bodies, the Standing Committee of the EFTA states was established. It consists 
of representatives from Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, and observers 
from Switzerland and the ESA. The Standing Committee has a structure of 
five subcommittees and a number of working groups mirroring that of the 
EEA Joint Committee, and is assisted by a staff of approximately 40 in 
Brussels. 
The EEA agreement is then by far the most complex and structured of 
all EU association and cooperation agreements. However, the burden of 
maintaining this complicated machinery is mainly taken care of by the EEA 
states. They are responsible for the running of the EFTA bodies specifically 
established for the EEA agreement, leaving the Commission and the ECJ to 
concentrate on the EU member states. 
5.3.2  Decision-shaping and decision-making 
According to Art. 99 of the EEA agreement, the European Commission 
must seek the advice from EFTA experts in the same way it seeks advice 
from experts in the EU member states. Art. 100 calls on the Commission to 
ensure “as wide a participation as possible” in the preparatory stage of 
draft measures and that it refers to these experts on an equal basis with EU 
experts when drafting such measures. This entails that experts and officials 
from the EFTA states participate in the preparatory phases of the legislative 
process in more than 200 Commission committees. It should here be noted 
that the European Commission and the EFTA states disagree on the precise 
extent of the legal right of participation in Commission comitology 
committees. This is in any case a challenging and resource-intensive 
process for the EEA states, since they must work quickly if they are to 
consult with domestic interests in order to represent national interests 
effectively. Some officials claimed that the existence of the EFTA Secretariat 
was an important reason why the EEA functions smoothly. Although the 
EFTA Secretariat helps in the process of identifying issues, there is still a 
danger that EEA positions are not firmly established in time. However, the 
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taking the form of green and white papers, which helps facilitate inputs 
from all interests, including the EEA states.  
Liaison between the EFTA Secretariat and the Commission also helps 
to facilitate EFTA input, but there would appear to be a lack of consistency 
on the Commission side in the approach and effort made by different 
services. Each DG designates an office to deal with the EEA dimension of 
any proposed measures, but many of these officials have extensive other 
responsibilities and cannot always devote much time to monitoring 
everything that goes on in the DG and passing this information to the 
EFTA Secretariat.  
By contrast, the Swiss agreements allow for much more limited 
participation by Swiss experts in these committees. This is due to the 
sector-specific approach and that, with the exception of the field of civil 
aviation, the agreements do not amount to a wholesale adoption of the 
acquis. However, in connection with the conclusion of the Bilateral I 
package, the EU Council of Ministers adopted a declaration granting Swiss 
representatives the right to participate as observers with a right to speak, 
but not to vote, in committee meetings in the areas of research, air 
transport, social security and recognition of diplomas. In addition, the 
Commission is committed to consult with Swiss experts on an equal basis 
with experts from EU member states in fields where Swiss legislation is 
recognised as equivalent to the acquis. Switzerland also benefits from its 
observer status in the EFTA Standing Committee, which coordinates the 
position of the three EFTA EEA states on EEA matters.  
It was acknowledged by several interlocutors that the EFTA members 
of the EEA were more involved in the earlier phases in the development of 
EU legislation than their Swiss counterparts. A frequent opinion voiced by 
Swiss officials was that Switzerland would only be invited to participate in 
a committee or working group as an expert in a specific area. This was seen 
as a key deficiency of the bilateral sectoral approach. Some EU officials 
noted that in practice, Swiss officials are frequently invited on an informal 
ad hoc basis, and that the difference vis-à-vis the EFTA states in the EEA 
was in practice not that significant.  
The influence exerted by the non-member states in the decision-
shaping phases also depends of course on how the state itself organises its 
internal processes and the resources committed to the process. In the case 
of Norway, both the government and the parliament have come under 
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the Norwegian government and central administration for not taking full 
advantage of the opportunities available for decision-shaping under the 
EEA agreement. Another study analysing the debate on the EU and new 
EU legislation in the Norwegian and Swedish parliaments found that the 
latter spends much more time debating the EU and new EEA relevant EU 
law than do its Norwegian counterpart.66 
It is also a result of broader developments in the relationship between 
the main EU institutions. Because of the shifting balance between the EU 
institutions, with a strengthening of the Council of Ministers and the 
European Parliament at the expense of the Commission and national 
parliaments, such participation in EU decision-shaping is however 
becoming less significant. The Council and its working groups play an 
increasingly important role in shaping EC legislation, as does the European 
Parliament with the extension of ‘co-decision’ in recent treaties. The 
growing use of other policy-making methods such as the ‘open co-
ordination’ of the Lisbon process, in which the Council machinery plays the 
pivotal role, both exemplifies and further exacerbates the shifting balance 
among the EU institutions. Some EU officials interviewed questioned the 
importance of such participation in EU ‘decision-shaping’ in general. 
Because these countries are not member states, officials from the member 
states and the EU institutions do not, in the end, have to take their views 
and positions into account reaching a decision.  
Once the drafting of a legislative measure begins, the EEA states are 
excluded from the process. Short of full membership of the EU, the EEA 
members cannot have a vote. Indeed, no EU association or cooperation 
agreement with a non-member allows any significant participation of 
representatives of the associated states in the decision-making process in 
the EU. The arrangement closest to being an exception to this is the 
Schengen association agreements with Iceland, Norway, and now 
Switzerland. Through the so-called ‘Mixed Committee’, the associated 
states participate in what is in effect the Justice and Home Affairs Council, 
COREPER and the Council working groups relating to the Schengen 
agreement. Switzerland is granted the right to make ‘suggestions’ in the 
Mixed Committee, but does not have a vote, and the right to propose and 
adopt new acts is reserved to the EU and its member states (Art. 4 (4)).  
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But there are a range of indirect means whereby EFTA views can be 
fed into the process. First of all, there is not always a clear de facto 
distinction between the work of a Commission expert advisory committee 
and a drafting committee of the Council. Suggestions for possible 
approaches to drafting may well be discussed in the expert groups. During 
the Council discussions, the EFTA Secretariat can retain some contact with 
what is going on via the Commission which may feed in EFTA views. The 
EFTA Secretariat can also maintain contact with the Council Secretariat in 
order to keep abreast of developments. They can of course also attempt to 
exert some influence through bilateral diplomacy with EU member states, 
an avenue that is open to Switzerland as well. 
5.4  Incorporation and implementation of new acquis  
The EEA is the primary example of a dynamic agreement, with detailed 
provisions for the inclusion of new EU acquis into the agreement. Monthly 
meetings at senior officials level takes binding decisions by consensus on 
the incorporation of new rules and regulations into the EEA agreement, 
through their adoption in the national law of the non-EU EEA member 
states. In recent years, the number of legal acts incorporated into the 
agreement has hovered at around 300 per year.67  
As in the joint committees of the EU-Swiss bilateral agreements, 
adoption of any EU legislation or other provision into the EEA requires 
agreement in the Joint Committee of the EEA (Art. 93). In this sense, the 
EEA does not differ from the EU-Swiss agreements, or any other EU 
agreements with third countries, although the EFTA states in the EEA are 
required to speak with one voice, which is rare in EU agreements with 
third countries. Furthermore, the EEA includes provisions granting the 
EFTA states the option of opting out of any EU legislation for the EEA 
states as a group. This ‘right of reservation’, known colloquially but 
misleadingly as a ‘veto-right’, has not been used to date. If such action were 
however to be taken by either the three EEA states (which have to speak on 
this as in other EEA matters with one voice) or the EU side, the ensuing 
dispute could take several courses. If agreement concerning the 
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incorporation of secondary legislation into the EEA acquis is not found in 
the Joint Committee, the parties may then request the ECJ for an 
interpretation of the relevant rule (Art. 111). If this fails to lead to a 
solution, the outcome is either that a) the affected part of the treaty is 
suspended (Art. 102); b) the introduction of ‘safeguard measures’ by one of 
the contracting parties, which could lead to counter-measures by other 
parties (Arts 112-114); or, as a last resort, c) withdrawal from the EEA 
agreement.  
As with the existing acquis, the EEA states seem committed to 
adopting all new areas of acquis. This appears to be because the moves 
towards liberalisation represented by the EU acquis are generally in line 
with the national interests of the countries concerned. Such general support 
for the approach of the EU should not, however, disguise a number of quite 
important issues and tensions between the EEA states and the EU when it 
comes to extending the EU acquis. 
The EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA) has responsibility for 
ensuring the effective and timely implementation of the decision of the 
Joint Committee. It produces a biannual scoreboard on implementation of 
the EEA acquis, mirroring the scoreboard produced by the Commission on 
implementation of the internal market acquis in the EU. While there have 
been several instances where the EFTA states’ implementation of the acquis 
has been late or below the EU average, for much of the time since the entry 
into force of the EEA more than a decade ago, the EFTA states’ 
implementation record has been comfortably above the EU average. 
According to the 16th Internal Market Scoreboard for the EFTA states from 
the ESA of July 2005, the Implementation (or transposition) deficit of the 
three EFTA states in the EEA is lower than the average in the EU (1.4% and 
1.9%, respectively).  
In terms of the transposition process, the EEA and its ‘fast-track’ 
procedures for implementing new acquis were regarded positively 
compared with the long and unwieldy transposition process in EU-Swiss 
relations. The difference with the EEA was also noted by Swiss officials, 
who stated that a frequent Swiss position was to wait for EU member 
states, noticeably countries such as Germany and the Netherlands, to see 
how they implemented new acquis before venturing to do so at home. 
Complaints that the ESA takes an increasingly legalistic view of the 
agreement, and that they are less tolerant of special demands from the 
three EEA states, are increasingly heard among politicians in the EFTA INTEGRATION WITHOUT MEMBERSHIP | 89 
 
member states. It is frequently seen as playing a more pro-active role than 
initially envisaged and is criticised for its broad interpretations of the scope 
of the EEA agreement.68 The steadily growing number of ESA ‘own 
initiatives’ supports the view that the ESA is becoming gradually more pro-
active. Another explanation is that so far, most cases have been concerned 
with less controversial issues related to the free movement of goods, 
whereas until quite recently there had been relatively few cases in more 
controversial fields such as financial services, competition and state aid, 
reflecting the gradual completion of the single market programme also in 
these areas. That the complaints about the EEA all related to how the 
agreement has developed over time illustrate the importance of keeping in 
mind that comparisons between the EEA and the EU-Swiss bilateral 
agreements are hampered by the fact that Bilateral I only entered into force 
in June 2002, and that most of these have significant periods of transition 
before they are fully implemented.  
The ESA and the EFTA Court provide the second pillar of the EEA. 
EU institutions such as the Commission and the Court have no authority 
vis-à-vis the EFTA states of the EEA similar to that accorded to them in 
Switzerland by the air transport agreement. Whilst this is the case from a 
legal point of view, the practical outcome is that the EEA still adopts the 
EU acquis. In order to ensure the credibility of a single market spanning 
across the whole of the EEA, a homogeneous market, the ESA has to follow 
the approach adopted by the Commission when it comes to interpreting 
any piece of legislation. Material circumstances can differ and so the ESA 
and Commission positions may diverge from time to time, but close 
cooperation between the Commission and ESA has ensured that there is no 
different interpretation of the rules. On the rare occasion when the ESA 
might be in a position to set a precedent not yet covered by the EU acquis, 
the Commission has called for and obtained restraint from the ESA.  
5.5  The settlement of disputes 
In most EU agreements with third countries, the settlement of disputes 
takes place in the bilateral committee of senior officials, with final 
arbitration left to a ministerial council, or, as in the case of the EU-Swiss 
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agreements, to a Joint or Mixed Committee. Although this is also, 
ultimately, the case in the EEA agreement, a more elaborate dispute 
settlement mechanism has been established. A special court, the EFTA 
Court, was established to deal with infringement cases and for the 
settlement of disputes between the EFTA EEA states. As in the EU-Swiss 
agreements, there is no direct effect in the EFTA states as in the EU, but ECJ 
case law and the decisions of the EFTA court must be taken into account. 
Most issues are solved through these legal procedures.69 Few cases even go 
as far as the EFTA Court, and in the first nine years after the entry into 
force of the EEA, disputes were only been brought back to the EEA Council 
twice.  
The EFTA Court is also available for the review of any ESA decision 
or for redress in the case of non-implementation by an EEA state. Between 
five and ten cases annually have been decided by the EFTA Court in recent 
years.70 This compares with the more than 1,000 cases being brought to the 
ECJ and the EU Court of First Instance annually, most of which are of 
relevance to the single market. Thus, the flow of case law affecting the EEA 
comes predominantly from the EU. 
5.6  Conclusions 
Overall, the scope of the EU-Swiss bilateral agreements falls short of the 
EEA, although there are some exceptions, notably the air transport 
agreement. The former only entails partial access to the EU’s internal 
market, notably without an agreement on services. The EEA states also 
participate much more extensively in EU programmes and agencies than 
does Switzerland. This seems in line with the Commission’s argument 
following the Swiss rejection of the EEA that “it would be inappropriate for 
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Switzerland to obtain all the advantages of an Agreement which it has 
rejected”.71 
In the EEA, the cost of obtaining guaranteed market access to the 
European single market has been a reduced scope for national policy 
autonomy in the policy areas covered by the EU acquis. Experience has 
shown the limited influence of the EFTA states in case of disputes. And 
although the EEA states can opt out, there has so far been no case in which 
this has actually happened, because of the perception that the homogeneity 
of the market depends on the credibility of the tie with the EU acquis. In 
practical terms, therefore, the EEA states have had to adopt the whole 
acquis, similar to the more limited experience of Bilaterals I and II. The EU 
has also been careful to discourage any notion of the possibility to ‘cherry-
pick’ the acquis in its relations with Switzerland as well. Indeed, this trend 
has strengthened during the period when Bilaterals I and II were 
negotiated.  
Institutional weakness, which was another criticism levied against the 
EEA in the 1999 Integration Report, is arguably even more characteristic of 
EU-Swiss agreements, and is therefore an important reason why the issue 
of an association agreement has been raised (see below). The EEA seems to 
provide greater opportunities for ‘decision-shaping’ than the bilateral 
sectoral approach, although there are clear limits to this and there are no 
co-decision rights. This observation has to be qualified, however, by the 
fact that Bilateral I has only been in force for little more than three-and-a-
half years at the time of writing and it may simply be too early to tell. The 
legislative process in the EU – from the time an issue makes it onto the EU 
agenda to the enactment of new legislation – is often considerably longer 
than this.  
The obligation to speak with one voice does impose further 
constraints on national autonomy, and would be an important factor in 
case any of the three EFTA EEA states would desire to exercise the ‘right of 
reservation’, which would require negotiations among the three EFTA 
partners in the EEA. This has been a limited problem among the three 
EFTA states of the EEA, although there seems to be a tendency for Norway 
to be most positive towards the inclusion of new acquis into the agreement. 
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There were also some criticisms of Norway during the negotiations of the 
financial contribution in 2003, as its EFTA partners found it too willing to 
substantially increase the funding provided by the three EFTA states. This 
was resolved by creating a special Norwegian financial facility through 
which approximately half of the funds are channelled, the result of which is 
that Liechtenstein and Iceland contribute about half of Norway’s 
contribution to the EU in per capita terms. 
While there have been minor disputes on incorporation of new acquis 
in the EEA, a perhaps bigger challenge has been the perception that the 
scope of the EEA agreement has been gradually expanded over time, and 
that the institutions established to manage the agreement have exceeded 
their authority in interpreting the agreement. Similar concerns, in particular 
relating to the scope of the agreement, have appeared also in EU-Swiss 
relations and the agreements of Bilaterals I and II. The lesson from the EEA 
on this issue seems to be that such problems are likely to increase rather 
than diminish over time, and are thus likely to constitute a growing 
challenge for Switzerland.  
The sectoral approach has not prevented Switzerland from entering 
into commitments with the EU that it initially did not seek, such as the 
agreement on taxation of savings and the financial contribution. Another 
purported benefit of the bilateral sectoral approach was that the direct costs 
were low. The financial contribution significantly reduces the strength of 
this argument, although the costs remain far below Switzerland’s likely net 
contribution to the EU in case it were to become an EU member.  
Another purported problem with the sectoral approach cited by the 
1999 Integration Report was that the EU would be very reluctant to enter 
into new agreements, and that negotiations of such agreements would be 
lengthy due to the diversity of interests within the EU. It has indeed taken 
more than a decade to conclude the agreements sought by Switzerland 
after the rejection of the EEA in December 1992. The expectations that a 
larger Union would be less flexible in terms of exceptions and derogations 
have also been borne out in practice, with the EU adopting a more 
restrictive policy against permanent exceptions during the process leading 
up to the EU enlargement in 2004.  
The existence of a two-pillar system in the EEA seems to serve more 
of a political purpose in limiting the loss of formal sovereignty by EEA 
states, rather than to increase their national policy autonomy. In the EU-
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‘equivalence of law’ rather than ‘adoption of the acquis’ and the 
autonomous implementation of the agreements in Switzerland. But as 
former External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten, who was 
responsible for the management of the EEA as well as the negotiations on 
Bilaterals I and II, concludes: 
They enjoyed all the enhanced sovereignty that comes with staying at 
home while the decisions that intimately affect their own economic 
life are made by their neighbours in Brussels. We put a diplomatic 
gloss on it of course. But to enjoy our markets, they have to follow our 
rules; rules that they do not make or share in making. … When we 
enlarged the Union, these outer-ring countries had to pay into the 
funds that we make available to help the poorer new members. I 
remember a Swiss negotiator telephoning me to plead that this 
subscription should be presented as a voluntary donation for 
development in the deprived parts of Europe, not an additional fee for 
access to a larger market. I was happy to oblige. But we both knew 
what the truth was. De facto sovereignty or de jure?72  
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6.  The prospects for relations between 
the EU and Switzerland 
The overall conclusion of this study is that so far, three and a half years 
after the entry into force, the Bilateral I package of sector-specific 
agreements between the EU and Switzerland is functioning well. There 
have been no significant conflicts between the two sides and although there 
have been a few minor disputes on some of the agreements, all of these 
have been resolved in a friendly manner.  
Their ability to find amicable solutions and willingness to use the 
institutional framework of the bilateral agreements indicate a broad 
commonality of interest between the EU and Switzerland. Significant 
changes in the EU in important areas for EU-Swiss relations, for instance on 
free movement of persons, air transport and Schengen cooperation in the 
wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, have been handled 
smoothly between the EU and Switzerland.  
Furthermore, the two parties seem content with the bilateral sectoral 
approach. Although the Swiss application has only been ‘frozen’ and not 
withdrawn, there is broad agreement among the political parties in 
Switzerland that the bilateral sectoral approach is the only viable 
alternative in the foreseeable future. This appears to be supported by the 
Swiss public. There have been three referenda on Bilaterals I and II, all of 
which have been supported by the Swiss people, while the most recent 
proposal to re-activate the membership application in 2001 was firmly 
rejected (77% against). The Swiss parliament has twice rejected motions to 
withdraw the Swiss membership application. Important Swiss actors, such 
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membership for Switzerland, are now, following the conclusion of 
Bilaterals I and II, content with the bilateral sectoral approach currently 
pursued by the Swiss government.73 Most interlocutors agreed that it was 
now time to implement Bilaterals I and II and allow them to operate for at 
least a few years before any debate on more fundamental alternatives to the 
bilateral sectoral approach is contemplated. A first official assessment is 
expected in a new comprehensive report on Switzerland and the EU to be 
prepared by the Swiss government in 2006. 
6.1  Full implementation of Bilateral I and Bilateral II 
The entry into force and full implementation of Bilateral II as well as of 
Bilateral I will be a major preoccupation in EU- Swiss relations well into the 
next decade.  
As there is no guillotine clause in Bilateral II apart from the link 
between Schengen and Dublin, the entry into force of the nine agreements 
will be on an individual basis. Three of the nine agreements in Bilateral II – 
on processed agricultural products, taxation on savings and pensions – 
entered into force in 2005. It is expected that the Schengen association 
agreement might enter into force in early 2006. But Switzerland is behind 
the new member states in the queue to join the Schengen area. The latter is 
expected to occur in the second half of 2007, which would mean that the 
Schengen association agreement would be fully implemented and border 
controls lifted in early 2008.  
Although the incorporation of new acquis  into the Schengen 
association agreement requires Swiss consent, the fact that such a rejection 
entails the termination of the entire agreement increases the stakes and 
makes it unlikely that Switzerland will oppose any new measures. While 
this seems clear to Swiss officials, they do not expect this to become a big 
problem, as they do not foresee any significant new Schengen-relevant 
acquis as emerging in coming years.  
Swiss officials have participated in the Schengen association 
institutions since the signing of the agreement in October 2004. This 
includes participation in more than 30 working groups in the Commission, 
both in the preparatory phase of legislation and on implementation, and in 
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the Council managing the Schengen and Dublin conventions. There are 
indications that the Swiss take a more cautious line in the Mixed 
Committee on whether or not new acquis in the justice and home affairs 
field is ‘Schengen-relevant’ than the position taken by the other Schengen 
associates Norway and Iceland. On the future development of Schengen 
and the eventual adoption of new legislation in Switzerland, some Swiss 
officials did not expect any significant developments to the Schengen 
acquis, and were thus rather dismissive of suggestions that this represented 
an important challenge in the years ahead. This seems a rather sanguine 
view, particularly in light of the conclusion of the Treaty of Prüm among 
seven EU member states in May 2005. This treaty aims to enhance 
cooperation on Schengen-relevant issues and although it was concluded 
outside the EU framework. The expectation is that this will eventually be 
part of the Schengen regime of the EU.74 
The entry into force of the rest of the agreements of Bilateral II is 
expected in 2006 in the case of the agreements on environment and MEDIA 
or in 2007, in the case of the statistics agreement. This will then be followed 
by the establishment of a further six bilateral committees, which will first 
need to establish their own rules of procedure.  
New acquis and other developments in the EU will also have to be 
handled in the more dynamic agreements. In air transport, there is still a 
backlog of legislation to be incorporated into the agreement, although this 
has recently been reduced. A consolidated version of the Air Transport 
agreement including the amendments made since entry into force in 2002 is 
to be made available to the public in 2006. 
6.2  Future agreements 
The conclusion of Bilateral II does not spell the end of the development of 
EU-Swiss contractual relations. A series of further bilateral agreements 
between the EU and Switzerland are ‘in the pipeline’, and one can expect a 
number of adaptations to existing agreements, as the EU continues to 
evolve.  
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6.2.1  Agreements under discussion 
A number of potential bilateral agreements are under discussion between 
Switzerland and the EU. These include agreements providing for Swiss 
participation in EU programmes and agencies and further sectoral 
agreements. There have also been talks on Swiss participation in the EU’s 
GALILEO satellite navigation project and Swiss association with the 
European Food Safety Agency. On education, Switzerland has shown an 
interest in participating in the European Centre for the Development of 
Vocational Training and EURYDICE, the European educational 
information network. Switzerland also seeks some sort of participation in 
the recently established European Railway Safety Agency. 
The EU and Switzerland are also negotiating a framework agreement 
on the financial and legal aspects of Swiss participation in ESDP operations. 
Switzerland participates in several EU operations, with both civilian and 
military personnel, for instance in the EU Police Mission and the military 
operation (EUFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the monitoring mission in 
Aceh, Indonesia and participated in the now completed Operation Proxima 
in Macedonia. This has so far taken place on the basis of ad hoc agreements 
negotiated for each operation.  
There have also been talks on electricity issues, such as transit and 
market access. The EU’s main concern is the need to improve the Swiss 
electricity grid, seen as an important cause behind the blackout in Italy in 
2002. Switzerland recently amended its legislation in line with the 
standards of the Florence Electricity Regulators Forum. Switzerland on its 
side is interested in obtaining access to the liberalised EU market. 
According to EU officials, it is not difficult to envisage additional topics 
that may lead to the conclusion of subsequent agreements.  
In light of the previous bundling of negotiations into packages, one 
question that arose in the interviews was whether a Bilateral III package is 
contemplated. The short answer to this question was a unanimous ‘no’ 
from the EU and Swiss officials interviewed. This method yields a lengthy 
and cumbersome negotiation process and can easily be regarded as an 
unreasonable approach insofar as cooperation in one area may become 
entirely dependent upon cooperation (or lack thereof) on a completely 
unrelated dossier.  
Indeed, Bilateral I may turn out to be an exception born of 
exceptional circumstances following the Swiss rejection of the EEA and 98 | VAHL & GROLIMUND 
 
subsequent request for a somewhat ‘lighter’ alternative in the shape of a set 
of sectoral agreements. The trend away from package negotiations emerged 
in the period between negotiations over the two sets of agreements, 
evidenced in the fact that Bilateral II was in several respects less of a set 
package than Bilateral I. While the agreements of Bilateral II were signed at 
the same time, the launch of negotiations were staggered, with negotiations 
on four dossiers starting in 2001, followed by another four dossiers in mid-
2002 and a final dossier towards the end of that year. More importantly, 
there is no ‘guillotine clause’ linking the agreements of Bilateral II, apart 
from the linkage between the Schengen and Dublin accords.  
6.2.2  Outstanding issues  
There are also two outstanding issues from the Bilateral II talks that have 
not been resolved. First, Switzerland and the EU have not agreed as of 
early 2006 on the Swiss financial contribution. Although agreement was 
reached in principle in autumn 2003, the main outstanding issue concerns 
whether parts of the Swiss contribution will be allocated to ‘old’ but less 
prosperous EU member states such as Greece, Spain and Portugal. The 
contribution was initially intended for the 2005-09 period, but with the 
delay the five-year period is now from late 2006 to 2011. 
The second outstanding issue concerns an agreement on services, 
which was initially part of the negotiations of Bilateral II. After a few 
rounds of negotiations, however, it became clear that the positions of the 
two parties were too far apart. It was in the course of these negotiations 
that the EU began to manifest its reluctance to tolerate exceptions to the 
acquis. The EU did not agree with the Swiss proposal for a more limited 
agreement covering only certain specified sectors, and insisted on a broad 
agreement including EU competition policy and company law, as well as 
flanking policies, the inclusion of which is difficult to delineate. An 
agreement on the EU’s terms would, according to EU officials, require 
further reforms of the services sector in Switzerland to comply with EU 
competition policies. 
It was thus decided in March 2003 that since it would not be possible 
to conclude an agreement in parallel with the other agreements of Bilateral 
II, negotiations would be put on hold and resumed at a later unspecified 
date. Both Swiss and EU officials contend that such an agreement will 
eventually be concluded, although neither side appears to envisage the 
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complicated by the fact that the single market in services is far from 
completed, and that the required legislation is highly politically sensitive 
within the EU. It seems unlikely that negotiations with Switzerland will 
resume before some of the key pending pieces, such as the services 
directive, have been adopted by the EU.  
6.2.3  Expected adaptations to existing agreements 
There are also likely to be negotiations on amendments to existing 
agreements. A new protocol on the free movement of persons extending 
the agreement to also cover Romania and Bulgaria is likely to be negotiated 
from 2006 onward, and will in due course be followed by further protocols 
when (or if) the EU enlarges further.  
Swiss participation in EU programmes negotiated in Bilaterals I and 
II will have to be re-negotiated as the multi-year programmes expire. This 
is relevant for the research agreement with the expiry of the 6th Framework 
Programme and the audio-visual agreement with the expiry of the MEDIA 
programmes, both at the end of 2006.  
Amendments to the agriculture agreement are also in the pipeline, in 
particular a protocol on mutual protection of labels for protected 
geographic indications. This had been on the Swiss list in 1993 and the 
negotiation of this protocol was envisaged in a joint declaration made 
during the signing of Bilateral I in 1999.  
Issues related to earlier agreements are also likely to arise. One such 
issue concerns the corporate tax regimes. In late 2005, the European 
Commission raised the question whether certain corporate tax regimes in 
certain Swiss cantons should be considered ‘predatory’ in the context of the 
1972 agreement. Switzerland contends that this is not covered by the 
agreement. The matter is as of early 2006 subject to an intensive dialogue 
between the EU and Switzerland including at the ministerial level.75 
                                                      
75 See for instance “No breakthrough in Swiss-EU tax dispute” (downloaded from 
www.swisspolitics.org, dated 15 December 2005) and “Swiss defend corporate tax 
regime”, Financial Times, 14 February 2006.  100 | VAHL & GROLIMUND 
 
6.2.4  Other developments 
The Europeanisation of Switzerland is likely to continue beyond the further 
development of contractual relations between Switzerland and the EU. As 
long as Eurolex remains, Swiss legislation will become ever more EU 
compatible, regardless of the direct implications of existing and future 
bilateral agreements.  
Further unilateral measures of Europeanisation can be expected. The 
Cassis de Dijon principle, which applies to non-harmonised products in the 
single European market and which is extended to the EEA, is not included 
in the agreement on technical barriers to trade between the EU and 
Switzerland. However, the Federal Council has decided to open the Swiss 
market – in accordance with the Cassis de Dijon principle to products 
circulating freely within the EU – even if the EU as such has no plans to 
reciprocate. The Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO) is 
therefore currently preparing a revision of the federal statute of technical 
barriers to trade. The interested groups will be consulted in spring 2006 
followed by a plenum debate in the Federal Assembly towards the end of 
the year. It seemed at the time of writing likely that the principle would be 
adopted with important caveats, notably excluding territorial application of 
intellectual property rights, which would reduce the impact of its unilateral 
adoption by Switzerland.  
6.3  Adaptations to the bilateral sectoral approach 
6.3.1  The idea of an association agreement 
The idea of a framework association agreement was raised in the public 
discourse by Swiss officials in spring 2005.76 The idea of an association 
treaty “going beyond the content of the EEA … specifically tailored to suit 
Switzerland” was raised briefly in the 1999 Integration Report. It was 
however dismissed, as it “presupposes a willingness of the EU to negotiate 
in this sense and fails to recognise that only EU Member States can exercise 
rights of co-decision”. The need for improved coordination of EU-Swiss 
relations to improve the functioning of the bilateral agreements and the 
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activities of the joint committees has been discussed much in recent 
months, and is apparently to be examined further by European and Swiss 
experts.77  
EU officials seemed to think that the idea of an association agreement 
was raised by Swiss officials in part as a potential replacement for the 
existing bilateral agreements in the event of a ‘no’ vote in the referendum 
on 25 September 2005 on the extension of the agreement on free movement 
of persons to the new EU member states in Central and Eastern Europe. 
From this perspective, the ‘yes’ vote implies that the question of an 
association agreement is now moot.  
The position of the various Swiss officials interviewed varied 
considerably on this issue. Overall, however, most Swiss officials seem 
sceptical of the idea of an association agreement for the purpose of 
coordinating the bilateral agreements. According to the majority of those 
interviewed, an overarching coordination (or ‘chapeau’) committee would 
not be a good instrument to improve the effectiveness and coordination of 
the institutional framework. The most frequent argument used against such 
a committee was that it would politicise the existing dialogue, which is 
mainly of a non-political and technical nature. Such a committee would 
necessarily entail more expenditure and complexity without improving the 
efficiency of the agreements. Another concern expressed was the fear that 
the amicable and cooperative spirit with which solutions are pursued in the 
joint committees could be lost by the establishment of a higher-level 
committee.  
A perhaps more promising idea to improve coordination would be a 
more ambitious proposal to merge the various joint committees into one 
association committee, similar to the EEA Joint Committee and indeed 
most other senior officials institutions in EU external relations agreements. 
This would however require renegotiation of the entire set of bilateral 
sectoral agreements, a prospect neither side is likely to support. 
The interviewees on the EU side were also mostly against the idea of 
an association agreement to coordinate existing agreements (the ‘chapeau’ 
idea). However, some interlocutors, both on the EU and on the Swiss side 
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in Brussels, argued on the contrary that such a coordination committee 
could be useful exactly in order to politicise issues and provide linkages 
between various policy areas as a means of finding acceptable overall 
solutions in case of multiple blockages on different dossiers.  
Some Swiss interlocutors were in favour of improving coordination 
of the bilateral agreements by establishing an institutionalised joint 
committee at the ministerial level. For the interlocutors on the EU side, 
while agreeing on the need for a better political dialogue as indeed agreed 
at the first-ever bilateral EU-Swiss summit in 2004, the idea of an 
association agreement as a means of institutionalising this high-level 
political dialogue was not regarded favourably. It would in this view be 
better if such dialogue took place on an ad hoc basis. Another possibility 
would be to integrate a high-level dialogue in the 1972 agreement. 
The experience concerning the political dialogue in the EEA and 
other association agreements between the EU and non-member states over 
the last decade is relevant in the debate on a possible association agreement 
between the EU and Switzerland. The initial idea when the EEA agreement 
was concluded was that the EEA Council would consist of the 15 foreign 
ministers of the EU, the three foreign ministers of the EEA states and the 
European Commissioner for External Relations. Over time, however, a 
practice developed whereby the EU side was represented not by the foreign 
ministers of the member states and then Commissioner, but by their 
d e p u t i e s  o r  s e n i o r  o f f i cials. This model was increasingly seen as 
unsatisfactory, not just for the EEA but also in general for the EU’s hugely 
expanding set of association agreements. The size of the association 
councils (in the case of the EEA consisting of 19 principals at the time) was 
found to be too cumbersome, with most of the time consumed by formal 
statements. In mid-2000, the EU streamlined its participation in all 
association councils, including the EEA. Instead of the EU-15 model, the EU 
is now represented by a ‘Troika’, consisting of the foreign minister of the 
rotating EU Presidency, the relevant European Commissioner and the High 
Representative for the CFSP. While this facilitates the proceedings and 
improves the possibilities for a real debate among the interlocutors, the 
absence of the member states reduces the potential significance of the 
political dialogue.  
In part to respond to these changes, the idea of an upgrade or an 
update of the EEA agreement was briefly raised in EFTA and discussed 
informally between the EEA states and the Commission in 2001 and 2002. INTEGRATION WITHOUT MEMBERSHIP | 103 
 
Several possibilities were debated, from a technical update to take account 
of legal changes in the EU since the signing of the EEA to a more 
comprehensive upgrade of the agreement to incorporate other agreements 
such as the Schengen association, enhanced political dialogue and greater 
participation in decision-shaping. However, the EU’s response was 
negative and the idea was subsequently dropped.  
The regular meetings that take place between the EFTA states and the 
EU outside of the EEA institutions are in any case probably more important 
than the political dialogue conducted within the EEA framework. In the 
case of Norway, these include the meetings between the Norwegian Prime 
Minister and the EU Presidency held at the beginning of each Presidency 
and the annual lunch meetings between EU and EEA finance ministers. The 
Norwegian Foreign Minister normally also meets bilaterally with EU 
colleagues and EU representatives in connection with meetings of the EEA 
Council. The most frequent meetings between Norway and the EU at a 
high political level are however those that take place on an ad hoc basis, 
between EU representatives and Norwegian ministers, bilaterally with EU 
member state governments or multilaterally, and increasingly consultations 
through Norway’s multiple association arrangements with the EU (CFSP, 
ESDP, Schengen, etc.) beyond the EEA. 
In spite of these caveats, and in comparison with the less frequent 
and ad hoc nature of the EU-Swiss political dialogue, the institutionalised 
political dialogue through the EEA agreement provides a useful regular 
forum to discuss broader political developments. It also facilitates early 
participation in new EU programmes and agencies. The EFTA states in the 
EEA joined the EASA in mid-2005, while Swiss participation is expected 
only in 2006. Switzerland is experiencing similar ‘queuing problems’ 
concerning their Schengen association. The main reason why this will not 
be fully implemented until 2008 is that Switzerland have to wait for the full 
inclusion of the new EU member states into the Schengen system at the end 
of 2007.  
An association agreement between the EU and Switzerland could 
provide for such an enhanced and regularised dialogue, although the 
experience of the EFTA states in the EEA seems to be that other irregular 
channels of communication and dialogue at the highest political level are 
perhaps more important. A regular political dialogue instituted by a 
possible association agreement should be regarded as a complement rather 
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6.3.2  Any role for the EEA institutions? 
Switzerland already benefits from its membership in EFTA through its 
observer status in the EFTA Standing Committee and in the EEA Joint 
Parliamentary Committee, and Swiss ‘social partners’ participate in the 
EEA Consultative Committee. However, the EFTA Court and the ESA are 
not involved in EU-Swiss relations. One question raised in the interviews 
with EU and Swiss officials was whether the deficiencies encountered in 
the bilateral sectoral approach could be improved through use of the EFTA 
institutions for the EEA, the ESA and the EFTA Court. 
Swiss officials were generally lukewarm to such ideas. The need for a 
more formal arbitration mechanism, which could be envisaged with the 
EFTA Court playing a role, was not seen as necessary, and the idea of 
giving the ESA a role in surveillance of the EU-Swiss agreements was 
rejected.  
On the EU side, although Swiss participation in the EEA would be 
easier, the idea of utilising the EEA institutions did not receive any support, 
unless this was by way of full Swiss participation in the EEA.  
6.3.3  Other proposals 
Most Swiss interlocutors reacted negatively to the idea of creating a more 
formalised arbitration process in the joint committees than what exists in 
the current agreements, although some were in favour of establishing some 
form of mediation procedure.  
A number of practical suggestions to improve the transparency of the 
activities of the bilateral committees emerged in the interviews. Although 
the nature of these committees as institutions of international law and the 
problem of approval by the government limit the scope of transparency, 
one could raise the question whether it would be possible to at least name 
the EU directives and regulations envisaged to be incorporated in the 
annexes. The interested public would then at least be in a position to 
inform themselves on the aims and content of those provisions.  
Although Bilaterals I and II are less extensive than the EEA, they 
represent a significant increase in the workload of all branches of 
government in Switzerland. One lesson from the EEA experience is the 
difficulty in keeping parliament actively involved. This raises important 
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available to their task of oversight of foreign affairs than do their EFTA 
counterparts.  
Whether the system of transparency regarding the developments in 
the bilateral agreements should be improved with centralising measures 
was one of the main topics that emerged from the study. The discussion 
focused on the idea of establishing a ‘central secretariat’ either within one 
of the existing institutions (for instance the Federal Chancellery or the 
Integration Bureau) or by the creation of a new institution to improve the 
transparency of the activities of the joint committees.  
Most interview-partners in Switzerland reacted positively to the idea 
of creating a centralised secretariat gathering and disseminating 
information from the joint committees and the involved departments. Some 
officials interjected that a new secretariat would be redundant, as such an 
institution, the Integration Bureau, already exist. More specifically, the 
officials in favour considered an improvement of the homepage of the 
Confederation’s website (www.kdk.ch) to be very important. It should be 
updated more regularly and also linked to the departments involved with 
the new EU-regulation and EU jurisdiction in the specific areas. The idea 
was not only to inform the public in a more specific and open way about 
the actions in the committees, but also to provide a clear and 
comprehensive overview of ECJ rulings and EU acquis incorporated into all 
of the agreements, for instance through a federal website with a list of EU 
acquis in the different agreements. The European Commission is currently 
establishing a delegation in Berne, which could contribute to enhancing the 
information flow, accessibility and transparency. 
Better coordination and more resources are obvious remedies to 
resolve or reduce the main apprehensions of Swiss officials concerning the 
lack of transparency and information. The EEA experience has shown the 
importance of political will to follow developments in the EU to take full 
advantage of the opportunities of decision-making provided by the 
agreement. It further showed, however, that the EU associated state should 
have no illusions as to the limits of decision-shaping and the importance 
the EU attaches to its own decision-making autonomy.  
6.4  A new approach for EU-Swiss relations 
The bilateral agreements are functioning well. There is broad support for 
the bilateral sectoral approach in Switzerland. In a comparative 
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most in EU external relations, and the EU is unlikely to request any 
fundamental change in EU-Swiss relations in the foreseeable future. There 
are however several arguments in favour of an assessment of the more 
fundamental alternatives, as opposed to more limited improvements and 
adaptations, to the bilateral sectoral approach that has characterised EU-
Swiss relations over the last half-century.  
One reason is the prospect of further referenda in Switzerland. 
Popular votes on the relationship with the EU have become almost annual 
events in Switzerland. Uncertainty about the outcome of the referendum on 
the extension of the free movement of persons to the new member states in 
Central and Eastern Europe on 25 September 2005 raised the prospect of 
abrogation of many of the bilateral agreements. Had the Swiss people 
rejected this extension, the EU would not have been able to accept the 
resulting discrimination between the citizens of old and new member 
states, and would in all likelihood have withdrawn from the agreement. 
This would in turn have triggered the so-called ‘guillotine clause’ and the 
termination of an additional five agreements of Bilateral I. Moreover, the 
unravelling would probably not have ended there. According to the EU, an 
agreement on free movement of labour was a fundamental requirement for 
Swiss inclusion in the Schengen area, although there are no legal provisions 
linking the two. A termination of the agreement on free movement of 
persons between the EU and Switzerland would thus likely trigger an EU 
withdrawal from the Schengen association agreement with Switzerland. 
This agreement is linked legally to the Dublin association agreement on 
asylum, which Switzerland is now set to join. To sum up, a rejection of a 
protocol to one agreement in Bilateral I could all too easily have resulted in 
the termination of about half of the agreements of Bilaterals I and II, most 
of which have no direct relevance to the protocol extending the agreement 
on free movement of persons to the new EU member states in Central and 
Eastern Europe.  
While the extension was supported by a comfortable majority of 56% 
on that occasion, future enlargements of the EU might not be as popular in 
Switzerland. A protocol on the extension of the agreement on the free 
movement of persons to Romania and Bulgaria when they accede in 2007 
or 2008 is likely to be raised by the European Commission in 2006. A 
protocol will also be needed to accommodate the EU accession of Croatia, 
which, following the imprisonment of war criminal General Gotovina in 
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followed sometime during the next decade by further protocols for the 
accession of other currently acknowledged candidates such as Turkey and 
Macedonia, and other potential members such as Albania and the rest of 
the former Yugoslav republics.  
One cannot rule out that unexpected ‘events’ could occur that create 
demands from the EU for further agreements in areas that are politically 
sensitive in Switzerland, or from Switzerland in areas that are difficult for 
the EU. A recent example of this was the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
which had a significant impact on several of the agreements of Bilaterals I 
and II, notably those on air transport, the fight against fraud, 
Schengen/Dublin and taxation of savings, and raised difficult issues 
challenging Swiss policy related to banking secrecy. Another recent 
example was the electricity blackout in northern Italy in the summer of 
2002,  ostensibly in part a result of an accident in the Swiss electricity 
infrastructure. The EU has now requested an agreement on electricity 
infrastructure and market access. 
A revival of the EU Constitution could have consequences for EU-
Swiss relations in the long-term. It is not unimaginable that pressures to 
simplify the EU could extend also to its contractual relations in external 
relations. The EU would acquire a legal personality as a result of the 
Constitution, which would change the legal basis for relations with third 
countries. The adaptation of existing agreements to this new reality, which 
could be reduced to a practical technical matter, may be regarded as an 
opportunity to overhaul relations with third countries. The Constitution 
includes a clause providing for a new type of contractual arrangement with 
neighbouring countries. 
Broader developments in the EU, such as the completion of the 
internal market and the ‘area of freedom, security and justice’ could give 
rise to further issues in EU-Swiss relations. Global developments, for 
instance the (eventual) completion of the Doha round of the WTO, are 
likely to spur developments between the EU and Switzerland in various 
areas. The latter example would particularly affect, for instance, agriculture 
and competition policy. Although there has been no global currency crisis 
for almost a decade, there were several in the previous decade, and one 
cannot rule this out in light of the profound financial imbalances in the 
global economy, although it is difficult to predict the consequences for the 
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Some have predicted that the outcome of the current crisis in the EU 
following the French and Dutch rejections of the Constitutional Treaty will 
result in more variable geometry in the EU, with member states opting out 
of common policies in various areas. One result of this is that in substantial 
terms the difference between insiders ‘opting out’ and outsiders ‘opting in’ 
is further reduced. This is already the case in several areas of EU policy, 
notably on monetary union, in the field of justice and home affairs, where 
several non-member states have opted out of Schengen cooperation which 
includes non-member states, and in the ESDP, in which some member 
states do not participate but which includes a number of non-member 
states. More variable geometry will affect the definition of the scope of the 
various agreements. With more opt-outs from member states, the issue of 
‘relevance’ of new acquis to areas of partial participation of EU member 
states is likely to become more prominent, and likely further limit the 
influence of non-member states in determining whether new acquis will be 
defined as falling within the scope of a given agreement or not.  
One could not exclude the possibility that Switzerland will become 
less enamoured with the bilateral sectoral approach as it progresses further. 
One of the supposed benefits of the bilateral approach was that it was a 
more ‘static’ model compared with the more ‘dynamic’ EEA, giving greater 
autonomy to Swiss authorities to determine the scope and depth of 
cooperation and integration. But as this study has demonstrated, the 
relationship between Switzerland and the EU is highly dynamic. A 
formally ‘static’ agreement does not prevent a dynamic development of a 
relationship, if circumstances require a change and the parties agree. The 
1972 agreement has for instance been updated and amended more than 15 
times since it was negotiated. Indeed, the bilateral relationship with 
Switzerland has probably seen the most significant upgrade in EU external 
relations in recent years and has had a significant impact on the way in 
which Switzerland governs itself, as both the EU and Switzerland have 
ended up with more agreements with the other than what was sought in 
the early 1990s. Furthermore, as the discussion in the sections above has 
shown, it seems clear that this dynamism will continue over the course of 
the next decade, as new agreements are concluded and existing agreements 
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6.4.1  Alternatives to the bilateral sectoral approach 
The bilateral sectoral approach was the third alternative of the Federal 
Council before the negotiations of Bilaterals I and II. Both of the two 
preferred options – full EU membership and participation in the EEA – 
remain open to Switzerland. One of the great challenges for the Swiss 
government will be to explain the pro’s and con’s of the bilateral sectoral 
approach, full EU membership and other theoretical alternatives in an open 
dialogue and in a transparent and coherent way.  
The Swiss EU membership application is currently suspended, and 
although there is a simmering debate on whether or not it should be 
withdrawn, this seems to receive limited support in Switzerland, even if 
neutrality, initially the main argument against Swiss membership in the 
European Community, is no longer considered an obstacle. However, there 
is also little support for reviving the membership application. On the EU 
side, in spite of the supposed ‘enlargement fatigue’ after the rejection of the 
EU Constitution, Swiss membership is widely supported. In a 2005 poll of 
EU citizens, Switzerland was the most popular potential member of the EU, 
with 78% in favour of enlargement to Switzerland, and only 13% against. 
However, ‘enlargement fatigue’ has raised another obstacle to future EU 
enlargement (to Switzerland or any other country seeking membership), 
namely the prospect of referenda in EU countries. In March 2004, the 
French Constitution was changed so that any future treaties of EU 
accession require the consent of the French people in a referendum. 
Possible referenda on future EU enlargements have also been discussed in 
other EU member states such as the Netherlands and Austria. As long as 
the debate on the EU Constitution remains unresolved, and the Treaty of 
Nice remains the legal basis of the EU, enlargement beyond the accession of 
Romania and Bulgaria is impossible, unless the member states are able to 
agree on an institutional set-up that can accommodate more than 27 
member states.  
The EEA is also open to Switzerland. Although Bilaterals I and II 
entail a quantum leap of integration and cooperation between the EU and 
Switzerland, they remain significantly less extensive than EU relations with 
the EEA states. While the European Commission, which handles the day-
to-day operations of EU-Swiss relations, might favour this for practical 
administrative reasons, the EU is highly unlikely to push for Switzerland 
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The idea of a customs union between the EU and Switzerland was 
raised in most of the interviews. Overall, the response was negative. On the 
EU side, the practical difficulties in managing the EU-Turkey customs 
union was cited as resulting in a general reluctance towards customs 
unions with third countries within the EU. Others noted a recent 
development towards a more pro-active trade policy in EFTA compared 
with the EU, with initiatives to conclude free trade agreements with non-
EU countries before the EU has negotiated similar agreements with these 
countries. This is also taking pace on a bilateral basis, with the ongoing 
exploratory talks between Switzerland and the US on a possible free trade 
agreement as the most prominent example.  
One could of course also envisage alternatives of less integration and 
cooperation between the EU and Switzerland. One of the claimed 
advantages of the sectoral approach according to the 1999 Integration 
Report was that it would allow Switzerland to exert a greater influence in 
determining the sectors subject to EU-Swiss cooperation. This does not 
seem to be borne out in practice. Indeed, the pressure on Switzerland to 
extend cooperation to areas of the EU’s choosing has been greater than on 
the EFTA states of the EEA, seen in connection with Bilateral II and the 
agreements on taxation of savings, fraud, Schengen and the financial 
contribution. However, this is more an unfortunate coincidence in the 
timing of bilateral negotiations and legislative developments in the EU 
with the particular interests of Switzerland (notably relating to banking 
secrecy), rather than the result of a systemic difference between the EEA 
and the EU-Swiss bilateral sectoral approach. Furthermore, the ‘guillotine 
clause’ and other linkages between the EU-Swiss reduce the flexibility in 
fine-tuning the policy areas subject to formal cooperation, ostensibly one of 
the principal benefits of the sectoral approach. Attempts to halt, 
circumscribe or reduce cooperation in specific sectors could easily unravel 
a large number of the agreements reached between the EU and 
Switzerland, making a slight downgrading of cooperation and integration 
highly problematic. 
6.5  A unique Swiss model?  
To what extent can one speak of a unique ‘Swiss model’ of integration 
without EU membership? The bilateral sectoral approach pursued by 
Switzerland in its relationship with the EU is sometimes regarded as a 
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the result of the national specificities of Switzerland and the particular 
historical context in which the principal agreements were negotiated. Some 
EU officials claimed that the EU would not have accepted an agreement on 
free movement of persons without any explicit reference to the acquis had 
Bilateral I been negotiated today. The services agreement was a first victim 
of the EU’s new less flexible approach in terms of acknowledging the acquis 
as the explicit reference and no acceptance of permanent derogations. 
Indeed, the EU’s flexibility has in all likelihood been further reduced after 
the negotiations of Bilateral II were concluded, due to the May 2004 
enlargement. Switzerland is not particularly high on the agenda of the new 
member states.  
The reduced tolerance towards exceptions and the greater difficulties 
in reaching any agreement within the Council make it even more arduous 
to agree on comprehensive packages of cooperation with third countries 
such as Bilaterals I and II. This reduces the scope for an a la carte approach 
to the acquis by third countries. Instead, the selection of topics proceeds on 
a quid pro quo basis, with concessions granted in one agreement offset by 
commitments in other areas. Officials interviewed for this study claimed 
for instance that EU support for Bilateral II, and the Schengen association 
and its specific derogations in particular, depended on agreement on the 
financial contribution.  
A key feature of the Swiss model is the sectoral nature of contractual 
relations. This is often contrasted with the comprehensive nature of the 
EEA, as well as other associations such as the Europe agreements, the 
Stability and Association agreements with the Western Balkans, etc. This 
difference is however less than it may appear. First, bilateralism is the 
dominant approach in EU external relations, and the EEA is the main 
exception that confirms this rule. Secondly, most third countries with 
extensive ties to the EU have indeed a number of sectoral contractual 
arrangements beyond their principal framework agreements. Over time, 
these are becoming an increasingly important element of the overall 
relationships. This is in part a result of the pillar structure of the EU and its 
complex legal personality. The EU Constitution included provisions to 
abolish the pillar structure and give legal personality to the Union as such. 
As long as the constitutional crisis remains unresolved, the institutional 
complexity of EU external relations is likely to continue to grow.  
The Swiss model stands out not so much because of the bilateral 
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bilateral ‘framework’ agreement. In most cases, a comprehensive bilateral 
agreement provides the framework for the conduct and development of 
relations between these third countries and the EU. Interaction takes place 
in a single set of institutions. The typical format consists of a 
cooperation/association council at the foreign ministers/commissioner 
level, a cooperation or association committee at the level of senior officials 
supported by a set of sectoral sub-committees of experts and lower-level 
officials. This executive branch structure is accompanied by a 
parliamentary committee consisting of representatives of third-country 
national parliaments and the European Parliament. In many cases the 
official institutions are supplemented by institutions and/or mechanisms 
of dialogue between non-state actors (trade unions, industry federations, 
business, etc). Although the 1972 agreements could be regarded as such a 
‘framework agreement’, it does not include provisions for a regularised and 
multi-faceted political dialogue as is typically the case in such agreements 
between the EU and other non-member states.  
The absence of such an overarching framework agreement means 
that there is less institutionalised political dialogue between the EU and 
Switzerland than between the EU and most other third countries. As a 
consequence, Swiss concerns are less likely to receive a hearing and be 
raised on the EU’s agenda, unless the issue is also significant to any of the 
EU member states. Most of the officials interviewed, in particular on the EU 
side, emphasised that this dialogue played a limited role in the shaping of 
the overall relationship. Furthermore, it has not prevented the 
establishment of a parliamentary dialogue and the Swiss associations 
participate alongside and together with their European counterparts. 
Switzerland also enjoys additional benefits through its EFTA membership.  
There are however several aspects of the experiences of the EU-Swiss 
bilateral sectoral agreements that could be relevant in considering the long-
term perspectives of the European Neighbourhood Policy. The partial 
integration of EU-Swiss agreements provides a potential model for the ENP 
slogans ‘everything but institutions’ and a ‘stake in the single market’. The 
experiences of the EU-Swiss partial integration agreements can perhaps 
provide some lessons that could be helpful in assessing the feasibility and 
likely challenges of the partial integration envisaged under the Stability 
and Association Process (SAP) and the ENP. 
One such challenge concerns difficulties in delineating the specific 
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agreements. This indicates the limits of the a la carte approach to European 
integration, insofar as the EU institutions regard the acquis as one single 
body of law and not simply as a set of individual and unrelated pieces of 
legislation.  
Due to the significant differences between the agreements, one can in 
fact speak of several Swiss models of association with the EU. There is for 
instance an EU-Swiss ‘air transport model’. Here the acquis is explicitly the 
legal basis of cooperation, and the EU institutions – the European 
Commission and the European Court of Justice – have competences in 
surveillance and arbitration in specified areas (in this case competition and 
state aid policies in the field of civil aviation). The Schengen association 
agreements provide another model differing from the standard EU 
cooperation and association agreements. The ‘Schengen association model’ 
goes further in granting access to the decision-making process in EU 
institutions than any other EU third-country agreement. Representatives of 
the associated states here participate with a say, but not a vote, in the EU 
Council of Ministers machinery (in the guise of the Schengen Mixed 
Committee) at the level of experts, junior and senior officials and ministers. 
As in the ‘air transport model’, participation of the associated state is 
explicitly based on the acquis.  
These two agreements could provide ideas for the EU’s fledgling 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), for instance by giving the 
European Court of Justice a greater role in the process of providing the 
ENP partners a ‘stake in the single market’ (the ‘Swiss air transport’ model) 
or giving the neighbours a more inclusive role in the decision-shaping and 
processes within the EU (the ‘Schengen association model’). 
The 1999 Integration Report predicted that the growing size of the EU 
constituted one of the principal challenges of the bilateral sectoral 
approach. This seems to have been borne out in practice. With more 
member states it is more difficult to reach agreement within the EU and 
consequently there is less flexibility in negotiating with third parties. In EU-
Swiss relations, as with other EU neighbours, the ‘equivalence of law’ has 
been replaced with ‘adoption of the acquis’. For other EU associates, it has 
in addition entailed also a gradual de facto downgrading of the political 
dialogue. Indeed, obtaining special privileges and specific exemptions is 
likely to become increasingly difficult for any third country wishing to 
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This poses particular challenges for countries such as Switzerland, 
which seems to take special pride in its exceptionalism. Indeed, broader 
European and global developments over the last couple of decades have 
reduced the significance of many of the key elements on which Swiss 
identity is based. The end of the Cold War limited the need for a neutral 
Switzerland, both its good offices in international politics in general and the 
use of Switzerland as a venue for meetings between the superpowers. This 
occurred at a time of relative economic decline of Switzerland, which for 
much of the post-war period had been regarded as an island of stability 
and good economic governance. But as the economic governance and 
development in the rest of Western Europe improved, to some extent in 
response to further European integration, the relative attractiveness of 
Switzerland gradually eroded. Finally, with Bilaterals I and II, Switzerland 
has entered into an extensive set of contractual arrangements with the EU, 
as have virtually all countries in and around Europe. Indeed, with the 
exception of its EFTA partners in the EEA, Switzerland provides the most 
ambitious example of integration without EU membership today.  
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SOURCES AND REFERENCES 
Principal sources 
Official websites 
The websites of the EU (europa.eu.int) and the Swiss Integration Bureau 
(www.europa.admin.ch.) include the texts of the agreements, other official 
documents and explanatory texts. Further information can be found on 
various websites of the Swiss government and the federal ministries and 
the cantons (www.admin.ch; www.kdk.ch; www.bfm.admin.ch; 
www.bj.admin.ch; www.ejpd.admin.ch; www.bav.admin.ch; 
www.europa.eu.int/eur-lex; www.aviation.admin.ch; and 
www.seco.admin.ch), and of the EU (europa.eu.int/comm/index_en.htm; 
ue.eu.int; and www.europarl.eu.int). The websites of other international 
organisations, notably of EFTA (www.efta.int), the WTO (www.wto.org) 
and the OECD (www.oecd.org) also provide relevant information.  
Interviews and seminar 
The authors conducted more than 20 interviews with EU and Swiss officials 
and experts between July and October 2005. A seminar with experts and 
EU and Swiss officials to discuss the preliminary conclusions of this study 
was organised at CEPS on 26 October 2005. 
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STATISTICAL ANNEX 
 
Basic figures (2004) 
 European  Union  Switzerland 
Population  457 million  7.3 million 
GDP  €12,691 billion  €288 billion 
GDP/capita €27,770  €39,637 
Source: Switzerland: European Commission, DG Trade. EU: Eurostat, World Bank. 
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Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, September 2005. Own calculations for EU 25 average. 
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The EU’s 10 major trading partners (2004) 
Partners  Trade volume (€ billion)  % 
World 1,993  100.0 
    
1 US  391  19.7 
2 China  175  8.8 
3 Switzerland  136  6.8 
4 Russia  126  6.3 
5 Japan  116  5.9 
6 Norway  86  4.4 
7 Turkey  68  3.5 
8 Korea  48  2.4 
9 Canada  38  1.9 
10 Taiwan  36  1.8 
Source: European Commission, DG Trade. 
 
 
Switzerland’s 10 major trade partners (2004) 
Partners  Trade volume (€ billion)  % 
World 199  100.0 
    
1 EU  138  69.5 
2 US  16  8.4 
3 Japan  5.4  2.7 
4 China  3.8  1.9 
5 Hong  Kong  3.6  1.8 
6 Russia  3.5  1.8 
7 Turkey  2.8  1.4 
8 Israel  2.6  1.3 
9 Singapore  2.2  1.1 
10 Canada  1.4  0.7 
Source: European Commission, DG Trade. 
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Switzerland’s trade in goods 
    2000 2002 2004 
Volume (€ billion )  62.3  61.4  61.5 
Share of total (%)  62.0  62.3  60.7 
 
Exports to the EU 
Share of total EU imports (%)  6.2  6.5  5.9 
Volume  (€  billion)  72.4 72.6 75.0 
Share of total (%)  76.6  80.3  77.3 
 
Imports from the EU 
Share of total EU exports (%)  8.4  8.0  7.7 
Source: European Commission, DG Trade. 
 
 
 
Switzerland’s trade in services 
  2001 2002 2003 
Exports of services to the EU (€  billion)  31.7 32.8 31.3 
Imports of services from the EU  (€  billion)  39.5 38.6 41.4 
Source: European Commission, DG Trade. 
 
 
 
Switzerland’s foreign direct investment 
  2001 2002 2003 
Swiss FDI outflows to the EU (€ billion)  7.4  7.6  18.6 
EU FDI inflows to Switzerland (€ billion)  7.6  27.5  10.7 
Source: European Commission, DG Trade. 
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
APM  Agreement on Procurement Markets (WTO) 
AS   Official Register of Federal Law (Amtliche Sammlung des 
Bundesrechts) 
BAZL  Federal Civil Aviation Depertment 
BBl Bundesblatt 
CHF Swiss  franc 
COREPER  Committee of Permanent Representatives 
CRAFT  Cooperative Research Action for Technology 
DG  Directorate General (of the European Commission) 
EASA  European Air Safety Agency 
EC European  Community 
ECJ  European Court of Justice 
Ecosoc  Economic and Social Committee (of the EU) 
ECSC  European Coal and Steel Community 
EEA  European Economic Agreement/Area 
EEA  European Environmental Agency 
EEC  European Economic Community 
EFTA  European Free Trade Association 
EIONET  European Environment Information and Observation 
Network 
ENP  European Neighbourhood Policy 
ESA  EFTA Surveillance Authority 
ESDP  European Security and Defence Policy 
Europol  European Police Office 122 | VAHL & GROLIMUND 
 
Eurostat  Statistical Office of the European Community 
FP6/ FP7  EU Framework Programmes for Research and Development  
GATT  General Agreement on Tariffs and Preferences 
GSP  General System of Preferences 
HGV  Heavy Goods Vehicle 
IB Integration  Bureau/Integration  Office 
JPC  Joint Parliamentary Committee (of the EEA agreement) 
KdK  Conference of the Cantonal Governments (Konferenz der 
Kantonsregierugnen) 
LFG  Swiss Statute of Air Transport  
NEAT  New Transalpine Railways 
OEEC  Organisation for European Economic Cooperation 
OECD  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
PCA  Parliamentary Control of the Administration 
PublG  Federal Publication Statute (Publikationsgesetz) 
PublV  Federal Publication Ordinance, (Publikationsverordnung) 
RTD  Research and Technical Development 
R&D  Research and Development 
RVOG  Federal Statute on the Organisation of the Government and 
Administration (Regierungs- und 
Verwaltungsorganistationsgesetz) 
SECO  State Secretariat of Economic Affairs (Staatssekretariat für 
Wirtschaft) 
SIS  Schengen Information System 
SR  Systematic Register of Federal Law (Systematische Sammlung 
des Bundesrechts) 
UN United  Nations 
WTO  World Trade Organisation 